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Abstract 
Bank Efficiency and Bank Competition: 
Empirical Evidence from Ghana’s Banking Industry 
by 
Kofi Adjei-Frimpong 
 
The Ghanaian banking industry has undergone considerably transformation since 1988 as a 
result of the gradual but steady implementation of financial service reforms. The main 
purpose of implementing the financial reforms is to build competitive and stable banking 
industry to enhance banks’ efficiency and ultimately stimulate economic growth and 
development. 
 
Using annual data spanning from 2001 to 2010, this study investigates the level of bank 
efficiency and the degree of bank competition and their determinants in Ghana. In 
addititon, the study also examines the causal relationship between bank efficiency and 
competition.  
 
The results suggest that Ghana’s banks are, on average, inefficient and competitively 
weak, but the level of efﬁciency has increased significantly from 2001 to 2010. This study 
also reveals that well-capitalized banks in Ghana are pure technically efficient and 
competitve but are cost inefficient. In addition, bank size influences bank pure technical 
efficiency suggesting that larger banks are pure technically efficient but have no influence 
on cost efficiency and competition. There is no indication that fee income has an impact on 
bank competition. The findings also exhibit that loan loss provision ratio has no effect on 
bank efficiency and competition in Ghana. Furthermore, this study finds GDP growth 
negatively influences bank cost efficiency while the rate of inflation positively affect bank 
pure technical efficiency, but has no impact on bank cost efficiency and bank competition. 
The results also reveal that lagged cost efficiency tends to persist from year to year. 
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Similarly, market power persistence exists in banking industry of Ghana. The findings also 
reveal that bank capitalization has a negative impact on bank market power. 
  
There is evidence that cost efficiency positively Granger-causes market power and hence 
causality negatively runs from cost efficiency to competition indicating that bank cost 
efficiency precedes competition. However, the reverse causality running from competition 
to cost efﬁciency is not supported. The findings also indicate that there is no causal 
relationship between bank pure technical efficiency and competition in Ghana. 
 
Keywords: Efficiency, Competition, Causality, Data Envelopment Analysis, Lerner Index. 
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The banking industry in Ghana has changed considerably since 1988 as a result of the 
gradual and steady implementation of financial services deregulation, globalisation and the 
emergence of communication and information technologies. The financial deregulation 
was undertaken as part of the structural economic adjustment and stabilisation programme 
launched in 1983 with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
These financial sector reforms are aimed at increasing banks competitiveness, efficiency 
and performance in the Ghanaian banking system that could contribute in greater measure 
to stimulate economic growth and ensure financial stability. The changes are still an 
ongoing process. 
 
Bank competition and efficiency are vital for economic development. Competition should 
compel banks to reduce their costs and therefore increase their cost efficiency, leading to 
more efficient allocation of financial resources and consequently increasing investment to 
stimulate economic growth. Thus, competitive environment stimulates banks to become 
more efficient by reducing overhead costs, enhancing overall bank management, 
improving risk management, and providing new banking products and services (Denizer et 
al., 2000). In addition, bank competition reduces bank market power and therefore should 
reduce prices of financial services effecting welfare gains for their customers.  
 
However, Keeley (1990) emphasises that too much competition among banks could foster 
insolvency of some banks and instability of the entire banking system. Thus, excessive 
competition emerging from financial reforms may encourage banks to pursue riskier 
policies in taking on more credit risk in their loan portfolio (which could eventually 
generate bank failure) so as to maintain their former profit level. For instance, increased 
competition contributed to weaker lending standards in the recent subprime lending market 
in US that caused systemic financial problems across the world. Boyd & Nicolo (2005), on 
the other hand, argue that reducing loan rates as a result of bank competition assists 
borrowers to repay loans contributing to lower default risk.  
  2 
Furthermore, increased competition will improve efficiency by creating incentives to 
managers to reduce costs in order to remain profitable (Casu & Girardone, 2006). In 
contrast, recent research by Claessen & Leaven (2004) has remarked that the perceived 
view of competition as undoubtedly good is more naïve in banking than in other industries. 
Casu & Girardone (2009) have recently commented that the relationship between 
competition and bank performance might be more complex.  Similarly, Fecher & Pestieau 
(1993) notice in their study of OECD financial services that competition fostered 
efficiency, but indicate that it is not clear in the process of deregulating the economy that 
increasing competitiveness always enhances efficiency. Financial sector reforms might not 
always improve efficiency and this may depend on the conditions before financial reforms 
and other incentives may intervene (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). Indeed, in some 
countries, financial sector reform has increased branch network, fostered asset growth, 
increase bankruptcies, and reduced efficiency (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). 
 
Findings of various studies have revealed inconsistencies regarding the relationship 
between financial reforms and efficiency. For instance, studies on bank efficiency by 
Ataullah et al. (2004) on India and Pakistan banks, Casu & Molyneax (2003) on Italy and 
Spain banks, Gilbert & Wilson (1998) on Korean banks and Hermes & Nhung (2010) on 
four Latin America and six Asian banks and  Kumbhakar & Lozano-Vivas (2004) on 
Spanish savings banks, Leightner and Lovell (1998) on Thai banks and Mukherjee et al. 
(2001) on US banks have documented some positive impact of financial sector reforms on 
bank efficiency. On the other hand, studies by Grabowski et al. (1994) and Wheelock & 
Wilson (1999) on U.S banks, Sturm & Williams (2004) on Australian banks, Ariff & Can 
(2008) on Chinese bank, Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Sathye (2003) on Indian banks, 
Casu & Molyneax (2003) on French and German banks and Fries & Taci (2005) on 15 
East European countries banks have reported inefficiencies in the banking sector.  
 
In the context of Ghana’s banking sector, Acquah (2006) points out that Bank of Ghana 
distinctively advocates that the entry of new banks be selective, well-managed, and paced 
over time. In addition, clear exit rules and prudential supervision are strongly enforced to 
ensure systemic stability and also to avoid decline in banks’ franchise value. While the 
entry of new banks would increase competition, excessive numbers within the system 
could reduce the franchise value of banks and increase instability. 
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During the pre-reform era, Ghana’s banking system was dominated by the state-owned 
banks and totally controlled by the government. The state-owned banks had a monopoly 
over the banking sector in regard to their operations and were directed to allocate essential 
component of their total loan portfolio to selected sectors in the economy. Hence, the 
government essentially became the biggest borrower.  As highlighted in Huang et al.’s 
(2011) study on China’s banks, the lending decisions of Ghana’s banks were basically 
directed by the government and were not based on the borrowers’ credibility and viability 
of the project. In such an economic environment, banks may be less inclined to improve 
their performance by reducing operating costs, increasing the mobilisation of deposits and 
enhancing the efficient allocation of loans. All the seven state-owned banks in Ghana were 
insolvent before the financial reforms. The banks in the entire banking system that were 
unaffected by the financial insolvency as a result of non-performing loans and bad 
investments are Barclays and Standard Chartered banks. 
 
In 1987, Ghana’s economic performance declined and its banking system was in distress. 
Banks were characterised by inefficiency, inadequate capital, insufficient loans loss 
provisions, high operating costs due to inefficient operations, a large portfolio of 
nonperforming loans and endured enormous political influence (International Monetary 
Fund, 1999; World Bank, 1989). The financial system was distorted by interest rate 
controls and selective credit policies, lack of competition, and weak supervision by the 
Bank of Ghana (World Bank, 1989).  
 
The government decided to undertake economic and financial reforms. As a result of the 
financial reforms, most restrictions on foreign banks entry, interest rates and exchange 
rates were removed and direct government intervention diminished to entice foreign banks 
to enter the banking and financial markets. The results have increased the capacity of 
financial institutions to mobilise domestic savings, enhanced competition and efficiency 
among banks, and strengthened economic growth.  
 
The Ghanaian banking sector has shown considerable improvements in communication 
and computing information technology, as banks have modernised their distribution 
networks and introduced new banking services such as Automated Teller Machines 
(ATMs), telephone banking, mobile banking and internet banking which are prevalent in 
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all cities. The central bank has set up payments system infrastructure and appropriate 
measures that facilitate a competitive and efficient banking sector.  
 
Since 2000, the financial sector has been built on a strong regulatory and supervisory 
framework, and modern payments and settlement infrastructure. This encouraged the 
development of the Ghanaian banking sector that is reasonably efficient, financially 
innovative, competitive, profitable, and growing quite quickly (Acquah, 2009). The sector 
has seen some structural changes with reduced concentration and strong competition for 
market shares, increase in branch network and provision of various new banking products 
in Ghana. For example, the number of banks actively operating in Ghana has grown from 
10 in 1987 to 27 in 2010. Most of the new entrants were foreign banks. During the same 
period, the number of foreign banks in Ghana increased from 3 to 15. As of 2010, with 
twenty-seven banks in operation in Ghana, the number of foreign-owned banks is more 
than domestic banks. The number of bank branches also increased from 309 in 2002 to 776 
in 2010. The bank concentration based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) has 
dropped considerably from 1,413.7 points in 2000 to 600.0 points in 2010 (Bank of Ghana, 
February 2010, February 2011) representing a decrease in market concentration of 30.2 
percent, as a result of the increase of the number of banks. Furthermore, the five-bank 
concentration ratio in terms of total assets also decreased from 78.2 percent in 2001 to 46 
percent in 2010 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006, International Monetary Fund, 2011). 
These developments reflect the intense competitive environment in Ghana’s banking 
sector. Bank of Ghana (February 2009) also reported that the banking sector has produced 
strong asset growth and enhanced profitability over the years. The growth in total assets 
was driven mostly by the relatively new banks in the system. 
 
1.2  Importance of the Study 
Banking efficiency and competition are major issues for financial stability and economic 
development, because banks play essential roles in the provision of credit, payment 
system, and the transmission of monetary policy. The degree of competition in the 
ﬁnancial sector is important for the efﬁciency of the production of ﬁnancial services, the 
quality of ﬁnancial products, and innovation in the sector (Claessens, 2009). Competition 
in banking is very important since bank failure or anti-competitive bank behaviour could 
have wider implications for bank efficiency, growth and welfare throughout the economy 
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(Wilson et al., 2010). In addition, bank competition has important implications for 
competition policy, financial stability, and for the effective regulation and supervision of 
the banking industry. Improvements in efficiency may reduce the cost of intermediation, 
which directly affects the intermediation margin in the market. Thus, improvements in 
efficiency in the banking industry are a vital requirement for providing a more efficient 
system of asset allocation in the financial system. Thus, when banks efficiently mobilise 
and allocate funds, this lowers the cost of capital to firms and accelerates capital 
accumulation and productivity growth (McKinnon, 1973).  
 
The financial reform in Ghana is an ongoing process, therefore a detailed study of 
efficiency and competition could be of a great assistance in the formulation and evaluation 
of policy to enhance the performance of the banking sector. Thus, empirical analysis of 
efficiency and competition is very important requirement for further policy changes 
relating to competition and efficiency in the financial market. This study may help bank 
regulator, policymakers and bankers to understand how regulatory changes may affect 
banks’ efficiency, competition, financial stability and bank performance.  It would also 
assist bank managers to identify the sources of efficiency or inefficiency within their 
banks. This study would help various interest groups such as investors and depositors to 
understand the competitiveness of Ghana’s banking system.  
 
The recent developments of the mortgage crises involving major banks in the US such as 
Citibank, IndyMac Bank and Bear Stearns which have affected many banking systems 
across the world make the detail examination of the efficiency of Ghana’s banks more 
important. Many policymakers and bank regulators across the world have been asking 
questions relating to the competitiveness, efficiency and stability of their various banking 
systems. Moreover, the findings of this research could offer some lessons learnt and policy 
recommendations to other developing countries, particularly other African countries that 
have embarked on similar financial sector reforms. 
 
In addition, previous studies on bank efficiency and competition have mostly used static 
panel data models to evaluate the determinants of efficiency and competition. However, 
many financial processes exhibit dynamic adjustment over time so failing to consider the 
dynamic aspect of the data process can lead to serious model misspecification and 
estimation biases. As De Jonghe & Vennet (2008) highlighted that most banking studies 
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failed to consider the time it takes for the impacts of competition and eﬃciency to 
materialize. Only Ataullah & Le (2006), Fiordelisi et al. (2011), Goddard et al. (2012) and 
Staub et al. (2010) have applied the dynamic model in their assessment of bank efficiency 
and competition. 
 
Furthermore, there is no study on the relation between competition and efficiency on 
Ghana’s banking industry and neither has a dynamic method been employed to assess the 
determinants of bank competition and efficiency. Hence, this research attempts to fill the 
gap in the literature by providing empirical evidence to the existing literature on efficiency 
and competition in Ghana’s banking industry. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
1. How efficient are Ghana’s banks and what role have bank-specific and 
macroeconomic factors played in the variation of efficiency across Ghana’s banks? 
2. How competitive are Ghana’s banks and what are the determinants of competition 
(or market power) within the industry? 
3. Does bank competition (or market power) influence bank efficiency and vice 
versa? 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
This research empirically investigates the impact of financial sector reforms on efficiency 
and competition of the banking sector in Ghana over the period 2001 to 2010 using panel 
data. 
 
More specifically, the objectives of this study are:  
1. To determine whether deregulation has improved bank efficiency and competition 
of Ghana’s banking sector. 
2. To examine the determinants of bank efficiency and bank competition in Ghana 
3. To investigate the causal relationship between bank competition and bank 
efficiency in Ghana. 
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4. To identify the policy implications of the financial sector reforms in term of 
competition and efficiency in Ghana’s banking industry.  
 
1.5 Organisation of the Study 
The rest of this study is structured into six chapters: Chapter 2 discusses the evolution of 
the Ghanaian Banking sector. Chapter 3 describes the data used throughout the study and 
discusses the fixed effect model and a two-step system generalised method of moment 
(system GMM) estimators that are used to explore the determinants of bank efficiency and 
competition as well as the causality between bank efficiency and bank competition. 
Chapter 4 provides the analysis of the level and determinant of bank efficiency. Chapter 5 
presents the degree and determinant of bank competition. Chapter 6 presents the causal 
relationship between bank efficiency and bank competition. Chapter 7 provides the 
conclusion and policy implications of the study. 
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    Chapter 2 
The Banking Industry in Ghana 
2.1 Introduction 
The banking industry in Ghana has witnessed significant reforms in the financial sector 
initiated in 1988. The implementation of these reforms has been gradual and steady aimed 
at enhancing bank competition, bank efficiency and bank stability.  It is expected that these 
reforms would foster economic growth and development of the country. The emphasis is 
on banks because they dominate Ghana’s financial system.  
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2.2 presents the historical development of 
the banking sector in Ghana relating to the pre-deregulation era. Section 2.3 discusses the 
structure of banking industry in Ghana. Section 2.4 presents the pre-reforms banking 
policies and their impact on Ghana’s financial service industry, and Section 2.5 examines 
the banking reforms that have taken place since 1988. Section 2.6 reviews the performance 
of the Ghana’s banking sector. Section 2.7 provides summary of the chapter. 
 
2.2 Historical Background of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
The Standard bank, Barclays bank and Bank of Gold Coast
1
 were operating in Ghana 
under the colonial rule to provide commercial banking services. Their main business was 
to offer trade finance and mainly served the expatriate community. In 1953, the first 
indigenous bank, Ghana Commercial Bank, was opened to offer credit services to the 
indigenous Ghanaians as well. After independence in 1957, the Bank of Ghana was set-up 
to replace the West African Currency Board established in 1912 by the colonial British rule 
to oversee the banks in Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. It became the central 
bank of Ghana. It replicated the functions of the West African Currency Board. Between 
the period 1957 and 1988, three state-owned development banks were set-up, namely 
National Investment Bank, Agricultural Development and Bank for Housing and 
Construction to offer long-term credit facilities; Merchant Bank for merchant banking 
services; Cooperative Bank to consolidate cooperative banking and the Social Security 
                                                 
1 Bank of Gold Coast became Ghana Commercial Bank. 
  9 
Bank to offer banking services to workers (World Bank, 1994). The ultimate aim of 
establishing Cooperative Bank and Social Security Bank was to help encourage savings. In 
addition, the government of Ghana acquired a large minority shares in both Standard Bank 
and Barclay Bank. The entry into Ghana’s banking market was restricted. Standard Bank, 
Barclay Bank and Bank for Credit and Commerce
2
  were the only foreign banks operating 
in Ghana before the financial reforms. Seven state banks were operating in Ghana in 
addition to the three foreign banks. The state-owned banks dominated the banking industry 
and financial sector as well. The most interesting event in the history of Ghana’s banking 
was the frozen of bank deposits accounts of 50 thousand cedis (currency of Ghana) or 
more by the government in 1981 (World Bank, 1988). Thus, depositors with 50 thousand 
cedis or more in the bank were asked to explain where they obtained their money from. 
The government also demonetised 50 cedi note in 1982 (the highest denomination of 
Ghana’s currency in 1982). These actions by the government undermined the confidence 
of the public in the Ghanaian banking system (World Bank, 1988).  Table 2.1 shows the 
establishment of Ghana’s banks between the period 1896 and 1988. 
 
Table 2.1 Pre-Reforms Banks in Ghana Between 1896 and 1988 
Bank Year established Ownership 
Standard Bank 1896 Private: foreign 
Barclay Bank 1917 Private: foreign 
Ghana Commercial Bank 1953 State 
National Investment Bank 1963 State 
Agricultural Development 1965 State 
Bank for Housing and Construction 1972 State 
Merchant Bank 1972 State 
Ghana Cooperative Bank 1975 State 
Social Security Bank 1977 State 
Bank for Credit and Commerce  1978 Private: foreign 
Source: Bank of Ghana Annual Reports and International Monetary Fund Country Reports 
 
2.3 The Structure of Banking Sector in Ghana 
The Bank of Ghana, the central bank, was established in 1957 to oversee all the banks in 
Ghana. It supervises and regulates all the banks operating in Ghana. At the time of 
                                                 
2 The operations of Bank for Credit and Commerce International in Ghana were closed in May 2000 
following the collapsed of the Bank for Credit and Commerce International world-wide. 
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independence, the banking industry consisted of three banks: Barclays Bank, Standard 
Bank and Bank of Gold Coast.  
 
In addition to the seven banks, the government also acquired significant minority holdings 
in private banks namely, Barclays Bank, Standard Bank and Bank for Credit and 
Commerce (Ghana). In terms of operations, all the banks regardless development or 
commercial offered almost the same banking services and operated under the same 
regulatory and supervisory requirements. The structure of Ghana’s banking system has 
changed considerably. Table 2.2 exhibits the structure of the banking industry in Ghana for 
the period 2001 to 2010. 
 
Table 2.2 Structure of the Banking Industry in Ghana 
Banks 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Universal Banks 0 0 3 6 8 16 23 25 26 27 
Commercial Banks 9 9 9 8 7 4 0 0 0 0 
Development Banks 3 3 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 
Merchant Banks 5 5 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
No. of major banks 17 17 18 19 20 23 23 25 26 27 
Bank Branches NA 309 295 360 392 450 595 640 706 776 
Ownership:           
Domestic 9 9 10 11 11 13 13 13 13 12 
Foreign 8 8 8 8 9 10 10 12 13 15 
Rural Banks 115 115 NA3 120 121 122 126 129 134 135 
Source: Bank of Ghana Annual Reports and International Monetary Fund Country Reports. 
 
Banks in Ghana still dominate the financial system. In 2010, there were 27 major banks 
operating in Ghana (Appendix E). This number consists of 12 domestic and 15 foreign 
banks and all are universal banks (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011; Bank of Ghana, 2010).  
 
The most significant changes in the structure of Ghana’s banking sector are the increase in 
the foreign banks operating in Ghana, the adoption of the universal banking and to some 
extent the introduction of rural banks (unit banks) which has only 2.7 percent of the total 
assets of Ghana’s financial system in 2010. The major banks (excluding the rural banks), 
on the other hand, have 75.1 percent of the total assets of Ghana’s financial system in 2010 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011). This undoubtedly demonstrates the dominance of the 
                                                 
3 NA means not available 
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banks in Ghana’s financial system. More remarkable is that 38.3 percent of the assets of  
Ghana’s financial system are owned by the foreign banks (International Monetary Fund, 
2011). In term of Ghana’s banking system, foreign-owned banks domination account for 
51 percent of the total assets. The state banks, however, dominate the domestic part of the 
banking system (28.9 percent), one of the highest in the Sub-Saharan Africa region 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011). In addition, total bank branches have increased from 
315 in 1998 to 776 in 2010.  
 
Furthermore, concentration has declined in the banking industry mainly as a result of the 
entry of many new banks. The market share of the five largest banks fell from 65.6 percent 
in 2000 to 46 percent in 2010 reflecting the intense competitive environment under which 
the banks are operating in Ghana (Bank of Ghana, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 
2011). 
 
2.4 Policies during Ghana’s Pre-Banking Reforms Era  
During the pre-reform period, the state owned banks dominated Ghana’s banking system 
and utterly controlled by the government. The various governments of Ghana pursued a 
policy of intervention in economic activity to ensure rapid industrialisation, modernisation 
of agriculture and general welfare of the people of Ghana. As a result, the governments 
prioritised some sectors that were perceived as strategic. The state-owned banks had a 
monopoly over the banking sector in regard to their operations and were directed to 
allocate essential component of their total loan portfolio to selected sectors in the economy 
(World Bank, 1988). Policies pursued by the governments of Ghana were structured to 
deal with the weaknesses inherent in the colonial banking system. As a result of the 
policies, there was excessive concentration of risks in certain sectors, or to certain 
individuals which did not depend on the viability of the project or creditworthiness of the 
borrowers. The excessive borrowing by the government crowded the finances for the 
private sector (Bank of Ghana, 2004). 
 
The governments also placed restrictions on foreign banks entry. The interest rates and 
exchange rates were set administratively by the Bank of Ghana and not market-based. The 
results were high rates of inflation, negative real interest rates and low rate of savings. The 
negative real interest rates, for example, generated huge banks’ non-performing loan 
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portfolios. Banks had little or no motivation to mobilise extra savings or reduce operating 
costs. The banks were unduly inefficient (International Monetary Fund, 1999). 
 
2.5 Banking Reforms in Ghana since 1988 
2.5.1 Reasons for the Banking Reforms  
In 1987, the banks in Ghana were in distress, especially the state-owned banks. For 
instance, nonperforming loans reached 41 percent of the total credits (International 
Monetary Fund, 1999). The World Bank study of the Ghanaian banking sector (1988) 
concluded that the banking sector was characterised by:  
i. high operating costs due to inefficiencies,  
ii. huge non-performing loan portfolios,  
iii. insufficient provisions for loan losses,  
iv. insolvency of the banking system,  
v. capital inadequacy, and 
vi. reported inflated profits. 
 
The World Bank (1988) study indicated that the banking sector had slumped because of the 
general economic decline during the 1970s and early 1980s. The Ghanaian economy was 
in a very bad shape. The economic and financial reforms were imminent as the Ghanaian 
economic situation was in profound crisis in 1987, precisely on the verge of collapse. Their 
ability to mobilise savings and supply credit even to the important sectors was non-
existent.  
 
The financial system was distorted by interest rate controls and selective credit policies, 
lack of competition, and weak supervision by the Bank of Ghana (World Bank, 1989). 
Many of the banks were highly exposed to foreign exchange risk (World Bank, 1989). 
From 1988, Ghana implemented financial sector reforms as part of economic adjustment 
program aimed at rehabilitating its financial system. 
 
2.5.2 Main Stages of the Banking Reforms 
Table 2.3 shows the main stages of the banking reforms in Ghana. 
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Table 2.3 Ghana’s Banking Industry Reforms from 1988-2010 
Year Reforms 
1988  Private banks are authorised to operate. 
Decontrolled the minimum banks savings rate. 
Removed of sectoral credit controls except for agriculture. 
Established foreign exchange bureaus. 
1989 Enacted new banking law to strengthen the regulatory environment and 
supervisory authority of the Bank of Ghana in the following areas: minimum 
capital requirement, disclosure, and prudential lending guidelines. 
1990 Liberalisation of commercial banks interest rates and bank charges. 
Abolition of credit controls including credit allocation by sector. 
Non-performing loans of state enterprises in three financially distressed state-
owned banks are replaced by Bank of Ghana bonds. 
Abolition of lending targets for the agriculture sector.  
Non-performing loans of private sector in three financially distressed state-owned 
banks are replaced by Bank of Ghana bonds. 
Restructuring of six financially distressed banks 
1991 Non-performing loans of private sector in four sound
4
 banks are replaced by Bank 
of Ghana bonds. 
1992 New Bank of Ghana law is enacted to offer stronger supervisory and regulatory 
powers to the Bank of Ghana. 
1995 Sale of 30 percent of government shares in Social Security Bank after merging 
with National Savings and Credit Bank: only 21 percent was subscribed. 
Placement of 60 percent of the capital of the Social Security Bank through the 
Ghana Stock Exchange. 
1996 Sale of 30 percent of government shares in Ghana Commercial Bank through the 
Ghana Stock Exchange; after oversubscription the public offer was raised to 42 
percent. 
1998 Government sold three quarters of the remaining 40 percent shares it held in 
Barclays Bank. 
2000 Closure of three insolvent banks: Bank for Housing and Construction, Cooperative 
Bank and Bank of Credit and Commerce and transfer of guaranteed deposits. 
2002 Bank of Ghana Act (2002) was passed to give independence to the central bank, 
Bank of Ghana, making price and financial stability as its primary function.  
Introduction of Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System also known as the 
Ghana Interbank Settlement System. 
2003 The universal banking license was introduced and as a result Bank of Ghana 
issued a directive requiring all banks to increase their minimum stated capital 
requirements to GH¢7million by the end of 2006 from GH¢20 thousand.  
Maintenance, transaction, and transfer fees charges by commercial banks were 
abolished. 
The Payment System Act (2003) gave explicit powers to the Bank of Ghana to 
oversee payments system.  
 
                                                 
4 These four banks were not distressed.  
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Table 2.3  Ghana’s Banking Industry Reforms from 1988-2010 (continued) 
 
Year Reforms 
2004  Banking Act 2004 replaced the Banking Law 1989. Bank of Ghana began to 
strengthen its risk based prudential supervision policies. In addition, the minimum 
capital adequacy ratio was increased from 6% to 10%. 
Bank of Ghana introduced a paper-based credit clearing system. 
2006 
 
 
 
Foreign Exchange Act 2006 - to liberalise inflows of foreign exchange into Ghana 
for foreign direct investment purposes. 
Abolition of secondary deposits reserves requirement (15%) by banks. 
2007 Banking Amendment Act 2007 – to allow Offshore banking; to enable 
establishment of international financial services in Ghana.  
The Credit Reporting Act (Act 726) was enacted to establish credit reference 
bureaux to offer a legal and regulatory framework for credit reporting in Ghana.  
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was introduced and all 
banks were to report their financial position and performance in accordance with 
IFRS5. 
Implementation of risk-based supervision of banks. 
2008 The Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2007 (Act 749) enacted to provide structure for 
criminalising money laundering.  
The Borrowers and Lenders Act (2008) was enacted to provide a framework for 
full disclosure in creditor and borrower relations and in particular the role of 
collateral in the delivery of credit. 
Operation of a common electronic platform, the National Switch (e-zwich) and a 
biometric smartcard. 
2009 The Cheque Codeline Clearing (CCC) was introduced which reduced the cheque 
clearing period from 5–8 days to 2 days throughout the country.  
Minimum capital requirement was increased from 7 million cedis to 60 million 
cedis in order to strengthen the capital base of the banks to enable them assume 
greater levels of risk. 
Mobile payment services were authorised and launched. 
2010 Commencement of electronic direct credit transfer system a component of the 
Automated Clearing House project. 
Sources: Bank of Ghana Annual Reports, Kapur, Hadjimichael, Hilbers, Schiff and Szymczac (1991), Ghana 
Banking Survey and International Monetary Fund Country Reports. 
 
The discussion of the banking reforms has been categorised into regulatory and 
supervisory reforms and payments and settlements system reforms. 
 
                                                 
5. Insurance companies, securities brokers, pension funds and investment banks, and public institutions 
report in accordance with IFRS. 
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2.5.3 Regulatory and Supervisory Reforms  
The regulatory and supervisory framework was strengthened with the passage of the 
following regulatory polices: 
 
In 1989, a new banking law was passed providing regulatory structure for the banking 
system: minimum capital requirements, capital adequacy ratios, prudential lending ratios, 
exposure limits, accounting and auditing regulations (World Bank, 1989; International 
Monetary Fund, 1999). For instance, commercial banks with at least 60 percent of 
Ghanaian ownership were required to obtain a minimum paid-up capital of 20 thousand 
cedis, while minimum paid-up capital for foreign banks was 50 thousand cedis. In addition, 
development banks were asked to obtain a minimum paid-up capital of 100 thousand cedis. 
The Banking Act also prescribed a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 6 percent which is 
lower than the Basle prescription. These were implemented because financial liberalisation 
places strong demand on prudential regulation and supervision. Therefore, insufficient 
regulatory and supervisory framework would hamper effective financial liberalisation.  
 
In the previous year, new private banks including foreign banks were granted permission to 
enter into the Ghanaian banking sector besides the three foreign banks: Barclays Bank, 
Standard Bank and Bank of Credit and Commerce. During 1990, bank interest rates and 
charges were liberalised and credit controls abolished (International Monetary Fund, 
2003). In addition, the requirement that banks lend to agriculture sector was also removed.  
However, the banking sector reforms were implemented at a cost. For instance, during the 
years 1990 and 1991, most nonperforming loans of banks were swapped for government-
guaranteed interest-bearing bonds totalling 4.75 million cedis and set to mature in two to 
five years and earning 7 percent to 9 percent in interest (World Bank, 1994).  In total, 6.2 
million cedis nonperforming loans were removed from banks’ portfolios at an estimated 
cost of 6 percent of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 1999). The difference was offset 
against liabilities to the government or Bank of Ghana. These policies were pursued in 
order to assist the banks to revive the Ghanaian economy. This was necessary because 
banks play important roles in the provision of credit, payment system and the transmission 
of monetary policy and as result are vital to Ghana’s financial stability and economic 
development. In addition to reviving the banking system, these policies were also pursued, 
in part, to preserve confidence and avoid a flight from deposit. Ghana had no policy of 
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deposit insurance, but distressed banks could hinder the access to credit for credible 
borrowers and sound investment project (World Bank, 1989). 
 
A new Bank of Ghana law was passed in 1992 to offer stronger supervisory and regulatory 
powers to the Bank of Ghana, while in 1995, 21 percent of government shares in Social 
Security Bank and National Savings and Credit Bank were sold after merging through a 
public offer (International Monetary Fund, 1999). In 1996, 42 percent shares of Ghana 
Commercial Bank were sold. Initially, the government intended to issue 30 percent shares 
but the initial offer was oversubscribed so the government increased it to 42 percent 
(International Monetary Fund, 1999). The oversubscription could be due to the fact that 
Ghana Commercial Bank is the largest commercial bank in Ghana. Similarly, the 
government sold 75 percent of its 40 percent shares in Barclays Bank in 1998 
(International Monetary Fund, 1999). These sales were issued in order to promote 
efficiency and competition in the banking system. 
 
Two state-owned banks: Bank for Housing and Construction and Cooperative Bank were 
liquidated in 2000 without disrupting banking activities in Ghana. The cost relating to the 
closure was about 6 million cedis and the government issued treasury bills to cover the 
liabilities to depositors and guaranteed deposits were transferred to solvent banks. In the 
same year, a private bank, Bank of Credit and Commerce was also closed. This occurred 
when the parent bank, Bank of Credit and Commerce was liquidated. As a result of these 
liquidations, paid-up capital of the banking industry declined by 0.246 million cedis (Bank 
of Ghana, 2000). 
 
In 2002, a banking law was passed to give independence to the central bank (Bank of 
Ghana) in formulating monetary and financial policies and supervising the financial system 
and making it more transparent and accountable. The law also empowered Bank of Ghana 
to strengthen supervision and modernise regulatory practices. These were aimed at 
ensuring price and financial stability and providing favourable economic environment for 
sustainable economic growth. 
 
To enhance competition in the banking industry, the Bank of Ghana introduced universal 
banking in 2003 to permit banks to enter into commercial, development, investment or 
merchant banking with no requirement for separate licences (Bank of Ghana, 2007a). 
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Banks were allowed to undertake retail banking, corporate banking, etc. Universal banking 
was intended to give banks the ability to take on higher level of intermediation needed to 
support growth in an expanding economy. Bank of Ghana issued a directive requiring all 
banks to increase their minimum stated capital requirements from GH¢20 thousand to 
GH¢7million by the end of 2006.  
 
The Foreign Exchange Act (Act 723) announced in 2006 offered a new statutory structure 
for foreign exchange payments and transactions. Bank of Ghana, instead of controlling as 
occurred during the repressive era, monitored foreign exchange transactions for balance of 
payments and other purposes in uniform with international best practice (Bank of Ghana, 
2006). The banks, in turn, would submit reports on all transactions in foreign exchange to 
the Bank of Ghana. The objective of this law was to entice inflows of foreign exchange 
into Ghana for foreign direct investment purposes. It also established that resident did not 
need Bank of Ghana approval to obtain loans (Bank of Ghana, 2006).  
 
Further, as part of the financial reforms, in 2007 Credit Reporting Act (Act 726) was 
enacted. XDS Data limited became the first credit reference bureau in Ghana to offer 
credible information on prospective borrowers (Bank of Ghana, 2008, 2009a). In addition, 
in 2011 Hudson Price Data Solutions was given licence to operate in Ghana while Dun and 
Bradstreet was given a provisional approval (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012). All banks 
were supposed to provide credit details to the bureau. This was an effort to reduce the 
information asymmetry that had characterised the lending function in Ghana. This is 
because no borrowers (individuals or firms) will willingly submit unfavourable 
information relating to themselves or their businesses. The problem of information 
asymmetry puts the financial system at greater risks. Credit reporting would ensure better 
and faster credit evaluation which could improve transparency and reduce lending risks 
(International Monetary Fund, 2007; Bank of Ghana, 2008). Having credible information 
about bank borrowers will help the banking industry to improve its credit risk 
management. In addition, this law protects and enforces creditor rights and help to 
establish confidence in the banking system (International Monetary Fund, 2007). In 
addition, Bank of Ghana has established a collateral registry to prevent a borrower from 
using the same collateral to secure more than one loan. 
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To prevent money laundering, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2007 (Act 749) was set up 
to offer the structure for criminalising money laundering. A Financial Intelligence Centre 
was then set up to identify and monitor money-laundering activities and report to the 
investigating authorities any information obtained (Bank of Ghana, 2007b). Under the 
Anti-money Laundering Act, a person commits the offence of money laundering if they 
knowingly convert, conceal, disguise, transfer, take possession of, or use property forming 
part of the proceeds of unlawful activity (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). 
 
Furthermore, the Bank of Ghana started the risk-based supervision (RBS) of banks in 
2007. The banks complied by setting up risk management departments with well trained 
personnel. The Bank obtained technical assistance from the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions of Canada in the form of advice and review of the RBS process. The 
RBS process involves critical identification, measurement, continuous monitoring, 
management of risks associated with the operations of banks such as new technologies, 
branch expansion, product innovation, size, linkages and interdependence of banks. The 
risk management systems are intended to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness 
of the supervision process (Bank of Ghana, 2007b). 
 
In line with the international regulatory standards, the Bank of Ghana requested all banks 
in Ghana to report their financial position and performance in line with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by end December 2008. Most of the banks complied 
with the Bank’s directive by December 2007 (Bank of Ghana, 2008). The change is to 
improve transparency and facilitate comparison of reported financial results with banks 
operating in Ghana and international banks. 
 
Gradual but steady, Ghana’s financial reforms process continued. In 2008, the Borrowers 
and Lenders Act (2008) came into force to ensure full disclosure of information by 
borrowers and lenders and disallow certain credit practices. It also indicated the role of 
collateral in granting credit. It set up a collateral registry for charges and collateral credited 
by borrowers.  It gave lenders the authority to take ownership of collateral security after a 
borrower was given 30-day notice of default without appealing to the court (International 
Monetary Fund, 2011). Thus, the Borrowers and Lenders Act provides the lending 
conditions and rights and obligations of lenders and borrowers (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2009). 
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In 2009, Bank of Ghana set the minimum capital requirement at 60 million cedis from 7 
million cedis. The foreign-owned banks were required to meet the new minimum 
capitalization of 60 million cedis by 2010. Domestic (local) banks were to attain a 
capitalization of at least 25 million cedis by 2010 and 60 million cedis by 2012 (Bank of 
Ghana, 2008, 2009a).  The aim is to strengthen the capital base of the banks to enable them 
assume greater levels of risk, particularly, at a time when banks are allowed to engage in 
universal banking. 
 
2.5.4 Payments and Settlements Reforms 
The Bank of Ghana in an effort to reform payment and settlement system set up the Ghana 
Interbank Payments and Settlement System (GIPSS)
6
 a subsidiary of the Bank which 
would implement and manage Ghana's payment and settlement infrastructures. The 
following infrastructures were implemented (Bank of Ghana, 2008, 2009b, 2010): 
i. Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS), 
ii. National Switch – e-zwich (the Common Platform) and Biometric Smart Card 
iii. Cheque Clearing 
iv. Cheque Codeline Clearing (CCC) 
v. Automated Clearing House (ACH) - electronic direct credits transfer system 
vi. Branchless Banking 
 
The infrastructures have created an environment for safe, efficient, secure and timely 
payments. The Bank of Ghana implemented the infrastructures to bring Ghana’s banking 
sector up to international standard and to ensure the efficiency of the payment and 
settlement system.  
 
The Bank of Ghana is determined to modernise Ghana’s payments and settlement system 
infrastructure. Consequently, the Bank implemented the RTGS for high-value payments in 
2002. The RTGS provided good environment for safe, sound, secure, and timely payments 
(Bank of Ghana, 2007b). In addition, it reduced systemic payments and settlement risks 
                                                 
6
 All banks in the banking sector are expected to be members of GIPSS either directly or access the system 
through member banks.  
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because transactions are settled almost instantaneously. To complement the RTGS, the 
Bank of Ghana also introduced a paper-based credit clearing system to ensure the 
settlement of low-value payments in 2004 (Bank of Ghana, 2007c).  
  
A common electronic platform, the National Switch (also known as e-zwich) for all 
payments transactions was set up by Bank of Ghana in 2008. This common platform links 
all banking institutions at significantly reduced costs. Further, it connects all ATMs and the 
settlement of payments transactions by customers of different banks at Points of Sale 
(POS). The National Switch enables transactions to be undertaken on online and offline. 
To include all segments of the population, Bank of Ghana also introduced a biometric 
smartcard (e-zwich smartcard). The e-zwich smartcard is mainly used for cash deposits and 
withdrawals, transfer of e-money, point of sale purchases, card to bank, loading and 
withdrawal of wages and salaries. It also has the following characteristics: low transaction 
costs, limited infrastructure needs, personal safety, security, convenience and simplicity. 
This has helped deposit-based financial intermediation. This card has more functions than 
the debit card (Bank of Ghana, 2007a). 
 
In addition to the National Switch and Smartcard, the Bank of Ghana also introduced 
Cheque Codeline Clearing (CCC) with cheque truncation system in 2009. CCC has 
reduced the clearing cycle nation-wide from 5-8 days to 2 days throughout the country 
(Bank of Ghana, 2010; International Monetary Fund, 2011).  
 
In 2009, the Bank of Ghana introduced a branchless banking that allowed mobile phones to 
be used to provide financial services. It is fast, convenient and secure method mobile 
phone users could use to transfer money. The services provided are deposits and 
withdrawals of funds, account balance enquiry, bills payments and funds transfer. The 
mobile money service providers aim to offer mobile phone users the chance to use banking 
services without having bank accounts. Therefore, it would assist both the banked and 
unbanked to transfer money. In 2010, two more telecommunication firms: Airtel and 
Globacom Ghana Limited joined Scancom Limited, Afric Express Ghana Limited and E-
transact Ghana Limited to offer mobile phone financial services (Bank of Ghana, 2009b, 
2010). 
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Furthermore, in December 2010 an electronic direct credits transfer system started 
operation. This retail payment system operates on the Automated Clearing House (ACH) 
platform and facilitates large electronic credit transfer of funds into the accounts of bank 
customers. Thus, it accelerates the clearing of funds into the accounts of bank customers. 
The system replaced the paper credit clearing system which ended operations after CCC 
system was introduced in 2009 (Bank of Ghana, 2010). 
 
The objective of the Bank of Ghana’s programme of modernising and improving the 
payments, clearing and settlement systems is to lower over-dependence on cash based 
transactions. 
 
2.6 Performance of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
The evaluation of the performance of the banking industry in Ghana focused on the 
following indicators: profitability, solvency, loan portfolio quality and liquidity. These 
indicators appear to be relatively strong. However, the level of non-performing loans in the 
banking industry continued to be a cause of concern to the banking industry. 
 
2.6.1 Profitability Indicators 
Two profitability ratios namely, return on assets and return on equity are employed to 
discuss the profitability of Ghana’s banking industry 
 
2.6.1.1 Return on Assets 
Increased competition as a result of new banks entry into the banking sector has generated 
a reduction in the banking industry’s return on assets (ROA). Figure 2.1 shows the ROA 
deteriorates for the five successive years, reflecting the effect of declining rates of interest; 
improves in 2006 and then reverses to the downward trend but improves in 2010. Thus, the 
continuous decline in the banking industry’s ROA from the periods 2001 to 2005 and 2006 
to 2009 were the result of increased in average total assets against declined in profit levels 
due to fall in net interest spreads (see Appendix I). ROA improved from 2.8% in 2009 to 
3.8% in 2010 because of increased in profits which was caused by significant fall in cost of 
funds (Bank of Ghana, 2010). 
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Figure 2.1  Return on Assets of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
 
2.6.1.2 Return on Equity 
The sharp and continuous decline in the industry’s return on equity (ROE) reflects the 
increase of shareholders’ capital over the period 2001 to 2004 and the corresponding fall in 
banks’ profits. Figure 2.2 shows a decreasing trend in ROE from 2001 to 2004. However, 
ROE increased modestly in two successive years but resumed its downward trend until 
2010 where it started to show an increasing trend. The industry’s ROE increased from 
17.5% in 2009 to 20.4% in 2010 (Bank of Ghana, 2010).  
 
Figure 2.2  Return on Equity of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
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The banking industry’s returns on equity have fallen faster over most of the period under 
study due to the build-up of shareholders’ capital (International Monetary Fund, 2007). 
The increase in ROE was the result of the capital injection in the two years by local banks 
to meet the minimum capital as well as retained earnings to meet statutory reserve 
requirements. This capital injection facilitated cheaper funds to finance banks’ operating 
assets and improved their earning capacity. This led to improvement in the industry’s net 
interest margin (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The banking industry’s net interest 
margin
7
 increased from 10.8 percent in 2009 to 12.4 percent in 2010 (Bank of Ghana, 
2010). 
 
The banking industry’s ROA and ROE improved in 2010, a reversal of the continuous 
decline. The enhancement could be attributed to considerable decline in cost of funds due 
to fall in interest on loans and advances. However, the fall in earnings performance is 
attributed to the expenditure by the banks on information and communication technology 
(ICT) re-engineering (Bank of Ghana, 2007b). Despite the long successive trend of 
decline, the banks were generally profitable.  
 
2.6.1.3 Interest Rate Spread 
Interest rate spreads indicate the difference between lending and borrowing rates. The 
Ghana’s banking system recorded a spread of 9.1 percent in 2009 compared with 11.1 
percent in 2010 suggesting an increase in spread. The lowest interest rate spread of 8.4 
percent was recorded in 2007 and highest spread of 15.4 percent in 2002 (see Appendix I). 
Figure 2.3 presents the trend of the banking industry’s interest rate spread between 2001 
and 2010. 
 
The size of the interest rate spread is an indication of a number of factors including 
inefficiencies in the banking system. These high interest rate spreads may discourage 
savings and are also indicative of high transaction costs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The reserve requirement ratio in Ghana is 9 percent.  
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Figure 2.3 Interest Rate Spread of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
 
2.6.2 Solvency Indicator  
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) measures banks’ solvency. The industry’s CAR is 
defined as the ratio of risk weighted capital to risk-weighted assets. The capital adequacy 
ratio determines the capacity of the banking system to absorb losses or risks. The aim is to 
protect depositors and other lenders and promote the stability and efficiency of the 
financial systems (Bank of Ghana, 2007b). Figure 2.4 shows the trend of the banking 
industry’s capital adequacy ratio between 2001 and 2010. 
 
Figure 2.4 Capital Adequacy Ratio of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
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Figure 2.4 shows in most cases, CAR exceeds the minimum requirement by the Bank of 
Ghana. The capital adequacy ratio shows a sharp fall in 2003. It was the only time that the 
CAR was below 10%, however, the required capital adequacy ratio was 6% 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006). Over the years, the banking industry has maintained high 
capital levels mostly reflecting the recent increase in minimum capital requirements and 
the increasing share of risk-free treasury securities. It continues to maintain its solvency 
with all banks complying with the required minimum capital adequacy ratio of 10.0 
percent. For instance, the industry average was 19.1 per cent in 2010 which is far higher 
than the prudential limit of 10 percent suggesting a solvent and well capitalized banking 
industry (Bank of Ghana, December 2010). Thus, the injection of extra capital to meet the 
new minimum requirement level in 2006 and 2009 has further strengthened the solvency of 
Ghana’s banking industry. 
 
2.6.3  Asset Quality Indicator  
Non-performing loans (NPL) ratio is used as asset quality indicator. Non-performing loans 
in Ghana include loans that are 90 days or more past due. Loan asset quality of Ghana’s 
banking industry deteriorated as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans showed 
rapid increasing trend from 2001 to 2002 (see Figure 2.5).  Following this, the banking 
industry experienced a long and significant improvement in the loan quality for a period of 
time extending from 2002 to 2007. The NPL in the total bank credit portfolio declined to  
 
Figure 2.5 Non-Performing Loans Ratio of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
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6.4 percent in 2007 from as high as 22.7 percent in 2002. The improvement was attributed 
to better loan recovery and most of the new loans are active loans (International Monetary 
Fund, 2007).  
 
However, the global financial crisis reversed the trend. The financial crisis affected the 
Ghanaian economy significantly resulting in a substantial decline in the quality of loans. 
The result following the financial crisis was a large reduction in Ghana’s GDP growth, fall 
in inflows from portfolio capital and remittances and significant depreciation in the 
exchange rate (International Monetary Fund, 2011). The government could not make 
payments to contractors and other service providers, and therefore created NPLs across the 
banking system (International Monetary Fund, 2011). The NPL ratio in 2010 was 17.6 
percent
8
 and many banks reported high NPL ratios across the banking industry in the range 
of 20-40 percent including important domestic banks and subsidiaries of reputable 
international banks (International Monetary Fund, 2011). The upsurge in default is due to 
the low asset quality in previous years which generated non-performing loans in recent 
years. The Ghanaian banking industry’s ability to withstand possible future deterioration of 
asset quality was improved by the increase in the minimum capital requirement for banks 
in 2009. Commerce and finance, manufacturing and service sectors exhibited the highest 
default rate in Ghana, 31.2 percent, 17.4 percent and 16.7 percent respectively. Apparently, 
Ghana banks have high non-performing loans in their books. Appendix G shows the 
comparison of banks’ non-performing loans in Ghana with that of U.S, U.K, Germany, 
Canada and Australia. (TheGlobaleconomy.com, 2013). 
 
Bad debt is a major problem for the banks in Ghana. However, the banks write off the 
debts when the borrowers are unable to pay. For example, GCB, the largest bank in Ghana, 
wrote off 64 million cedis of bad debts in 2010 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). In order 
to mitigate credit risk, the banking sector has intensified credit risk management process 
from origination to monitoring of credit. The introduction of the credit reference bureau 
(e.g. XDS Data Ghana limited, Hudson Price Data and Dun and Bradstreet) has enabled 
the banks to include credit checks into their management processes 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012). In addition, banks in Ghana have also instituted Credit 
                                                 
8 The data used in the study on NPL seem unusually high. They were based on Bank of Ghana Statistics. 
 
  27 
Committee Board that serves as the ultimate loan decision-makers instead of leaving it to 
the immediate credit officer. 
 
2.6.4 Liquidity Indicator 
Liquidity is defined as assets that can be converted into cash quickly without much loss in 
value.  It is measured by the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Figure 2.6 shows a sharp 
decline in liquidity between 2003 and 2005 because banks held more funds in less risky 
assets and the government reduced its domestic borrowing to reduce interest rates (Bank of 
Ghana, 2004). The aim of the government was to reduce inflationary pressures. However, 
the liquidity position of the banking industry appeared to be satisfactory. The rising trend 
in liquidity started from 2006 was due to the abolition of the secondary reserves 
requirement in August 2006 which increased banks liquidity (International Monetary Fund, 
2007). Figure 2.6 illustrates the trend of liquidity in the banking industry between 2003 and 
2010. 
 
The decline in liquidity in 2010 is attributed to the reduction in the government borrowing 
which generated a fall in interest on government securities (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2011).  
 
Figure 2.6 Liquid Assets to Total Assets of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
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especially foreign direct investment, remittances, and portfolio capital flows are the factors 
that have maintained significant liquidity in the Ghanaian banking sector over the years 
(International Monetary Fund, 2011). However, the International Monetary Fund (2011) 
warned that high liquidity in the banking system could promote greater risk taking by 
banks as a result of the recent increase in minimum capital requirements. 
 
2.6.5 Efficiency Indicators 
Cost to income ratio is defined as non-interest operating expenses divided by operating 
income. This ratio has been high throughout the study period 2001-2010. It recorded its 
lowest ratio of 40.2 percent in 2001 and the highest ratio of 67.4 percent in 2005 (see 
Appendix J). The cost to income ratio has been very high but started to decline from 2008 
to 2010 (see Figure 2.7). The cost to income is high in Ghana because of the operating 
costs and rigidities in the banks cost structure that rigidities reduce flexibility of the banks 
to respond to macroeconomic impact leading to high lending rates (International Monetary 
Fund, 2011). Overhead costs are high and  
 
Figure 2.7 Cost-Income Ratio of Ghana’s Banking Industry 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
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exceeding supply placing upward pressure on staff costs. The lack of scale economies as 
result of the small banking system and small average bank size are contributors to the high 
cost of overhead cost in Ghana (International Monetary Fund, 2011). 
 
2.7 Summary 
Ghana’s financial system is dominated by both domestic and foreign banks. Most 
remarkably, foreign banks hold 51 percent of the total assets of Ghana’s banking industry. 
Ghana banking system is small and banks sizes are small on average.  The amount of total 
assets of the Ghanaian banking sector in 2012 was 27,237.7 million cedis
9
 (Bank of Ghana, 
February 2013). The amount of total deposits in 2012 was 19,581.1 million cedis 
representing 71.9 percent (the main source of bank funding) of total liabilities whereas the 
total borrowings in 2012 amounted to 2,262.7 million (8.3 percent as percentage of total 
liabilities) (Bank of Ghana, February 2013). 
 
Between 1988 and 2010, the entry of foreign banks and more market-oriented policies 
have fostered competition and efficiency in the banking system. The repressive policies 
have either been removed or diminished.  The removal of restrictions on foreign bank 
entry, interest rates and exchange rates and decreased in direct government intervention 
have entice foreign banks to enter Ghana’s banking and financial markets.  
 
The quality of bank services to their customers has been immensely enhanced. The banks 
have provided innovative products such as electronic-banking, telephone banking, internet 
banking and ATM facilities. The Bank of Ghana has also introduced the necessary reforms 
regarding payments and settlements and supervision and prudential regulations.  
 
However, the strong competition and increased liquidity has caused bank management to 
take on higher risk ventures. Over the last three years (2008-2010), non-performing loans 
have deteriorated and continue to be a major problem in Ghana’s banking industry. 
However, Ghana’s banking industry is adequately capitalized, liquid and profitable10.  
 
                                                 
9 For 27 banks. 
10 Ghana’s banks financial data may seem usual but this is the true reflection of the banking system in Ghana. 
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    Chapter 3 
Data and Econometric Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
The chapter is divided into two sections. Section 3.2 describes the data used in this study 
and Section 3.3 discusses the estimation procedure of the fixed effect regression estimator 
for the static panel models and the two-step system generalised method of moment 
estimator for dynamic panel models used in this study. 
 
3.2 Data 
The study covers Ghanaian banks during the period 2001 to 2010. The data used in this 
study depend on the amount of information available for each bank involved. The data 
exclude banks which have data available covering less than three years of operation during 
the entire study period. There were very few mergers and acquisitions and exit during the 
period. The data are analysed for inconsistencies, reporting errors, and outliers. In addition, 
the years with zero or missing values on input and output variables are omitted. With these 
restrictions, the sample data for this study is an unbalanced panel data of 25 banks with 
211 annual observations, which accounts for more than 99% of bank assets in the time 
period under consideration. The choice of an unbalanced panel is due mostly to entry 
during the study period. The number of banks in each year varied between 14 and 25. The 
data are based on the balance sheets and income statements of the banks’ annual reports. 
The data are obtained from PricewaterhouseCoopers. All 25 banks used the same 
accounting standards namely, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The 
macroeconomic variables are obtained from International Monetary Fund's World 
Economic Outlook. The 25 banks used in this study are listed in Appendix F. These 25 
banks consist of 3 state-owned banks, 9 domestic private banks, and 13 foreign-owned 
banks. A bank is identified as foreign-owned in Ghana if the foreign ownership share of 
assets exceeds 50%.  
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3.3 Econometric Method  
Many studies have employed a censored Tobit regression method to determine factors 
affecting efficiency because the efficiency scores (dependent variable) are bounded 
between 0 and 1 making the dependent variable a limited dependent variable (e.g., Maudos 
et al., 2002; Casu & Molyneux, 2003; Weill, 2003). Some researchers have argued that 
non-censored methods provide biased and inconsistent estimates. However, recently Hoff 
(2007), Banker & Natarajan  (2008) and McDonald (2009) documented that the use of a 
two-stage procedure involving the DEA followed by ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression yields consistent estimates. Banker & Natarajan (2008) indicate that input 
variables may be correlated with each other and the efficiency factor variables may be 
correlated with each other. Therefore, the factor variables affecting efficiency must be 
independent of the stage one the DEA input variables. However, the Chang et al. (2008), 
Sufian & Habibullah (2009) and Saranga & Phani (2009) estimated their second stage 
regressions using the DEA as dependent variable (without any transformation) and applied 
OLS method, while Fiordelisi et al. (2011), Casu & Girardone (2009) and Stuab et al. 
(2010) used a  two-step system GMM with the DEA (without any transformation) as the 
dependent variable. Murthy et al. (2009), Denizer et al. (2007), Bozec & Dia (2007) and 
Lovell et al. (1994), on the other hand, used logarithm of the DEA efficiency as their 
dependent variable and estimated their regression using OLS. Simar & Wilson (2007) 
argue that the conventional methods of statistical inference are invalid in the second stage 
regression. To address these problems, the authors propose the use of a bootstrap method 
to correct for the small sample bias and serial correlation of the DEA efficiency estimates. 
Hoff (2007) and McDonlad (2009) argue that the DEA efficiency scores cannot be 
considered as censored but rather a fractional data. Accordingly, one of the methods used 
to estimate fractional dependent variable is to transform the dependent variable into a log-
odds ratio (logit transformation). Ataullah & Le (2006) and Maudos & Fernandez de 
Guevara (2007) among others have also argued against the censored Tobit regression 
method. They transformed the efficiency scores using a log-odds ratio. Maudos & 
Fernandez de Guevara (2007) used logistic regression while Ataullah & Le (2006) and 
Staub et al. (2010) applied the system GMM estimator to identify the factors influencing 
bank efficiency after transforming the DEA efficiency using logit transformation. This 
study uses modified logit transformation to transform the DEA efficiency and applies the 
fixed effect estimator for static model and the system GMM estimator for dynamic model. 
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This study employs fixed effect estimator for static model and the system GMM estimator 
for dynamic model. 
 
3.3.1 Fixed Effect Estimator for Static Panel Models  
Static equation implies instantaneous impact. It is likely that the unobserved individual 
bank heterogeneity (such as management style and strategy, managerial ability and 
willingness to risk) and the explanatory variables are not correlated. In such situation, the 
fixed-effect estimator which is based on deviations of the observations can be consistent 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995). The fixed effects model unlike the random effect model, 
assumes that the unobserved effects are constant within individual banks, but changes 
across banks (assuming heterogeneity across banks) for a given point in time. Unlike Tobit 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) models, the fixed effect regression model controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity
11
. 
 
In this study, the fixed effect regression model (static model) is used to assess the 
determinants of bank efficiency and bank competition. Thus, equation can be represented 
by the following regression: 
 
           
                                                                                                      
 
where  
i represents the individual bank and t denotes time, 
yit = dependent variable,  
Xit = explanatory variables,  
 i = unobserved individual effect (such as managerial ability, strategy or historical factors), 
 it = error term,  
 
                                                 
11
 In the absence of correlation between unobserved individual bank heterogeneity and the explanatory 
variables, random effect estimator is more appropriate. Otherwise treating the individual heterogeneity as a 
random error component can provide biased and inconsistent estimates.  
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3.3.1.1 Estimation Methods for Fixed Effect Estimator  
A fixed effect regression estimator consists of subtracting the time mean from each 
variable in the model and the OLS method is applied to the transformed model in order to 
estimate β. The above model (3.1) is transformed as follows:  
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The fixed effect (FE) estimator uses the within transformation to eliminate the unobserved 
individual effect  i and consistently estimate β. 
 
3.3.2 Two-Step System GMM Estimator for Dynamic Models  
The dynamic approach is applied in this study because there is no guarantee that all the 
explanatory variables (especially bank-specific variables) are strictly exogenous, since 
banks may manage their assets and liability structures over a period of time indicating that 
the lagged explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous (Goderis et al., 2007). Thus, 
some explanatory variables may be exogenous, predetermined or endogenous. 
 
This study uses the two step system GMM estimator instead of difference GMM estimator 
for the following reasons: 
 
Blundell & Bond (1998) demonstrated that the system GMM estimator reduces the 
potential biases and inaccuracies associated with the first-difference GMM estimator 
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especially for small samples, unbalanced panel data and when the explanatory variables are 
persistent. 
 
System GMM estimator is chosen because it is asymptotically more efficient and robust to 
heteroskedasticity (and second order autocorrelation) relative to difference GMM, but its 
standard error is largely downward biased in small samples (Arellano & Bond, 1991; 
Blundell & Bond, 1998). Therefore, Windemeijer’s (2005) correction for small sample is 
applied to rectify the standard error bias. Consequently, the two-step GMM estimator 
provides more accurate estimates than the robust one-step GMM estimator, especially for 
the system GMM (Roodman, 2003).        
 
In addition, Roodman (2006, 2009) also suggests the avoidance of employing difference 
GMM estimator when using an unbalanced panel, simply because it has a weakness of 
magnifying gaps in unbalanced panels. For instance, if some yit is missing, then both Δyit 
and Δyi,t+1 are missing in the transformed data. Arellano & Bover, (1995) and Roodman 
(2006, p.20; 2009, p.104) recommend the use of forward orthogonal deviation in place of 
first-differencing. Forward orthogonal deviations approach subtracts the mean of all future 
available observations of a variable instead of subtracting the past value of observations of 
a variable. Only the last data for each individual variable is not computable and therefore it 
minimises data loss (Roodman, 2009). This approach preserves sample size in panels with 
gaps (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2009). Simulation results show that the GMM 
estimator with forward orthogonal deviation transformation works better than that 
transformed by the first difference (Hayakawa, 2009).  
 
3.3.3 Estimation Method for System GMM Estimator  
Equation (3.1) can be represented by the following dynamic regression: 
 
                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                        
                   ,              for all i = 1,2,...N and t = 1, 2,...T           (3.5) 
 
where  
i represents the individual bank and t denotes time, 
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yi,t = dependent variable for the bank i at period t,  
xi,t = set of independent variables (observed heterogeneity)  
ηi = unobserved heterogeneity, 
  i,t = an error term,  
           is the fixed effects decomposition of the error term. 
 
3.3.3.1 First Difference GMM Estimator  
The presence of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable does not allow 
the use of conventional techniques to estimate α and β in equation (3.3). Arellano & Bond 
(1991) propose first-differencing the variables in equation (3.3) to eliminate any potential 
bias that may arise from unobserved bank specific effect (unobserved heterogeneity). This 
is because unobserved heterogeneity does not vary with time. This removes the correlation 
between banks’ unobserved heterogeneity (error term) and lagged dependent variable. 
Thus, taking first difference of equation (5.9) yields the following specification: 
 
                                (           )  (           )                             
 
However, the lagged dependent variable is still potentially endogenous, because yi,t-1 term 
in yi,t-1 – yi,t-2 correlates with  i,t-1 in  it -  i,t-1. In addition, any explanatory variables in x that 
are weakly exogenous could be potentially endogenous because they too may be correlated 
with  i,t-1. Therefore, we need to employ instrumental variables to address this problem of 
endogeneity. Arellano & Bond (1991) suggest using the lagged levels of explanatory 
variables (including the lagged dependent variable) as instruments for the equations in first 
difference. This is valid under the assumption that the error term is not correlated with the 
lagged explanatory variables. This implies that the following moment conditions for each 
endogenous variable have to be satisfied for equation (3.6) to be estimated using first 
difference GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991):  
 
 [           ]                                                                                                                    
 [           ]                                                                                                   
   
 where        and        represent the instruments set used in the first difference GMM.           
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Thus, the moment conditions in equations (3.7) and (3.8) can be written compactly as 
follows:  
 
 [   
    ]                                                                                                                            
 
where  Zdi is the (T-2) x (T-1)(T-2) matrix of instruments of the individual i (in this case 
the bank) given as follows: 
 
Zdi = [
        
              
   
                               
 
 
 
                     
]               [
    
    
 
    
]        (3.10) 
 
 
Then the matrix with all the instruments in the model is represented as 
       
     
       
  . Therefore the first difference GMM estimator for ̂  = (α, β)  in 
equation (3.6) based on the moment conditions in equations (3.7) and (3.8) or (3.9) are as 
follows: 
 
  ̂     
       
               
                                                                              
 
where 
matrix X is formed by the stacked matrices              
           
               
    
including lagged explanatory variables and matrix Y is formed by stacked vector    
                 is the vector of dependent variable. 
 
However, the first-difference GMM estimator may suffer from the weaknesses of its 
instruments as the lagged levels of persistent explanatory variables are weak instruments 
for the equation in first-difference (Blundell & Bond, 1998). This implies that past levels 
provide little information about future changes (the first-differencing procedure may 
dispose much of the available information in the data). 
 
3.3.3.2 System GMM Estimator  
To address this potential bias and imprecision associated with the use of first difference 
GMM estimator, Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) developed a 
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system GMM estimator that combines both equations in levels (equation 3.3) and 
equations in differences (equation 3.6) simultaneously. This assists to retain some of the 
information in the levels equation. This system GMM estimator (considered as an 
extension of the first-difference GMM estimator) reduces the potential biases and 
inaccuracies associated with the first-difference GMM estimator especially for small 
samples and with persistent data. 
 
However, the system GMM estimator still includes unobserved heterogeneity therefore 
Blundell & Bond (1998) suggested differencing the instruments to make them exogenous 
to the fixed effects (instead of transforming the explanatory variables). This is valid 
provided the first-difference variables are not correlated with unobserved fixed effects in 
order for the first differences to be valid instruments in the levels equation (see Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Bond, 2002). In other words, this assumption is valid if any correlation 
between endogenous variables and the unobserved ﬁxed effect is constant over the time 
period of the data set (Wintoki et al., 2012). This additional assumption leads to additional 
set of moment conditions (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002) 
as follows: 
 
 [             ]                                                                                              
 [             ]                                                                                                      
 
These moment conditions allow the use of lagged first-differences of the endogenous 
variables as instruments for equations in levels as suggested by Arellano & Bover (1995). 
The level GMM estimator is obtained by using the moment conditions in equations (3.12) 
and (3.13) which can then be written compactly as: 
 
 [   
    ]                                                                                                                                     
         
Then the instruments for the equations in levels for each individual i are given by 2(T-2)(T 
- 2) matrix 
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]           (3.15) 
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The matrix of all the instruments in the model is represented as follows:    
    
     
       
  .  
 
The system GMM estimator adds set of equations in first-differences with lagged levels as 
instruments to the set of equations in levels with lagged first-differences as instruments. 
This is performed to improve the efficiency of the estimator. The system GMM estimator 
is obtained by using the moment conditions in equations (3.7), (3.8), (3.12) and (3.13) or 
(3.9) and (3.14) which can then be written compactly as: 
 
 [   
    ]                                                                                                                                    
 
Therefore the whole set of instruments used in the system GMM estimator is given by the 
2N(T-2) (2(T-2+(T-1)(T-2)) matrix 
 
   = [
    
    
]                 [
   
  
]                                                                                        
 
where Zd as defined by equation (3.9) and        
     
       
   . Hence the system 
GMM estimator based on moment conditions in equation (3.16) is 
  
 ̂      
       
    
    
       
                                                                                        
 
where Xs is a stacked matrix of explanatory variables in differences and levels and Ys is a 
stacked vector of the dependent variable in differences and levels.  
 
3.3.3.3 One-Step and Two-Step GMM estimators 
Each GMM estimator (difference GMM or system GMM) has two different choices 
namely; one-step or two-step estimator. For instance, the one-step system GMM estimator 
uses  
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where 
 
H= 
[
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The two-step GMM estimator uses  
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The one-step GMM estimator uses a weighted matrix that does not rely on the estimated 
parameters and is only efficient under homoskedasticity and uncorrelated with error terms 
(Presbitero, 2005). On the contrary, the efficient two-step GMM estimator uses the 
residuals from the one-step estimate and applies a consistent estimate of the weighted 
matrix (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2004).  
 
3.3.3.4 Some Rules of Thumb in GMM Estimation 
i. the number of period (years) must always be smaller than the number of units (in 
this study, banks) in order to control for dynamic panel bias (e.g. Bond, 2002; 
Roodman, 2006, 2007; Baltagi, 2008).  
ii. the number of instruments should not exceed the number of units (banks) 
(Roodman, 2006).  
 
3.3.3.5 Choice of Lagged Variables as Instruments  
The choice of lagged variables as instruments depends on the nature of the explanatory 
variables: 
i. For the exogenous explanatory variables, their current values are used as valid 
instruments. 
ii. For predetermined explanatory variables or lagged dependent variables (which are 
not correlated with future values of the error term), lagged values for at least one 
period can be used as valid instruments. 
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iii. For endogenous explanatory variables, only their lagged values for at least two 
periods can be used as valid instruments.  
 
3.3.3.6 Issue with Excessive Instruments  
The concern with the use of GMM with small sample is that the number of instrument 
could become large relative to the number of banks in the regression. This is to avoid the 
problem of too many instruments (overfitting endogenous variables) in the system GMM 
estimations since it weaken the specification tests and bias the results (Roodman, 2007, 
2009). Thus, when the instrument count is high, the Hansen test of validity of the 
instruments weakens (Roodman, 2009). This could mean accepting a model as valid when 
the problem of endogeneity is partially solved.  
 
To solve this issue, Roodman (2007, 2009) suggested the following techniques:  
i. use less lags as instruments than all available lags for instruments. This approach 
caps number of instruments for each period, so the instrument count is linear in T. 
ii. ‘collapse’ instruments in order to reduce the number of instruments without losing 
much information from the data. That is, combine instruments in small subsets. 
Specifically, group together columns of the instrument matrix that are for the same 
variable and lag distance and combine them to generate a smaller set of moment 
conditions. The instrument count is quadratic in T for both GMM estimators. 
Collapsing also makes the instrument count linear in T. Thus, it restricts all of the 
yearly moment conditions to be the same and, hence, reduces the instrument count. 
 
Apply these techniques while examining the behaviour of the coefficient estimates and 
Hansen and difference-in-Hansen tests. The two techniques can be applied together. The 
application of these techniques reduces the number of instruments in GMM estimations in 
order to have more reliable estimations. 
 
3.3.3.7 Testing the Validity of the Instruments and Structural Specification 
The specification of the models and the validity of the instruments are tested. Arellano & 
Bond (1991) and Blundell & Bond (1998) suggest two tests:  
i. Tests for the first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first differenced 
residuals. However, the second-order serial correlation test is the decisive test 
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because second-order serial correlation among the residuals would show any 
violation of the exclusion restrictions (given that ﬁrst differencing induces ﬁrst 
order serial correlation in the first differenced errors). The second-order serial 
correlation test assesses the null hypothesis that the errors in the first-difference 
regression have no second-order serial correlation. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis gives support to the specification of the models.  
 
ii. The dynamic panel GMM estimator uses multiple lags as instruments suggesting 
that the system is over-identified. The Hansen (1982) J-test of over-identifying 
restrictions is used to test for the validity of the instruments. The null hypothesis is 
that instruments are exogenous. The test is distributed χ2 with J-K degrees of 
freedom, where J is the number of instruments and K is the number of regressors. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. It is an indication 
that the instruments are valid. The Hansen J- test performs well in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation unlike the Sargan (1958) test, which over-
rejects in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
 
iii. The system GMM estimator makes an additional assumption that any correlation 
between endogenous variables and the unobserved (ﬁxed) effect is constant over 
time. This assumption enables us to include the levels equations in the system 
GMM estimation and use lagged differences as instruments for these levels. This 
assumption can be tested directly using a difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity 
(Bond et al., 2001). Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity is under the null 
hypothesis that the instruments used for the equations in levels are exogenous. This 
test also provides a J-statistic which is distributed χ2 under the null hypothesis that 
the additional subset of instruments used in the levels equations (system GMM) is 
exogenous. Failure to reject justifies the inclusion of the levels equations in the 
system GMM estimation. 
 
These tests must be satisfied under the system GMM estimation. The Hansen (and 
difference-in-Hansen) tests of over-identifying restrictions should not be rejected implying 
that the instruments used in the system GMM estimation are valid. According to Roodman 
(2007), the p-value should exceed the conventional 0.05 or 0.10 significance levels, at least 
0.25 to rule out specification problems. However, most researchers use the higher values 
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over the conventional level of significance (and ignore the “at least 0.25” recommended by 
Roodman). It is also expected that the p-values of the Hansen and difference-in-Hansen 
tests should not be equal to 1.00 (Roodman, 2007 pp.10). A p-value of Hansen test equal to 
one suggests model mis-specification because it is a classic sign of instrument proliferation 
weakening its ability to detect the problem (Roodman, 2007). Further, the p-values of the 
Hansen test closer to 1.00 are considered as worrisome. However, there is no stipulated 
range that is considered closer to 1.00. Nonetheless, any p-value of Hansen tests over 0.90 
is viewed with concern. Moreover, it is imperative that the second order autocorrelation 
test under the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation is not rejected (by 
construction the model will exhibit ﬁrst-order serial correlation). This leads to the 
conclusion that the original error term is serially uncorrelated. 
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    Chapter 4 
Bank Efficiency 
4.1 Introduction 
The chapter is divided into ten sections. Section 4.2 describes measurement of efficiency 
using DEA approach presented in Section 4.3. Literature review is provided in Section 4.4. 
Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 provide the methodology and variables measurement 
respectively. The issue of endogeneity is discussed in Section 4.7 and Section 4.8 offers 
the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. Section 4.9 presents the results and 
Section 4.10 provides the summary of the chapter.  
 
4.2 Measurement of Bank Efficiency  
The measurement of bank efficiency mostly focuses on two key approaches: parametric 
and non-parametric methods. Parametric approaches take into account random errors and 
specify a particular functional form which shapes the form of the frontier such as Cobb-
Douglas and translog. In contrast, nonparametric methods neither require specifying the 
functional form for the frontier nor consider random errors. The apparent differences 
between these two approaches are based on the shape of the efficient frontier and the 
assumptions about the distribution of the inefficiency (e.g. half-normal, truncated normal 
or exponential) and random error (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). 
 
4.2.1 Choice of Frontier Efficiency Measurement Approach 
There is no agreement on the accepted method for assessing the best-practice or efficient 
frontier against which relative efficiencies are measured (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). The 
choice of estimation approach is a subject of debate. Some researchers consider the 
parametric approach  (Berger, 1993) as the appropriate method, while others prefer the 
non-parametric approach (Seiford & Thrall, 1990).   
 
Three main parametric frontier approaches are employed to estimate efficiency:  
1. Stochastic frontier approach (SFA) by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen & van den 
Broeck (1977).         
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SFA is the most commonly used parametric approach. It defines a functional form 
for the cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs, outputs, and 
environmental factors and allows for error term (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). The 
main advantage of SFA is that it incorporates the error term in the efficiency 
estimation. SFA has a two-component error term: random errors (statistical noise) 
and inefficiency. The inefficiency is assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, 
usually the half-normal distribution while random error term is commonly assumed 
to follow a symmetric distribution, such as the standard normal distribution (Berger 
& Humphrey, 1997). However, SFA models require a large sample size to make 
reliable estimations. 
 
2. Distribution free approach (DFA) by Berger (1993)12.  
DFA imposes no assumptions about the distribution of the inefficiency and the 
random errors, because it considers inefficiency as constant over time while random 
error tends to average out over time. 
 
3. Thick frontier approach (TFA) by Berger & Humphrey (1991). 
TFA also requires a functional form. It measures separately the highest and lowest 
performance quartiles of the observations. It assumes that deviations in predicted 
performance values between the highest and lowest quartiles represent 
inefficiencies while the random error is the deviation within the lowest and highest 
performance quartile of observations (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). 
 
An important drawback of the parametric approaches is that they impose a functional form 
which pre-specifies the shape of the frontier. If the functional form is misspecified, the 
efficiency estimate will be biased (Delis et al., 2009). 
 
Two main non-parametric frontier approaches are:  
1. Free disposable hull (FDH) by Deprins et al. (1984).        
FDH is a form of the DEA model in which the points on the lines connecting the 
DEA vertices are excluded from the frontier.  
2. Data envelopment analysis by Charnes et al. (1978).  
                                                 
12 Based on the earlier work of Schmidt and Sickles (1984) 
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DEA, a non-parametric approach, on the other hand, does not specify any functional form 
of the underlying production relationship (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). In addition, DEA 
does not take into account random errors. It uses linear programming method to estimate 
efficiency. The main drawback of the DEA approach is that it does not take into account 
the random error in the data. Consequently, the approach assigns the following factors to 
inefficiencies:  
i. measurement errors in constructing the frontier  
ii. inaccuracies made by accounting rules (would make measured outputs and inputs 
deviate from the economic outputs and inputs)  
iii. extreme data, that is, large outliers  
DEA does not distinguish between inefficiency and random error.  Thus, any deviation 
from the frontier is imputed to inefficiencies. For instance, if there is any shock that 
reduces the performance of a bank, it will be characterised as inefficient. This may result in 
overestimation of inefficiencies. In addition, it is not possible to conduct statistical 
hypothesis tests because DEA is a nonparametric method. 
 
Nevertheless, DEA is used extensively in studies of the banking industry in developed and 
developing economies; for individual countries as well as cross-country comparisons (Aly 
et al., 1990; Chen, 1998; Sathye, 2001; Casu & Girardone, 2006; Moffat & Valadkhani, 
2011). Similarly, SFA has been applied worldwide (Allen & Rai, 1996; Ashton, 2001; 
Shanmugam & Das, 2004; Girardone et al., 2004; Sun & Chang, 2011). Of the 122 frontier 
studies in financial institution efficiency reviewed by Berger & Humphrey (1997), 69 
applications used the nonparametric techniques and 60 used parametric approaches. Of the 
69 nonparametric applications, 62 were DEA and out of the 60 parametric applications, 24 
used SFA.  
  
Sherman & Zhu (2006) remark that using DEA can help to identify:  
i. efficient units (in this study, banks) – banks using fewer inputs to produce products 
and services (best-practice units).  
ii. inefficient units - banks using more inputs than the best-practice units to produce 
products and services. 
iii. targets for improvement in the inefficient units by adopting best practices. 
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Following Aly et al. (1990), Chen (1998), Sathye, (2001), Casu & Girardone (2006), and 
Tecles & Tabak (2010) among others, a non-parametric DEA is used in our study to 
estimate bank efficiency in Ghana. This choice is based on following factors:  
i. DEA does not require knowledge of the functional form of the frontier, error and 
ineﬃciency structures  
ii. DEA can handle multiple inputs and multiple outputs 
iii. DEA is relatively less data demanding and as a result it works well with a small 
sample size. This is very important because of the small number of banks in our 
study. 
 
4.3 Data Envelopment Analysis  
The concept of DEA was first developed by Charnes et al. (1978) based on the concept of 
efficiency as proposed by Farrell (1957). The authors’ model also employed input 
orientation and assumed constant return to scale. They extended Farrell’s (1957) single 
input and single output efficiency measure to multiple inputs and multiple outputs. 
Subsequently, Banker et al. (1984) proposed variable return to scale model. These are the 
two main DEA models which have been widely used in the banking literature.  
 
DEA is a linear programming based technique for measuring the relative efficiency of a 
fairly homogeneous set of decision making units (DMUs), which are banks in our study.  
DEA uses multiple inputs and outputs to determine efficiency scores that can be used to 
evaluate decision making units. DEA forms surface frontier over the data points to 
determine the efficiency of each firm relative to the frontier. DEA constructs the frontier as 
a discrete piecewise linear combination of the most efficient units. This provides a convex 
production possibilities set that envelops all observations. Thus, DEA sets up an efficient 
frontier based on observed best performances and evaluates the efficiency of each DMU 
relative to the frontier. This implies that the best-practice or efficient unit defines the 
efficient reference DMU. The efficiency of the other DMUs under study is computed 
relative to this reference DMU. DMUs that lie on the frontier are efficient. Firms that are 
not on the frontier are inefficient (Das & Ghosh, 2006, 2009).  DEA quantifies the distance 
to the efficient frontier for each DMU. Thus, this method provides a measure of relative 
efficiency.  
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DEA can be employed to estimate technical (pure technical and scale), cost, revenue, and 
profit efficiency for any units. However, this study focuses on pure technical and cost 
efficiency to estimate how efficient Ghanaian banks are in reducing input wastes or cutting 
costs in this era of financial sector reforms. Pure technical efficiency refers to the bank’s 
managerial skills in using its inputs to ensure outputs maximization. This relates to 
managerial skills such as controlling operating expenses, effective screening and 
monitoring of borrowers, marketing activities focussing on attracting depositors, efficient 
risk management techniques, etc. The following are examples of previous studies that have 
estimated banks technical efficiency: Isik & Hassan, 2002; Ataullah & Le, 2006; 
Havrylchyk, 2006; Pasiouras et al., 2007, and that of cost efficiency: Isik & Hassan, 2002; 
Williams, 2004; Ariff & Can, 2008; Ray & Das, 2010. 
 
4.3.1 Various Alternative DEA Models  
There are other DEA models occasionally used to estimate bank efficiency. Table 4.1 
shows other forms of DEA models. 
 
Table 4.1 Other Forms of DEA Models 
Model Authors Year Main Characteristics 
Additive DEA Model Charnes et al.        1985 Has the same envelopment surface as the 
VRS model. 
Projects the inefficient units onto the 
efficient frontier by reducing their inputs and 
increasing their outputs at the same time. 
Multiplicative DEA Model Charnes et al.        1982 A multiplicative combination is used to 
obtain virtual outputs and inputs instead of 
additive combination.  
Has a piecewise log-linear frontier. 
Stochastic DEA Model Sengupta 2000 Includes random error in the input-output 
data. 
Cross-Efficiency DEA 
Model 
Sexton et al. 1986 Identify good overall units. 
Effectively rank DMUs. 
Super- Efficiency DEA 
Model 
Andersen & 
Petersen 
1993 Permits ranking of efficient DMUs. 
Assurance Region DEA 
Model 
Thompson et al.  1986,  
1990 
Restricts weight values in order to limit the 
range of acceptable efficient input-output 
levels. 
Cone-ratio DEA model Charnes et al. 1990 Links the DEA with multi-criteria analysis. 
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4.3.2 Input and Output Orientations 
In order to construct DEA frontier and estimate efficiency, the production unit is expected 
to specify its objective regarding input/cost minimisation or output/revenue maximisation. 
The choice of input or output orientation is based on the objective of production units 
subject to production and management constraints. DEA permits the choice between two 
main orientations: input and output. The input orientation measures efficiency by 
minimising inputs. An input-oriented measure quantifies the input reduction without 
reduction in output. The input-oriented approach identifies the input waste (or excess 
capacity) in the production process. Similarly, by maximising outputs an output-oriented 
measure quantifies the output expansion, assuming the inputs are fixed. The orientation 
used to measure efficiency may influence the efficiency scores estimated.  
 
The majority of the banking studies in the literature using DEA models have applied input 
orientation (Delis et al., 2009). However, Coelli et al. (2005) indicate that choosing an 
appropriate orientation is important when using econometric approaches because it could 
suffer from statistical problems but linear programming approaches have no such 
problems. DEA is not subjected to statistical tests. Coelli & Perelman (1996), on the other 
hand, suggest that, in many instances, the choice of orientation has only a small impact on 
the efficiency scores estimated. Previous studies have applied the input-oriented efficiency 
measures because the input quantities are considered the primary decision variables, but 
this reason may not be valid in all industries (Casu & Molyneux, 2003).   
 
The choice of orientation, undoubtedly, has both practical and theoretical implications. 
However, the theoretical literature has not been able to choose the appropriate alternative 
orientations of measurement (Casu & Molyneux, 2003). In some previous studies, the 
choice of the orientation was straightforward; for example, in industries where cost-control 
is considered essential, input orientation has been the ultimate choice (Ferrier & 
Valdmanis, 1996, Casu & Molyneux, 2003). Many studies in the banking literature have 
based their choice of orientation on the quantities (inputs or outputs) the managers have 
most control over. Further, when a bank (firm) has a fixed quantity of resources and is 
required to produce as much output as possible, then the appropriate model is the output-
oriented model (see Coelli et al., 1998). 
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However, there are other measures such as the non-oriented models. Non-orientation is 
used to compute efficiency by changing both inputs and outputs at the same time. 
Specifically, non-oriented models use a mix of input reduction and output increase to 
estimate efficiency. In spite of this measure, input or output orientation is mostly used in 
the banking literature involving DEA model. 
 
4.3.3 Choice of Input or Output Orientation 
A review of the banking literature revealed that output-oriented estimations are 
inappropriate for assessing bank efficiency in an industry that is reforming as in the case of 
the Ghanaian banking sector. Financial reforms have brought technological advances in 
information and communication and enhanced competition. The increased competition 
would compel banks to strategically focus on cutting costs, for instance, by introducing 
more cost effective innovative products. Therefore, it is anticipated that the relative 
efficiency would depend on the banks’ capability or to be more precise the managements’ 
capability in using their resources better than their competitors. Moreover, through input-
oriented DEA, the sources of input waste (for not employing best practices) in the 
Ghanaian banking industry may be identified and some policy conclusions drawn from 
them. Furthermore, previous studies such as Elyasiani & Mehdian (1990), Drake (2001), 
Goddard et al. (2001) and Berger (2007) focused on the estimation of efficiency assuming 
that bank management has more control over costs rather than over outputs. Consequently, 
the adoption of an input-orientation is deemed fairly appropriate for our study. 
 
4.3.4 Formulation of DEA Models 
DEA  models  can  assume  either  constant  returns-to-scale (Charnes et al., 1978),  or  
variable return-to-scale (Banker et al., 1984). The constant return-to-scale (CRS) 
assumption is acceptable when all banks in the sample are operating at optimal scale 
(minimum point on the long-run average cost function). It means that a proportionate 
increase in input leads to a proportionate increase in output. It indicates that all banks, 
small and large, are able to produce with the same input–output ratios. In contrast, the 
variable return-to-scale (VRS) is appropriate when firms or banks are not operating at 
optimal scale. It implies that a proportionate increase in input leads to a disproportionate 
change in output. Generally, imperfect competition, regulatory requirements and 
constraints on finance in practice suggest that most of the banks are not operating at 
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optimal scale (Coelli et al., 1998). DEA model uses linear programming to generalise the 
Farrell’s (1957) single output and input idea of efficiency measure to the multiple output 
and input measure. 
 
4.3.4.1  DEA Input-Oriented Model with Constant Returns to Scale   
Consider the situation with K number of inputs, M number of outputs and N number of 
banks.  For the i-th bank, xi represents a vector of inputs and yi a vector of outputs. The 
K×N input matrix X, and the M×N output matrix Y, represent the data of all N banks. The 
efficiency of a bank i is then determined as the ratio of all outputs over all inputs such as                               
                                       
    
    
                                                                                                                                                 
 
where  
v  =  K  x  1 vector of input weights              
u  =  M  x  1 vector of output weights  
v′  =  transpose of the input weights matrix             
u′  =  transpose of the output weights matrix 
 
To determine the optimal weights, the following mathematical programming problem is 
specified and solved for the i
th
 bank: 
   
                   
    
   ⁄                                                                                                         
                       
   ⁄                                                                 
                                                   
                    
The objective function specified in equation (4.2) involves solving for the values of the 
optimal weights u and v, so that the efficiency of the i
th
  bank is maximised, subject to the 
constraint that all efficiency measures must be less than or equal to one.  However, the 
above fractional problem is non-linear in nature and has infinite number of solutions for u 
and v. To avoid this problem, the fractional problem in equation (4.2) is converted into a 
linear programming by restricting the denominator (weighted inputs) of the objective 
function to unity, i.e. ν′xi = 1 and adding this as an additional constraint to the problem, 
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while maximising the numerator, the outputs (this becomes an input-oriented efficiency
13
 
measure which implies with given outputs, banks minimise the use of inputs). This 
transforms the above non-linear programming model into linear programming problem as 
follows: 
 
                  
                                                                                                                       
                         
                             
                     
                                                                   
 
where the notation changes from u to µ and from v to   reflects the transformations.  This 
is known as the multiplier form of the DEA linear programming problem. However, 
corresponding to this multiplier form problem yields another linear problem called dual of 
the problem (dual problem). Therefore, one possible solution to the linear programming in 
equation (4.3) is to formulate a dual companion. By denoting the input weights of bank i 
by θ and the input and output weights of other banks in the sample by  the dual form of 
the equation (4.3) is specified as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                    
                                                 0 
  
where θ is a scalar and is the efficiency score of the ith bank and λ is a column matrix N x 1 
is a vector of constants or weights attached to each of the efficient banks. Optimal 
solutions (θ, λ) are obtained for each of the banks being evaluated. The dual form involves 
fewer constraints than the multiplier or primal form and hence is generally the preferred 
form to solve. If θ=1, it indicates a technically efficient bank as it lies on the frontier. 
Banks with θ=1 are benchmark institutions, and their input-output mix lies on the efficient 
frontier. If θ<1, then the bank is inefficient and needs a 1-θ reduction in the input level to 
reach the efficient frontier. The linear programming in equation (4.7) is solved for N  
                                                 
13
 Output-oriented efficiency measure restricts the sum of the weighted output to unity, and minimises the 
inputs.  
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number of times, once for  each  bank in the sample, a value of θ is obtained for each bank 
representing its efficiency score. The DEA CRS measures the overall efficiency for each 
bank and thus, consists of pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Under the 
assumption of CRS any environment inefficiency may be attributed to the size of the bank 
or poor management. 
 
4.3.4.2 DEA Input-Oriented Model with Variable Returns to Scale   
The CRS assumption is unlikely to prevail if the banks operate in imperfect competitive 
environment or are subject to financial constraints and regulatory requirements (Coelli et 
al., 1998). One or combination of these factors might compel or cause the banks not to 
operate at optimal scale. Hence, in such a situation, estimating technical efficiency using 
the CRS model will be confounded by scale inefficiencies. Banker et al. (1984) introduce 
the VRS DEA model by including an additional convexity constraint N1′λ = 1 to account 
for VRS. The VRS model of DEA permits technical efficiency to be computed without the 
impact of scale efficiency. VRS offers a measure of pure technical efficiency. Thus, dual 
linear programming model CRS in equation (4.4) can be modified to VRS by adding a 
constraint N1′λ = 1 as follows:         
         
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                                       
                                                                       
                       
where N1 is a N x 1 vector of ones. The convexity constraint ensures that a bank is 
compared only to banks of similar size and as a result, VRS envelopes the data more 
closely than CRS. Accordingly, the VRS technical efficiency score are greater than or 
equal to that of CRS. Once again θ is a scalar and is the efficiency score of the ith bank. If θ 
= 1, it shows that the bank is technically efficient. Hence, it lies on the efficient frontier. If 
θ < 1, then the bank is technically inefficient. The DEA VRS measures only pure technical 
efficiency.  
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4.3.4.3 Estimation of Cost Efficiency 
In order to calculate the DEA cost efficiency (CE), we assume that wi is a 1×Ν vector of 
input prices for the i
th
 bank and solving the following cost minimization DEA (assuming 
VRS) yields: 
 
                       
     
   
                                                                                                                                                                  
                      Subject to                                                                                                                 
                                               
                                                   
                                                                
                                                       
 
  
  is the frontier or cost-minimising vector of input quantities for the i-th bank, given the 
prices of input wi and the levels of output yi. The bank i would have a frontier or minimum 
cost   
   
  which, by definition, would be less than or equal to the observed or actual 
cost  
   . The optimal values   
  are found by solving the linear programming problem 
(equation 4.6), where matrix X and Y are the observed data of all the banks. The cost 
efficiency of the i
th
 bank is calculated as the ratio of minimum cost to actual cost. Thus: 
 
   
  
   
 
  
   
                                                                                                                   
                                                                                               
That is, cost efficiency measures how close a bank’s cost is to the minimal cost (or best 
practice bank’s cost) for producing a certain level of output with given input prices and 
technology. Thus, a cost efficiency value of CE indicates that it would be possible to 
produce the same vector of production with a saving cost of (1-CE) x100 percent. In other 
words, 1-CE represents the amount by which the bank could reduce its costs and still 
produce the same amount of output. The measure of cost efficiency is bounded between 
zero and one. Cost efficiency scores are also bounded between the value of zero and one 
(or 100 if the results are expressed as percentages). A cost efficiency score of one 
represents a cost efficient bank and is also known as best practice banks in the sample, 
whereas cost inefficient banks exhibit a value less than one. However, the cost inefficient 
banks with a value of zero are considered worst practice banks. A bank is cost efficient if it 
is technical and allocative efficient at the same time.  
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4.3.4.4 Choice between CRS and VRS DEA Models 
Some recent studies advocate that DEA models can be estimated using only the 
assumption of VRS. Some researchers have found that banks face non-CRS (for example 
McAllister & McManus, 1993; Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; Sufian & Majid, 2007; 
Wheelock & Wilson, 1999). These studies advocate that CRS is only appropriate when all 
firms are operating at an optimal scale. In addition, VRS frontier, which is less restrictive 
than CRS, permits the best practice level of outputs to inputs to vary with the size of the 
banks in the sample (Halkos & Tzeremes, 2009). On the other hand, if the VRS model is 
employed where there is no inherent scale effects of the firms (that is, where there is no 
diversity in the size of the firms) being evaluated, small and large firms will tend to be 
over-rated in the efficiency evaluation (Dyson et al., 2001). In contrast, other studies have 
also advocated for the use of CRS (e.g. Ariff & Can, 2008; Avkiran, 1999; Noulas,1997; 
Pasiouras, et al., 2007) instead of VRS or expressed caution in using the VRS formulation 
(e.g. Dyson, et al., 2001; Soteriou & Zenios, 1999). Accordingly, many studies present 
their results under both CRS and VRS assumptions (e.g. Canhoto & Dermine, 2003; Casu 
& Molyneux, 2003) in order to avoid this controversy. 
 
In this study, VRS is used because factors such as imperfect competition, finance 
constraints and regulatory requirements may cause a bank to operate less than optimal 
scale.  
 
4.3.4.5 Specification of Inputs and Outputs   
In order to analyse the efficiency of the banking industry, it is essential that input and 
output measures of bank activities are defined or specified. Selecting the appropriate 
specification of bank output is a vital issue for banks’ eﬃciency investigations. The choice 
of inputs and outputs in DEA is a matter of long standing debate among researchers 
(Sathye, 2003). There is a consensus among researchers that the choice of input and output 
variables in efficiency studies can considerably impact the results.  
 
Berger & Humphrey (1997) identify two main approaches for the selection of inputs and 
outputs as production and intermediation approaches and they are the most widely used to 
measure bank efficiency (see Berger & Humphrey, 1991; Hunter & Timme, 1995; Ray, 
2007; Pasiouras et al., 2008; Berger et al., 2009). Most banking studies have applied either 
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the production approach (Sherman & Gold, 1985; Soteriou & Zenios, 1999; Sherman & 
Zhu, 2006) or the intermediation approach (Aly et al., 1990; Yue, 1992; Pasiouras et al., 
2008; Staub et al., 2010) and sometimes both approaches are adopted to assess whether the 
results are affected by the choice of output (Ashton, 2001; Giokas, 2008). However, most 
of the DEA studies employ intermediation approach as opposed to production approach.  
 
According to the production approach pioneered by Benston (1965), banks produce loan 
and deposit accounts using labour and capital as inputs. In other words, inputs are needed 
only to perform transactions and process financial documents (Vesala, 1995; Berger & 
Humphrey, 1997). On the other hand, outputs are measured by the number of accounts 
serviced (e.g. the number of deposit or loan accounts serviced) and transactions or 
documents processed for customers such as loan applications, credit reports, cheques or 
other payment instruments. This approach does not consider interest costs, it only 
considers physical inputs such as capital and labour and their costs (Berger & Humphrey, 
1997). 
 
Intermediation approach was originally developed by Sealy & Lindley (1977). According 
to this  approach,  banks  act as financial intermediaries,  transforming  and  transferring  
financial  resources  they  borrow  from depositors into credit and lent to the borrowers 
(Berger & Humphrey, 1997). Banks produce intermediation services through the collection 
of deposits and other liabilities and use them to generate interest-earning assets such as 
loans, securities and other investments. Hence, this approach uses deposits collected and 
funds borrowed from financial markets (i.e. bank liabilities) as inputs, whereas loans and 
other earning assets are considered to be the bank’s outputs. Thus, the intermediation 
approach considers the input of funds and their interest cost because funds are the main 
raw material which is transformed in the financial intermediation process (Berger & 
Humphrey, 1997). 
 
Elyasiani & Mehdian (1990) highlight the following advantages of the intermediation 
approach over the production approach:  
i. intermediation approach includes total interest expenses which make up large 
proportion of banks’ total costs, therefore excluding them may make the empirical 
results unreliable.  
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ii. intermediation approach views deposits as inputs because they are employed for 
making loans and investments, whereas production approach considers deposit as 
output. 
iii. by using the currency value of the input-output data, the intermediation approach 
reduces the potential quality problems of input-output data. 
 
Nevertheless, neither of these two approaches fully captures the entire role of financial 
institutions. According to Berger & Humphrey, (1997) the production approach may be 
appropriate for assessing the efficiencies of branches of financial institutions (in this case 
the banks), because most bank branches process customer documents for the entire bank 
and branch managers have no control over bank funding and investment decisions. On the 
other hand, they suggest that intermediation approach may be suitable for assessing the 
entire financial institutions because it includes interest expenses, which accounts for one-
half to two-thirds of the total costs. Yildirim (2002) also indicates that intermediation 
approach takes into account the overall costs of banking and is preferred when studying the 
economic viability of banks. Thus, the intermediation approach may be better for assessing 
the profitability of the financial institution, since minimisation of total costs, not just 
production costs, is required to maximise profits. Furthermore, it is not easy to obtain 
detailed bank information relating to transactions and financial documents which are 
needed in the production approach. The intermediation approach is more preferred to 
production approach in the banking literature. 
 
In addition to the two main approaches, Favero & Papi, (1995) identify three other 
approaches: asset  approach, user-cost approach and value added  approach. The asset 
approach is a variant of intermediation approach which considers the role of banks as 
financial intermediaries between depositors and final users of bank assets. Deposits and 
other liabilities, in addition to labour and capital are defined as inputs, whereas bank assets 
mainly loans are view as output.  According to the value-added approach, the specification 
of inputs and outputs relies on the share of value added (Berger & Humphrey, 1992). 
Assets or liabilities are considered outputs if they add value to the bank (Berger et al., 
1987) . For instance, demand and time deposits, loans and investments are considered as 
outputs because they contribute to large proportion of value added. On other hand, labour, 
capital expenses to fixed assets and interest expenses are viewed as inputs. Hancock (1985) 
first applied the user cost approach. The user cost approach identifies inputs and outputs 
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depending on their net contributions to banks’ revenue. Most recently, Drake et al. (2006) 
proposed a variation of intermediation approach known as profit-oriented approach or 
operating approach in DEA where the banks’ objective is solely to generate revenue from 
the total cost incurred for executing bank business.  Consequently, total expenses such as 
interest and non-interest expenses are classified as inputs and total revenue such as interest 
and non-interest income are considered as outputs.  
 
Despite the extensive studies on bank efficiency, there is no consensus on the exact 
definition and measurement of banks’ inputs and outputs. The choice of the approach to 
input and output definition and the appropriate number of inputs and outputs utilised 
basically rest on the data availability. 
 
4.3.4.6 Issue with the Classification of Deposits 
Researchers encounter the problem of how to classify deposit; whether it should be 
considered as input or output. Deposits are considered as inputs to the production process 
(intermediation and asset approach), whereas production, value added and user cost 
approaches view deposits as outputs. This is because it creates value added (value added 
approach) and customers bear an opportunity cost (user cost approach). This shows the 
difficulties in the specification and measurement of the concept of bank output. 
 
Some banking studies view deposits as inputs because interests paid on deposits are 
considered as costs and the rate paid is included as an input price and both are considered 
as inputs of the raw material of investible funds (Berger & Humphrey, 1997). However, 
those studies that consider deposits as outputs relate them to amount of liquidity, 
safekeeping, and payments services offered to depositors (Berger & Humphrey, 1991; 
Bauer et al., 1993; Berger & Humphrey, 1997). Since the classification of deposits in 
efficiency models can impact on the efficiency estimates, it is deemed as important issue. 
To resolve this issue, some bank efficiency studies have adopted a solution of first treating 
deposits as an input and then as an output (e.g. Tecles & Tabak, 2010).  
 
4.3.4.7 Choice of the Number of Inputs and Outputs 
In using DEA model, the choice of the number of inputs and outputs will always depend 
on the total number of DMUs in the sample, since the number of inputs and outputs 
selected can inhibit the discrimination power of the DEA among the units (Dyson et al., 
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2001). This is because DEA permits the units to freely choose and apply weights to their 
inputs and outputs in order to assess them, so the greater the number of inputs and outputs 
included the lower the level of discrimination (Dyson et al., 2001). For instance, a large 
number of inputs and outputs may inhibit the discriminatory power of the DEA among the 
units, which may result in overestimation of efficiency. In contrast, a small number of 
inputs and outputs may result in underestimation of efficiency. Moreover, in using small 
sample size if a high number of inputs and outputs relative to the number of observations 
are chosen, the units or banks can be wrongly identified as efficient because too many 
constraints will be specified. Hence, a small sample size may restrict the number of input 
and output variables that can be used in order to maintain the DEA model's discriminatory 
power. On the contrary, arbitrarily limiting the number of inputs and outputs variables may 
also underestimate the relative efficiency score.  
 
Accordingly, various solutions as to how to deal with the issue have been suggested. 
Nunamaker (1985) and Stern et al. (1994) suggest that the sample size should be at least 
three times greater than the sum of the number of inputs and outputs. On the other hand, 
and Cooper et al. (2000, pp.252) recommend that in order to discriminate effectively 
between efficient and inefficient banks,  the  sample  size  should be at least three times the 
sum of the number of input and output variables. However, a recent study by Dyson et al. 
(2001) advocates that for the DEA model to preserve its discriminatory power, the sample 
size should be at least two times the product of the number of inputs and outputs.  
 
DEA is sensitive to the number of variables chosen. As the number of variables increases, 
the ability of DEA to discriminate between the inefficient and efficient units decreases. As 
a result, inefficient units can be identified as efficient (Smith, 1997).  
 
4.4 Literature Review 
For some years now banking efficiency has been the subject of many studies (see Ariff & 
Can, 2008; Berg et al., 1993; Das & Ghosh, 2006; Sherman & Gold, 1985; Staub et al., 
2010). Many studies have used various methods to estimate bank efficiency as well as 
different econometric approaches to determine the factors that affect bank efficiency. 
Many of the previous studies on bank efficiency have been conducted on developed 
economies. However, the recent resurgence of economic and financial reforms across the 
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developing countries has also raised the awareness of the importance of bank efficiency. 
This section is categorised into three parts; evidence on bank efficiency in developed 
countries and in developing and emerging countries both based on individual-country 
studies and cross-country studies. 
  
4.4.1 Evidence on Developed Countries 
Sherman & Gold’s (1985) study is the first to apply data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
method to examine the efficiency of 14 branches of US savings bank. They adopt the 
production approach using labour, office space and supply costs as input variables and 17 
types of transactions processed by the bank branches as output variables. The authors find 
that six branches operate inefficiently out of the 14 branches. A similar study by Parkan 
(1987) examines 35 bank branches of a major Canadian chartered bank. The author also 
uses the DEA method but adopts the intermediation approach using six input variables 
namely, total authorised full-time employees, annual rent, quality of customer service 
space ranking, telephone and stationery expenses, number of online terminals and 
marketing activity ranking and six output variables namely, number of transactions, 
commercial account openings, retail account openings, number of loan applications, 
customer service survey rating and number of corrections. The author concludes that 11 
out of the 35 branches are relatively inefficient. Aly et al. (1990) adopt the DEA method to 
investigate the differences in efficiency between unit and branch banking organisation in 
322 US independent banks in 1986. The authors’ model includes five outputs: real-estate 
loans, commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans, all other loans and demand 
deposits; and three inputs: labour, capital and loanable funds to compute technical, scale 
and allocative efficiencies. The authors attributed the main source of inefficiency to 
technical inefficiency, rather than allocative or scale inefficiencies.  
 
However, Rangan et al.’s (1988) study consolidated banking institutions instead of bank 
branches employing a sample of 215 US banks in 1986. They also use the DEA method 
and adopt the intermediation approach using labour, capital and purchased funds as input 
and loans and deposits as output variables. Their study reveals the banks are inefficient and 
that scale inefficiencies of the banks are relatively small, identifying technical inefficiency 
as the key source of inefficiency. Yue (1992) similarly applies the DEA method to four 
input variables, namely, interest expenses, non-interest expenses, transaction deposits and 
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non-transaction deposits, and three output variables, namely, interest income, noninterest 
income and total loans to evaluate the efficiency of 60 commercial banks in Missouri, US, 
during the period 1984-1990. The author finds that pure technical inefficiency is the major 
source of the overall technical inefficiency rather than scale technical inefficiency. 
Interestingly, both studies find technical inefficiency as the major source of overall 
technical inefficiency. Miller & Noulas (1996) employ the DEA approach to estimate 
overall technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency of 210 large 
banks operating in US for the period 1984-1990. The authors observe that the average 
scale and pure technical inefficiencies are small relative to previous studies. The authors 
also examine the determinants of efficiency. They report a significant positive impact of 
bank size on pure technical efficiency.  
 
Fukuyama (1993) applies the DEA approach to examine bank efficiency in 143 Japanese 
commercial banks in 1990 using labour, capital and funds from customers as input 
variables and income from loans and other business activities as output variables. The 
author finds the mean level of pure technical efficiency to be 0.8645 and scale efficiency 
around 0.9844 indicating that the major source of overall technical inefficiency is pure 
technical inefficiency. The author attributes the scale inefficiency mainly to increasing 
returns to scale. Scale efficiency has positive but weak effect on bank size. A more recent 
study by Loukoianova (2008) uses the DEA method to investigate the cost and revenue 
efficiency of Japanese banks for the period 2000-2006. The author’s findings reveal 
enhancement in efficiency since 2001. Loukoianova findings show that City and Trust 
banks are more cost and revenue efficient than the regional banks. However, the banks in 
Japan are less profitable relative to banks in other developed countries. 
 
In a broader set up, Yeh (1996) applies both DEA and financial ratio analysis to examine 
the efficiency of six commercial banks in Taiwan over the period 1981 to 1989. Yeh uses 
interest expenses, non-interest expenses, and total deposits as input variables and interest 
income, non-interest income, and total loans as output variables. The author’s result shows 
that the banks with high DEA scores have higher ratios in capital adequacy, asset 
utilization and profitability and lower ratios in financial leverage and liquidity. The author 
then infers that it is possible to link the estimated efficiencies with banks’ actual financial 
operating decisions. Similarly, Chen & Yeh (1998) assess efficiency of 34 commercial 
banks using the DEA approach and financial ratios analysis. They employ the following 
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two input variables: staff employed and interest expense and four output variables: loans, 
investment interest revenue, non-interest revenue and bank assets. Their results identify 15 
out of the 34 commercial banks as efficient. The authors also find that the private-owned 
banks manage their resources more efficiently than public-owned banks. In contrast, Chen 
& Yeh (1998) indicate that the results from the DEA method are not consistent with those 
obtained from the financial ratios. A more recent study by Chen (2001) highlights a 
positive effect of the financial deregulation on banking efficiency in Taiwan. 
 
Resti (1997) employs the DEA method to evaluate a panel of 270 Italian banks for the 
period 1988-1992. The author adopts the intermediation approach and use labour and 
capital as input variables and loans, deposits, and non-interest income as output variables. 
Resti observes no increase in efficiency but large differences in the efficiency scores. The 
result also reveals positive association between efficiency and assets quality. In another 
study by Girardone et al. (2004) on Italian banks over the period 1993–1996 the aftermath 
of the introduction of the EU’s 1992 Single Market Programme, the authors find 
improvement in the overall cost efficiency of the Italian banking system. The study also 
examines the key factors explaining the Italian banks’ cost eﬃciency and find evidence 
that there is no association between size and bank eﬃciency. In addition, Italian banks’ 
cost eﬃciency is positively related to capital strength but negatively associated with the 
level of non-performing loans which is consistent with the findings of Mester (1993, 
1996). 
 
A study by Gilbert & Wilson (1998) on Korean financial deregulation programme in the 
period between 1980 and 1994 reports that most Korean banks experience efficiency gains.  
A recent study by Hao et al. (2001) analyse efficiency of 19 private Korean banks over the 
period 1985 to 1995, an era of financial deregulation. Their findings suggest that banks 
with faster growth rates, operating nationwide and employ core deposits in funding their 
assets appear most efficient. Moreover, banks with more nationwide branches emerge 
more efficient. However, their findings also indicate that financial deregulation has little or 
no effect on the level of bank efficiency in Korea. A more recent study by Sufian & 
Habibullah (2009) use the DEA approach to examine the effect of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis on the efficiency of the Korean banking sector. The authors find high degree of 
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inefficiency in the Korean banking industry, which is more pronounced in the year after 
the Asian financial crisis. 
 
To assess bank efficiency using Australian trading banks from 1986 to 1995, Avkiran 
(1999) applies two types of DEA model. In the first model, the author employs interest 
expense and non-interest expense as input variables and net interest income and noninterest 
income as output variables. However, in the second model, two input variables: deposits 
and staff numbers and two output variables: net loans and non-interest income are 
employed. The author reports increase in efficiencies during the post-deregulation period. 
Sathye (2001) examines the x-efficiency (technical and allocative) in  29 Australian banks 
in 1996 using the DEA method and finds that the Australian banks, on average, are less 
efficient relative to banks in US and the European countries. The author identifies technical 
inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency as the source of the inefficiency. 
Consequently, the inefficiency is due to wasting of input resources rather than incorrect 
input combinations.  
 
In another study, Pasiouras (2008) employs the DEA approach to assess the efficiency of 
the Greek commercial banking industry over the period 2000-2004 including Greek banks 
operating abroad. The study results show that banks operating abroad are more technical 
efficient than those operating at the national level. In order to investigate the determinants 
of efficiency, the author applies the Tobit analysis with technical and scale efficiency as 
dependent variables. The results indicate that higher capitalization and loan activity 
increase the efficiency of Greek commercial banks. Loan activity has positive and 
signiﬁcant effect on bank efficiency and this result is consistent with Isik & Hassan (2003) 
study. The author reports that capital is significant and positively associated with bank 
efficiency. Therefore, well-capitalized banks are more efficient, both in terms of technical 
and scale efficiency. In this context, Pasiouras’ results are consistent with Isik & Hassan 
(2003) study on Turkey, Casu & Girardone (2004) on Italy and Kwan & Eisenbeis (1997) 
on the US banks.  
 
Contrary to the growing bank literature on static efficiency, Berger & De Young (1997) 
use Granger-causality method, a dynamic approach to examine the intertemporal 
relationships between problem loans, cost efficiency and capital for a sample of U.S. 
commercial banks between 1985 and 1994. The authors find that improvement in 
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nonperforming loans tends to be followed by the reduction in cost efficiency and decreases 
in cost efficiency precede increases in nonperforming loans indicating that the 
intertemporal relationships between loan quality and cost efficiency run in both directions. 
At the same time but contrary to Berger & De Young’s (1997) finding, Kwan & Eisenbeis 
(1997) use a simultaneous equation framework to examine the interrelationships between 
bank risk, capitalization, and operating efficiency and find positive impact of inefficiency 
on both bank risk-taking and capitalization. Their study also reports that banks with more 
capital tend to operate more efficiently than less well-capitalized banks.  
 
4.4.2 Evidence on Developing and Emerging Countries 
To examine the impact of financial liberalization on the efficiency of Turkish commercial 
banks, Zaim (1995) employs the DEA method and finds positive effect on efficiency. The 
author’s findings show that technical efficiency increased on average by 10 percent from 
1981 to 1990. Another finding of the study indicates that technical efficiency differences 
between banks diminish during the study period. Further, pure technical inefficiency 
emerges as the key source of inefficiency in the Turkish banking sector.  Interestingly, the 
result also shows that state banks are more efficient than privately owned banks in 1990 in 
term of overall and pure technical efficiency scores. On the other hand, state banks emerge 
as more prone to allocative inefficiency. In a broader set-up, Isik & Hassan (2002) analyse 
cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies in the Turkish banking 
industry over the 1988–1996 period. They used both non-parametric and parametric 
approaches to estimate bank’s efficiency and report that multinational domestic banks are 
superior to purely domestic banks in terms of all efficiency measures. The authors 
investigate the determinant of efficiency and find evidence of a strong negative association 
between bank size and eﬃciency. Yildirim (2002), expanding the study period from 1988 
to 1999, assesses the efficiency of Turkish commercial banking sector. The study period is 
considered as the unstable macroeconomic conditions in Turkey. DEA method is applied 
to estimate technical and scale efficiencies of Turkish commercial banks. The author’s 
results suggest that the sector suffers mainly from scale inefficiency, which is attributed to 
decreasing returns to scale. Both pure technical and scale efficiency scores report a large 
variation. Furthermore, the study examines the impact of profitability, asset quality and 
size on two types of efficiency. Yildirim reports that larger banks have positive 
relationship with pure technical efficiency in the Turkish banking industry. This positive 
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relationship is attributed to larger banks’ market power and their ability to diversify credit 
risk in an uncertain macroeconomic environment. The trend in the performance levels over 
the period indicates that macroeconomic environment has considerable impact on the 
technical and scale efficiencies.  
 
Among the earliest studies on bank efficiency in Thailand, Leightner & Lovell (1998) 
investigate the efficiency of 31 banks operating in the Thai banking sector from 1989 to 
1994. Their results indicate that large domestic banks are most efficient, while the smaller 
domestic are seen as the least efficient. In addition, foreign-owned banks are found slightly 
more efficient than medium-sized domestic banks. More recently, Sufian & Habibullah 
(2010) investigate the efficiency of the Thai banking sector from 1999 to 2008. Their 
results show that inefficiency in the Thai banking sector emerges mainly from scale 
efficiency. Their findings indicate that small banks are most efficient contrary to the 
findings of Leightner & Lovell (1998), while medium-sized banks are found to be the least 
efficient banks. Interestingly, the domestic banks are comparatively more efficient than the 
foreign banks in Thailand. This result is attributed largely to a higher pure technical 
efficiency level. Furthermore, the authors use log-linear and OLS to identify factors that 
affect bank efficiency in Thailand. Their results suggest that banks with higher loans 
intensity and better capitalized tend to show higher efficiency levels. As expected, credit 
risk is negatively related to bank efficiency.  
 
Ayadi et al. (1998) evaluates bank performance of ten Nigerian banks using the DEA 
method for the period 1991 to 1994. The authors employ an intermediation approach using 
interest paid on deposits, total expenses and total deposits as input variables and total 
loans, interest income and non-interest income as output variables. The authors find the 
existence of relatively efficient Nigerian banks. However, these are banks that have been 
operating for a long period of time in Nigeria. The authors also infer that poor management 
is the key factor that caused the weakness in the Nigeria banks and attributed it to poor 
loan quality, excessive credit risk, liquidity risk and their inability to generate capital 
internally.  
 
Sathye (2003) investigates  the efficiency of Indian banks after the economic and financial 
reforms. During the period 1997-1998, the author studies the efficiency of Indian banks 
applying the DEA method and finds several of the foreign owned banks efficient. The 
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author further observes that private owned domestic banks are less efficiency relative to 
the foreign and pubic owned banks. Sathye (2003) attributes the poor efficency score of the 
private sector banks to their expansion. On the other hand, a recent study by Ataullah & Le 
(2006) investigate the determinants of banks’ efficiency in India. Ataullah & Le analyse 
the impact of fiscal reforms, financial reforms, and private investment liberalisation on 
technical efficiency of the Indian banking industry during 1992–1998. They first estimate 
the efficiency using the DEA method and find evidence of efficiency gain in the Indian 
banking industry during the post-economic reforms era. They then apply system 
generalized method of moments, a dynamic estimation technique, to estimate the 
determinants of efficiency and find a positive relationship between the level of competition 
and bank efficiency. They also notice that the efficiency of the previous year is significant 
and positively related to the current year efficiency. Another finding of their study is that 
bank size is positively related to efficiency. This relationship supports the perspective that 
attributes such association to larger banks’ market power and their ability to diversity 
credit risk in uncertain macroeconomic conditions. At the same time, Das & Ghosh (2006) 
using more years (1992-2002), examine the performance of India commercial banking 
sector during the post reform and find high degree of inefficiency of some Indian banks 
which is inconsistent with the findings of Ataullah & Le (2006) which indicated  efficiency 
gains. Most of the inefficiencies are attributed to poor use of resources as well as from 
current large scale of operations. In the second estimation stage, they regress efficiencies 
over a set of variables namely, bank size, ownership, capital adequacy ratio, non-
performing loans and management quality using a multivariate analysis based on the Tobit 
model. Their results suggest that technical efficient banks have, on average, less 
nonperforming loans. A strong association is found between efficiency and capital 
adequacy ratio. Furthermore, Das & Ghosh (2006) link the differences in the efficiency 
performance of commercial banks with different ownership status, level of non-performing 
loans, size, asset quality, and management. For instance, it is found that banks with low-
risk portfolios, as measured by a higher capital adequacy ratio are likely to be more 
efficient.  
 
Havrychyk  (2006) examines the efficiency of the Polish banking sector over the period 
1997 to 2001. The author estimates cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale 
efficiencies using the DEA method.  Havrychyk reports that foreign banks are more cost 
efficient than domestic banks. Contrary to expectation, the author finds evidence of 
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reduction in efficiency. The author used Tobit regression model to examine the factors that 
affect efficiency and finds that size has positive association with banks efficiency in 
Poland. Similar studies by Ataullah et al. (2004) and Chen et al.  (2005) underpin this 
result.   
 
Ariff & Can (2008) employ the DEA method to evaluate cost and profit efficiency of 28 
Chinese commercial banks over period 1995–2004.  The authors find that cost efficiency is 
greater than profit efficiency levels implying that inefficiencies are largely from the 
revenue side. The authors use the Tobit regression to identify the factors that influence the 
Chinese bank efficiency. The study reports negative and weak relationship between size 
and efficiency for large banks, but significantly positive association for medium-sized 
banks. Medium-sized banks are adjudged as the most cost and profit efficient and large 
banks the least efficient which is consistent with the findings of Berger et al. (2006), but 
inconsistent with that of Chen et al. (2005) on Chinese banking efficiency. The authors 
find negative effect of both credit risk and asset quality on bank efficiency suggesting that 
banks with higher credit risk and/or higher loan-loss provisions are less efficient. Another 
finding of the study suggests negative but weak relationship between bank capital level and 
efficiency. Fu & Heffernan (2005) adjudge the cause of this negative relationship to the 
recapitalization of four state-owned banks and loans provided by the Chinese government 
to the joint-stock banks since 1998. Ariff & Can (2008) suggest that such a policy by the 
Chinese government may avert bank capital risk. However, it may increase moral hazard 
incentives.  
 
On the efficiency of the Brazilian banking industry over the post-privatization period of 
2000–2007, Tecles & Tabak (2010) used both Bayesian stochastic frontier and DEA 
approaches reported that large banks are the most efficient banks.  Their finding shows a 
lower level of bank cost efficiency in Brazil, with an average cost efﬁciency score of 0.66. 
On the determinants of bank efficiency based on a static model, their results report a 
positive effect of bank capitalization on efficiency. The authors also find no significant 
relation between non-performing loans and bank efficiency. In another study, Staub et al. 
(2010) estimate cost, technical and allocative efficiencies for Brazilian banks for the same 
period 2000–2007. The authors apply the DEA approach and find that banks in Brazil are 
inefficient. The inefficiency in the Brazilian banks is assigned mostly to technical 
inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency. The authors explain that the higher 
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technical inefficiency is evidence that the Brazilian banks’ managers selected the 
appropriate input mix given the prices, but use fewer inputs which could be attributed, for 
some banks, to the large interest expenses or capital, personnel expenses and a low 
production. On the other hand, between the period 2003-2007 technical efficiency is 
greater than allocative efficiency. They conclude that non-performing loans have effect on 
allocative efficiency. However, investigating the factors of bank efficiency by applying 
dynamic system GMM estimator, the study indicates that non-performing loans have 
insignificant and negative relationship with bank technical and cost efficiency. Bank 
capitalization and size also have no significant effect on technical and cost efficiency. In 
addition, the coefficient of the lagged efficiency (the persistence effect) is positive and 
significant. 
 
4.4.3 Evidence on Cross-Countries 
One of the earlier studies that use the DEA method to assess European banking sectors is 
Berg et al. (1994). The authors evaluate the efficiency of three Nordic countries’ (Finland, 
Norway and Sweden) banking sectors during 1990. Input variables in the DEA method 
include labour and capital, whereas output variables consist of total loans to other financial 
institutions, total deposits from other financial institutions and number of branches. Their 
findings indicate that on average the Swedish banks are relatively more efficient than the 
Finnish or Norwegian banks. 
 
Altunbas et al. (2001) examine a sample of banks from 15 European countries over the 
period 1989-1997. They provide evidence that Austria, Denmark, Germany and Italy have 
the most efficient banking systems, but on average they conclude English and Swedish 
banks are least efficient over the period 1989-1997. In addition, the authors find 
improvement in banks efficiency over the period under evaluation. The authors also find 
evidence indicating that increase in the effect of technological progress reduces bank costs 
with bank size.  
 
Using banks from 17 transition European economies from 1995 to 1998, Griogorian & 
Manole (2002) find the banks in these countries to be inefficient. On the factors 
influencing the bank efficiency, the authors find that capitalization is positive and has 
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significant effect on bank efficiency. Their findings also show that inflation has 
insignificant effect on bank efficiency. 
 
Casu & Molyneux (2003) use a sample of 530 banks from five European Union countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom covering the period 1993 to 1997 
to investigate existence and convergence of productive efficiency across the European 
banking markets since the introduction of the Single Internal Market. Their results show 
evidence of a small improvement in bank efficiency levels since the European Union’s 
Single Market Programme, but a weak evidence of convergence. They also assess the 
determinants of European bank efficiency using the bootstrapping technique to DEA 
efficiency scores and Tobit regression model approach. Their results suggest that there is 
little evidence that the average capital has effect on bank efficiency levels. 
 
Ataullah & Le (2004) offer a comparative analysis of the evolution of the technical 
eﬃciency of commercial banks in India and Pakistan during 1988–1998.  The authors used 
the DEA approach and two kinds of input–output specifications to estimate technical 
eﬃciency. Ataullah & Le decomposed technical eﬃciency into two components, pure 
technical eﬃciency and scale eﬃciency. They reported evidence of very low overall 
technical eﬃciency in India and Pakistan banking industry over the study period and 
documented little improvement in efficiency until 1995. In both countries, the low overall 
technical eﬃciency was attributed mainly to low scale efficiency. In addition, the 
examination of the relationship between bank size and technical eﬃciency showed that the 
larger banks outperformed the smaller banks. However, this difference dwindled over the 
years. The result also showed that banks are relatively more efficient in generating earning 
assets than in generating income. This is attributed to the presence of high non-performing 
loans. 
 
Cihak & Podpiera (2005) study on three East African countries (using 43 banks from 
Kenya, 23 banks from Tanzania and 17 banks from Uganda) financial service reforms find 
the banks in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to be inefficient. Using 137 commercial banks 
from 29 African countries, Kablan (2010) investigates the level and determinants of bank 
cost efficiency from 1998 to 2002. The author finds the banks to be cost efficient using 
stochastic frontier analysis. Applying dynamic system generalized method of moments, the 
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author reports a negative relationship between nonperforming loans and efficiency. In 
addition, bank capitalization is statistically significant and negatively related to bank 
efficiency. 
 
Kasman & Yildirim’s (2006) study documented weak efficiency gains on eight new 
members of the European Union from Central and Eastern European countries. Their 
results also reveal that capitalization and GDP growth are significant and negatively related 
to profit efficiency. As expected, inflation has a negative impact on profit efficiency. Using 
the stochastic frontier approach and the distribution-free approach, Yildirim & Philippatos 
(2007) investigate cost and profit efficiency of 12 transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) banks from 1993 to 2000. Their findings show significant 
managerial inefficiencies in 12 CEE banking markets, with mean cost efficiency level 72% 
and 77% by the distribution free approach and the stochastic frontier approach, 
respectively. The results also suggest that foreign-owned banks are relatively more cost-
efficient but less profit-efficient relative to state-owned and private domestic banks. 
According to their findings, banks in Poland and Slovenia are adjudged to be the most cost 
efficient whereas the Russian Federation, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are found to have 
the least efficient banks. The authors investigate the determinants of efficiency employing 
generalised least squares fixed-effects estimators and conclude that market concentration is 
negatively associated with bank efficiency. Another finding of the study is that bank size is 
positive and significantly related to levels of bank efficiency. In addition, the level of 
equity capital has a positive impact on cost efficiency. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Berger & Mester (1997) study on U.S banks over the period 1990-1995. The 
authors find a negative and significant relationship between credit risk and bank efficiency. 
Furthermore, the degree of competition relates positively to cost efficiency. Similarly, 
economic growth has a positive association with cost efficiency but a negative relationship 
with profit efficiency showing that favourable economic conditions have stimulated 
competition in the CEE banking markets.  
 
Staikouras et al. (2008) assess the cost efficiency of banks operating in six emerging South 
Eastern European (SEE) countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of 
Macedonia, Romania and Serbia–Montenegro over the period 1998–2003. Using a 
stochastic frontier approach, the authors find existence of low level of cost efficiency, with 
significant inefficiency differences among countries. They observe that foreign banks and 
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banks with higher foreign bank ownership have the least inefficiency. In addition, they 
notice that cost inefficiency is negatively related to bank capitalization. However, they 
identify a positive but insignificant relationship between cost inefficiency and credit risk. 
GDP growth has a positive relationship with inefficiency which is inconsistent to Yidirim 
& Philippatos (2007) finding. 
 
Turk-Ariss (2010) uses 821 commercial banks in 60 developing countries from five 
different regions, including Africa, East and South Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and the Middle East for the years 1999–2005. 
The author’s aim is to assess the effect of a higher degree of market power on bank 
efficiency and stability. The author reports evidence of signiﬁcant negative relationship 
between bank market power and cost efficiency and documents that market power is 
signiﬁcant and positively associated with bank profit efficiency and overall stability. 
 
Using Granger-causality techniques, Williams (2004) following Berger & De Young 
(1997) assesses the inter-temporal relationships among problem loans, cost efficiency, and 
bank capital in a sample of European savings banks over the period 1990-1998. The author 
identifies evidence of negative association between loan loss provision and efficiency 
suggesting that poorly managed banks tend to make more poor quality loans. William’s 
finding also reveals that cost efficiency positively Granger-causes capital. In a later study, 
Altunbas et al. (2007) employ a static simultaneous equation model (Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression approach) to analyse the relationship between capital, loan provisions and cost 
inefficiency on banks operating in 15 European countries between 1992 and 2000 and 
document that cost efficiency and bank risk-taking are negatively related contrasting the 
finding of Williams (2004). Both bank size and capitalization have positive impact on cost 
inefficiency. The difference in their finding might be due to differences in the estimation 
method. It is also important to point out that Altunbas et al. (2007) study fails to account 
for the dynamic nature of capital and credit risks. In a recent study, Fiordelisi et al. (2011) 
employ commercial banks from 26 European Union countries between 1995 and 2007 and 
test for the causal relationship between cost efficiency, risk and capital. The authors find 
that increase in capital precedes increase in cost efficiency and vice versa. In addition, cost 
efficiency negatively Granger-causes bank risk. 
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Previous empirical studies on bank efficiency have mostly employed static panel data 
methods to analyse the determinants of bank efficiency. However, many financial 
processes exhibit dynamic adjustment over time so failing to incorporate dynamic aspect of 
the data can lead to serious misspecification biases in the estimation and results. De Jonghe 
& Vennet (2008) report that most banking studies failed to consider the time it takes for the 
impacts of bank competition and eﬃciency to materialize.  
 
Similarly, static models are mostly used to estimate the factors that influence bank 
efficiency. These studies fail apparently to incorporate the dynamic nature of efficiency in 
the assessment of bank efficiency. According to Staub et al. (2010), the banks that are 
more efficient in a specific year tend to be efficient in the following year. On the other 
hand, Ataullah & Le (2006) describe lagged efficiency as an accumulation of knowledge 
and technological endowment that may help banks to produce higher outputs with their 
inputs or reduce cost by adapting relatively quickly to the financial reforms. Such 
persistence can only be modelled with dynamic models (Staub et al., 2010). The studies 
also do not account for endogeneity of some of the regressors such as the lagged 
efficiency, credit risk and bank capital. However, there is gradual awareness of the need to 
include lagged efficiency such as in the studies of Ataullah & Le (2006), Staub et al. 
(2010) and Fiordelisi et al. (2011). 
 
4.5 Method 
This section presents the DEA approach used to estimate the bank efficiency. The section 
also provides the bank efficiency models employed to assess the determinants of bank 
efficiency in the Ghanaian banking industry from the year 2001 to 2010. Stata software is 
used to estimate the determinants of bank efficiency. In this study, we use the fixed effect 
regression estimator to estimate the determinants of bank efficiency in Ghana, while the 
dynamic model is estimated using the two-step system GMM.  
 
The fixed effect model (described in Chapter 3) is used to examine the determinants of 
bank efficiency (static model) because it controls for unobserved heterogeneity. To control 
for potential heteroskedasticity, the fixed effect model is estimated using White (1980)  
robust standard error test. This is because the banks in Ghana have different sizes which 
may contribute to different variations in the error terms (see Baltagi, 1995). The static 
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models do not include lagged dependent variables in the fixed effect models because the 
fixed effect estimators generate severe biases in the coefficient estimates with lagged 
dependent variables (Roodman, 2009).  
 
System GMM (as described in Chapter 3) is used to investigate the determinants of bank 
efficiency because it accommodates unobserved heterogeneity, exogenous and endogenous 
variables (dynamic model). In the presence of dynamics and endogenous explanatory 
variables in panel estimation, the GMM estimator is more superior to fixed effect estimator 
which generates inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 1995). To solve these problems a two-step 
system GMM is adopted. In addition, relative to ordinary least squares, the fixed effect 
model and first difference GMM estimators, the system GMM estimator provides the least 
bias in small samples (when employing Windmeijer (2005) standard error correction). To 
test for heteroskedasticity, Pagan and Hall heteroscadasticity test is used. 
 
4.5.1 Estimation of Bank Efficiency in Ghana’s Banking Industry 
This section estimates the bank efficiency in Ghana using the DEA approach. A detailed 
description of the DEA models was presented in Section 4.2. DEA-Solver Pro software is 
used to compute the bank efficiency scores. The efficiency scores are used as the 
dependent variable in the estimation of the factors determining bank efficiency in Ghana. 
 
4.5.2 Choice of Input and Output Variables for the Study 
There is an agreement among researchers that the DEA is sensitive to the choice of input–
output variables. This may be to the advantage of the DEA technique, since it indicates 
which of the input–output variables should be closely monitored by bank management to 
improve overall eﬃciency (Sathye, 2003). The role of banks to serve as the financial 
intermediaries between depositors and borrowers is seen as more reasonable even though it 
does not fully capture all the roles of the financial institutions.  
 
Therefore, following Das & Ghosh (2006), Casu & Girardone (2006), Staub et al. (2010) 
and Moffat & Valadkhani (2011) studies, the specification of input and output used in our 
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study is a variation of the intermediation approach where deposits
14
, labour (personnel 
expenses) and capital-related expenses (defined as operating expenses minus personnel 
expenses) are assumed as inputs for producing loans and other earning assets such as loans 
to special sectors, investment securities, equity investments and government securities such 
as treasury bills and bonds. Pure technical efficiency can now be estimated. 
 
Deposits are the most important input resources for Ghanaian banks and are available to 
banks to perform their activities such as lending and investing. The choice of labour and 
capital expenses shows their importance as other input resources in the production process 
of the banks in Ghana. In the case of output, loans and other earning assets constitute the 
major activities of banks that channel their funds into investment or lending for profit 
motives. In Ghana, loans and other earning assets account for about two thirds of banking 
assets and are important generator of revenues. 
 
In order to estimate cost efﬁciency, input prices must also be calculated. Table 4.2 shows 
the description of the variables used in the computation of bank efficiency.  
 
Table 4.2 Variables used in the Computation of Bank Efficiency   
 Variable Name Description 
Inputs:   
Deposits  Customers deposits 
Labour  Personnel expenses of bank staff such 
as salaries, wages and benefits 
Output:   
Loans  Total customers’ loans 
Other earning assets  Banks’ investments in different types 
of securities (e.g. government 
securities, bonds, Treasury bill and 
equity investment) 
Input prices:   
Price of deposits  Interest expenses divided by total 
deposits 
Price of labour  Personnel expenses divided by the 
total assets 
Price of capital  Capital-related expenses (operating 
expenses - personnel expenses) 
divided by total ﬁxed assets. 
   
 
                                                 
14 There is no consistent data on other funds with many missing values. Total deposit as a percentage of total 
liabilities was 72.5 percent in 2011 whereas total borrowing was 8.1 percent in the same year (Bank of 
Ghana, 2011). 
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However, these inputs prices are proxies since relevant data are not available (Maudos & 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). 
 
4.5.3 Determinants of Bank efficiency in Ghana 
4.5.4 Empirical Models  
This section explores the underlying relationship between the estimated efﬁciency levels 
and bank specific factors namely size, capital and credit risk and macroeconomic factors 
such as inflation and GDP growth rate
15
. In the second stage, the DEA scores are regressed 
on bank-speciﬁc and macroeconomic factors. The determinants of bank efficiency is 
estimated using fixed effect estimator for the static model and two-step system GMM for 
the dynamic model as discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Many banking studies have examined the factors that affect the efficiency of banks. In the 
banking literature, some studies investigate only bank-specific factors while others assess 
both bank-specific and external factors. The widely used bank-specific factors are size, 
capitalization, loans to assets, and loan loss provision to total loans (see Casu & Molyneux, 
2003; Casu & Girardone, 2004; Ataullah & Le, 2006; Ariff & Can, 2008). The inflation 
and real GDP growth rates are commonly used to control for the macroeconomic 
conditions (see Salas & Saurina, 2003; Girardone et al., 2004; Yildirim & Philippatos, 
2007; Pasiouras, 2008).  
 
4.5.4.1 Static Panel Model of Bank Efficiency  
The static panel data model used to determine the bank-specific and macroeconomic 
factors that affect bank efficiency in Ghana is given as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
where  
i represents the individual bank and t denotes time, 
                                                 
15
 The reason for the selection of small number of determinant factors for this study is to provide 
parsimonious models and to avoid excessive reduction in the degree of freedom. This is done to ensure 
meaningful system GMM results for the study. This procedure is used due to the small number of banks and 
observations used in this study. 
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  = parameters to be estimated,  
i = individual bank specific-effect,  
µit = error term,  
EFFit = bank efficiency (pure technical efficiency, PTE or cost efficiency, CE),  
CAPit = capitalization, and is measured as total equity divided by total assets, 
SIZEit = bank size, and is measured as natural logarithm total assets, 
LLPit = loan loss provision ratio
16
 proxy as credit risk, and is measured as loan loss 
               provisions divided by total loans,  
GDPGit = real gross domestic product growth rate,  
INFit = inflation rate, and is measured as change in consumer price index.  
  
In this model, all the explanatory variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous.  
 
4.5.4.2 Dynamic Panel Model of Bank Efficiency  
A dynamic model is adopted by including one-year lagged efficiency among the 
explanatory variables to capture the dynamic nature of the efficiency of banks. This study 
attempts to find out whether bank efficiency tends to persist over time in the Ghanaian 
banking sector. According to Staub et al. (2010), the banks that are more efficient in a 
specific year tend to be efficient in the following year. On the other hand, Ataullah & Le 
(2006) suggest that the one-year lagged efficiency indicates accumulation of knowledge 
and technological endowment that may assist banks to produce higher outputs with their 
inputs by adjusting comparatively quickly to the financial reforms. Ataullah & Le (2006), 
Solis & Maudos (2008), and Staub et al. (2010) studies find significant and positive 
relationship between the efficiency of the previous year and that of the current year. 
Furthermore, many early banking studies have confirmed the persistence of efficiency over 
time (Berger & Humphrey, 1991; Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1997). The introduction of a lagged 
dependent variable complicates the estimation of the model since the lagged dependent 
variable correlates with the error term, even where the error terms are not correlated  
(Fiordelisi et al., 2011).  
 
                                                 
16 Loan loss provision ratio is used as a proxy for credit risk because there was no consistent data on non-
performing loans. 
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In addition, based on the banking literature, bank capitalization and loan loss provision are 
considered endogenous variables (see Section 4.6). This is because failure to address such 
reverse causality in efficiency equations will bias the estimates of the coefficients. This 
will also complicate the analysis of the results.  
 
Following the procedure of Ataullah & Le (2006), Solis & Maudos, (2008) and Staub et al. 
(2010) the dynamic panel model specification for the determinants of bank efficiency in 
Ghana is given as follows: 
 
                                                              
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
where  
i represents the individual bank and t denotes time, 
  are parameters to be estimated,  
i = individual bank specific-effect,  
ϵit= error term,  
EFFit = bank efficiency (pure technical efficiency, PTE or cost efficiency, CE),  
EFFi,t-1= one-year lagged bank efficiency  
CAPit = capitalization, and is measured as total equity divided by total assets, 
SIZEit = bank size, and is measured as natural logarithm of total assets, 
LLPit = loan loss provision ratio proxy as credit risk, and is measured as loan loss 
            provisions divided by total loans,  
GDPGit = real gross domestic product growth rate,  
INFit = inflation rate, and is measured as change in consumer price index.  
 
To estimate the dynamic models using the system GMM, this study combines two 
techniques to ensure that the number of instrument counts is less than or equal to the 
number of groups (banks). The ﬁrst technique uses less lags as instruments instead of all 
available lags for the endogenous variables (for the levels and difference equations). In 
addition, the study uses the technique of “collapsing instruments” to constrain all of the 
yearly moment condition to be the same in order to decrease the instrument count. In the 
standard instrument matrix (without collapsing the instruments) each instrumenting 
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variable produces one column for each time period and lag available to that time period, 
whereas collapsing instruments put the instrument set into a single column to limit the 
instrument count. The use of these techniques allows us to considerably reduce the number 
of instrument counts to avoid over-fitting of the endogenous variables in order to have 
more reliable estimations. Collapsing the instruments is vital to the identification of the 
models because the study uses only 25 banks (Jallab, 2008). In addition, this study uses 
second and third lags of the lagged dependent variable, and loan loss provision and 
capitalization
17
 as instruments (as opposed to using all available lags).  
 
4.5.4.3 Logit Transformation of the DEA Efficiency as the Dependent Variable  
 
Since the estimated values of the DEA efficiency (EFFu) ranges from 0 to 1, logistic 
specification is used to transform the efficiency scores into natural log odds ratio as 
follows: 
EFFR=  (
    
      
) 
 
which is linear and continuous. This is a monotonic transformation. It ranges from negative 
infinity to positive infinity. It follows the same general principles used in linear regression 
and hence can be estimated with the usual ordinary least square methods since the value of 
EFFR is known (Gujarati, 1992).  
 
However, EFFR is undefined when the efficiency score, EFFu is zero or one. This problem 
reduces the total observations by the number of undefined efficiency scores, causing some 
loss of the data. Consequently, as in Cox (1970 p.33), Voos & Mishel (1990), Campbell et 
al. (2008) and Kader et al. (2010), the logit transformation is modified by adding 1/2N to 
both the numerator and denominator, where N represents the number of observations for 
the efficiency. The advantage of this modified logit transformation is that there is no 
reduction or elimination of some of the observations when the efficiency score is equal to 
zero or one (Maddala, 1983 p.30). The transformed efficiency score (modified logit 
transformation), EFF, is employed as the dependent variable for the evaluation of the 
determinants of efficiency as well as for the investigation of the causal relationship 
between efficiency and competition. However, it is impossible to obtain directly the 
                                                 
17 Capitalization and loan loss provision, in this study, are considered endogenous based since they have 
effect on efficiency or market power and vice versa as explained in sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2. 
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marginal effects of the explanatory variables on efficiency. Nevertheless, the signs and 
statistical significance of each coefficient of the determinant factors of efficiency can be 
interpreted directly. In this study, only the signs and statistical significance of each 
coefficient of the factors are needed. The logit method has been used in recent studies on 
bank efficiency (see for example, Ataullah & Le, 2006; Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara, 
2007; Solís & Maudos, 2008; Kader et al., 2010).  
 
4.6 Variable Measurements 
This section explains the measurements of the variables used in the determinants of bank 
efficiency.  These variables are grouped into bank-specific and macroeconomic factors.  
 
4.6.1   Bank-Specific Factors 
The bank-specific variables considered are size, credit risk, bank capitalization and fee 
income.  
 
4.6.1.1 Size 
Bank size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and it is included in the 
model to investigate the impact on bank efficiency. It is essential to know which size 
optimises bank efficiency. The results of previous studies on the relationship between bank 
size and bank efficiency are inconsistent. Some studies have found a significantly positive 
impact of bank size on bank efficiency (e.g. Miller & Noulas, 1996; Ataullah & Le, 2006; 
Chen et al., 2005; Tecles & Tabak, 2010). In contrast, others studies have documented a 
significantly negative effect of bank size on bank efficiency (e.g., DeYoung & Nolle, 
1996; Isik & Hassan, 2002; Girardone et al., 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007), while others 
observe insignificant influence of bank size on efficiency (e.g., Pi & Timme, 1993; Berger 
& Mester, 1997, Ariff & Can, 2008; Staub et al., 2010).  
 
4.6.1.2 Credit Risk  
Credit risk is measured as loans loss provision divided by total loans. This is included to 
control for the differences in efficiency across banks due to differences in credit risk. This 
is an important factor because poor asset quality (or higher credit risk) is seen as the most 
prominent cause of bank failures. The loans loss provision to total loan is an indicator of 
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asset quality. Banks which have a higher ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans have 
lower asset quality and tend to incur higher credit risk. Previous studies have shown that 
higher risk-taking banks are less efficient (e.g. Yildirim, 2002; Casu & Girardone, 2004; 
Ataullah et al., 2004; Chang & Chiu, 2006; Staikouras et al., 2008; Yildirim & Philippatos, 
2007). Since efficient banks are likely to be better in monitoring and credit evaluation, 
these banks encounter lower default risk (lower loan loss provisions) and therefore a 
negative relationship is expected. However, Altunbas et al. (2007) find a positive 
association between loan loss provision and efficiency while Staub et al. (2010) have 
observed insignificant relationship. 
 
4.6.1.3 Bank Capitalization 
Bank capitalization is defined as shareholders’ equity divided by total assets. Generally, 
lower capital ratios indicate higher risk leading to higher borrowing costs. Thus, the 
efficiency is expected to be higher in better-capitalized banks and hence a positive 
relationship is expected. However, the results on the effect of bank capital levels on bank 
efficiency are mixed. Many studies have reported banks with higher capital ratios to be 
more efficient (see Casu & Girardone, 2004; Carvallo & Kasman, 2005; Chang & Chiu, 
2006; Pasiouras, 2008, Yildirim & Philipatos, 2007; Staikouras et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, Altunbas et al.’s (2004) study reported a negative relationship. A negative 
association can be attributed to the fact that financial capital influences costs through its 
use as a source of financing loans (Berger & Mester, 1997; Ariff & Can, 2008; Staikouras 
et al., 2008). Thus, raising capital that involves higher costs than taking deposits could 
generate a negative relationship between bank capitalization and efficiency. Negative 
relationship between bank capitalization and efficiency has also been reported by Altunbas 
et al. (2007) and Kwan & Eisenbeis (1997), while others such as Ariff & Can (2008), Casu 
& Molyneux, (2003) and Staub et al. (2010) find no significant impact of capitalization on 
efficiency. 
 
4.6.2 Macroeconomic Factors 
The gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate and rate of inflation are included to account 
for the impact of macroeconomic conditions on bank efficiency. This is because 
macroeconomic developments are likely to affect the quality of banks’ assets (Soedarmono 
et al., 2011). 
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4.6.2.1 Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate 
It is expected that higher GDP growth will positively influence bank efficiency. This is 
because economic growth contributes to the development of the banking industry as higher 
GDP growth influences positively on the demand and supply of banking services, and 
possibly improves bank efficiency as well as enhancing the banks’ asset quality. However, 
as GDP growth slows down and in particular during recessions, credit quality tends to 
deteriorate and default rate increases, thus reducing bank efficiency. Previous studies on 
European countries by Maudos et al. (2002), Pasiouras et al. (2009), Delis & Papanikolaou 
(2009), Lozano-Vivas & Pasiouras (2010) and Yildirim & Philippatos (2007) report 
positive impact of real GDP growth rate on bank efficiency. However, Fries & Taci (2005) 
study on 15 East European countries find no significant effect of GDP growth on bank 
efficiency, likewise Di Patti & Hardy’s (2005) study on Pakistan banks. On the other hand, 
Staikouras et al.’s (2008) study on six emerging South Eastern European countries finds a 
negative relationship between GDP growth and bank efficiency. 
 
4.6.2.2 Inflation Rate 
Inflation rate measured by annual growth rate of the consumer price index is hypothesized 
to negatively affect the bank efficiency, because inflation tends to increase cost and reduce 
cost efficiency. Inflation reflects potential inefficiencies due to price (high interest margin) 
and non-price (excessive branches) behaviour of banks a symptom of high inflationary 
conditions (Grigorian & Manole, 2002). High inflationary conditions are prevalent in 
Ghana. For example, Kasman & Yildirim (2006) documented that inflation increases cost 
and reduces profits as banks tend to compete through expanding branch networks. 
Therefore, inflation is expected to have a negative association with bank efficiency. 
 
4.7 The Issue of Endogeneity 
In this study, bank capitalization and loan loss provision (non-performing loans) are 
considered as endogenous. Many bank studies have considered the relationship between 
bank eﬃciency and non-performing loans as endogenous (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Tabak et 
al., 2011; Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1997; Williams, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007). Thus, an 
increase in non-performing loans is expected to lead to reduction in bank eﬃciency. This is 
because banks would not able to retrieve from borrowers all costs resulting from increase 
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in defaults. On the other hand, lower bank efficiency can increase the rate of default due to 
bank ineﬃciency resulting from high operational expenses and failure to monitor and 
appropriately control credit portfolios (Staub et al., 2010). In terms of bank capitalization, 
well-capitalized banks tend to be efficient. More efficient banks incur lower costs and 
eventually become well-capitalized (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). 
 
4.8 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
This section reports the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of the explanatory 
variables used in determining bank efficiency in Ghana for the period 2001 to 2010.  
 
Table 4.3 shows large variation across banks shown by the minimum and maximum values 
of the factors during the study period 2001 to 2010.  The dispersion of bank specific 
factors (measured by standard deviation) is high. The dispersion is more apparent in CAP 
and LLP (see Appendix B). This suggests the Ghana’s banks are heterogeneous. The 
introduction of universal banking policy in 2003 in Ghana could reduce the heterogeneity 
across banks. 
 
The average GDP growth is 5.7 percent during the study period. Ghana economy has 
enjoyed a sustained economic growth from 2001 to 2010. However, the inflation rate 
continues to show to be high despite the economic and financial reforms. The rate of 
inflation depicts a minimum figure of 10.2 percent and a maximum of 32.9 percent with an  
 
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of the Determinant Factors of Bank Eficiency in 
Ghana 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SIZE 211 11,935 1,388 7,910 14,560 
INF 211 0.164 0.067 0.102 0.329 
LLP 211 0.088 0.084 0.000 0.640 
GDPG 211 0.057 0.012 0.045 0.084 
CAP 211 0.136 0.113 -0.150 0.980 
Notes: INF, LLP, GDPG and CAP are ratios and size in millions. Number of banks is 25. 
 
average of 16.4 percent from 2001 to 2010. The loan loss provision ratio exhibits a 
worrying trend. On average, 8.8 percent of the total loans in the Ghanaian banking industry 
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exhibited a minimum of zero percent and a maximum of 64 percent. The range is 
overwhelmingly substantial during the study period. However, Ghanaian banks are well- 
capitalized where the average bank in the sample has a capital ratio of 13.6 percent. There 
are also noticeable differences in bank size during the study period. 
 
The study also tests for multicollinearity problems between the determinant factors of bank 
efficiency. Table 4.4 reports the results of the correlation matrix of the determinant factors. 
The results show low correlation among the variables and allay the fear of multicollinearity 
problems. The results suggest that there is no signiﬁcant correlation between the 
explanatory variables. A variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis for each explanatory 
variable is conducted to identify variables that are collinear (see Tables 1 and 2 in 
Appendix A). When the VIF is below value of 10 (e.g. Zhu et al., 2007; Wu, 2007; Smith 
et al.,  
 
Table 4.4 Correlation Coefficients of Determinants of Bank Efficiency in Ghana 
Variable SIZE INF LLP GDPG CAP 
SIZE 1.0000     
INF -0.3089 1.0000    
LLP -0.0149 0.0821 1.0000   
GDPG 0.2117 -0.2290 -0.1298   1.0000 
CAP -0.2362 -0.0347 -0.1229 0.0336 1.0000 
 
2009) indicates no problem of multicollinearity. In this study, the highest value of the VIF 
values for efficiency is 1.22 hence support the results. 
 
4.9 Empirical Results and Analysis 
This section presents the results of the level of bank efficiency and the determinants of 
bank efficiency in Ghana. 
 
4.9.1 Average Bank Efficiency Scores by Year 
 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the yearly and overall eﬃciency of the Ghanaian banking 
system over the period 2001 to 2010. The results show that the overall average pure 
technical efficiency score for the Ghanaian banking industry is 0.663 compared with the 
score of 0.505 for the overall average cost efficiency over the period 2001 to 2010. The 
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overall average pure technical efficiency score of 0.663 indicates that on average, banks in 
in Ghana wasted 33.7 percent of input usage relative to the “best-practice” bank. In other 
words, on average, banks could have produced the same amount of outputs with 33.7 
percent fewer input resources. There is much waste of valuable resources in the Ghanaian 
banking system over the period under study.  
 
Similarly, the overall average cost efficiency is 0.505. This implies the Ghanaian bank 
wastes 49.5 percent (almost half) of its costs relative to the “best-practice” bank. In other 
words, on average, the industry could reduce its cost by 49.5 percent and still produce the 
same amount of output. The results suggest Ghanaian bank managers did not use their 
inputs more eﬃciently over the period 2001 to 2010. Overall, the results show relatively 
low average eﬃciency scores during the study period. This suggests that Ghanaian banks 
are operating far from the efficiency frontier.  This also implies that Ghanaian banks can 
obtain bigger cost savings by reducing their managerial and cost inefficiencies. The pure 
technical inefﬁciency (the underutilization of input usage) is an indication of bad senior 
management practices in input-usage and management of the loan portfolio in the form of 
less screening and monitoring of bank borrowers. The underutilization of input resources 
by Ghanaian banks could, in part, be attributed to banks expansion generating higher 
amount of ﬁxed assets which are yet to produce returns (see Sathye, 2003). For example, 
the cost to the banks for the introduction of technologies is high simply because many 
people are not using these technologies. The limited use of technology by bank customers 
is attributed to illiteracy and high cost of using the technology. The cost of using, for 
example, ATM is high and not many customers have access to personal computers limiting 
internet banking usage. Biometric technology is being introduced in Ghana to solve the 
illiteracy problem. In addition, the high interest rates in Ghana confirm the high cost of 
capital and high non-performing loans contributing to high operating costs might explain 
the low level of efficiency of the banks. Thus, Ghanaian banks have inadequate control of 
their operating expenses and therefore should focus more on cost management. 
 
Casu & Girardone (2009), in their study on five European countries, find an increase in 
input waste from 2000-2001 resulting in lower average efficiencies. The authors further 
explain that decreases in bank efficiency can be the cause of bank consolidation which 
allows managers to exploit market power.  Similarly, high levels of inefﬁciency in some 
emerging countries such as India, Turkey and Brazil have also been reported (Sathye, 
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2003; Das & Ghosh, 2006; Denizer et al., 2007; Tescles & Tabak, 2010). In addition, low 
level of cost efficiency has been reported on six emerging South Eastern European 
countries for the period 1998 to 2003 (Staikouras et al., 2008). On the contrary, Fang et al. 
(2011) in their study reported efficiency score of 76.95 percent for the Croatian banking 
sector over period 1998 to 2008. Similarly, Ariff & Can (2008) study reports an average 
cost efﬁciency score of 79 percent for the Chinese banking industry during the period 
1995-2004 and Maudos & Pastor (2003) study documents relatively higher efficiency 
score of 87.1 percent for the Spanish banking sector during 1985-1996.  
 
 Table 4.5 Average Efficiency Scores of the Ghana’s Banking Industry (2001-2010) 
Year Number    PTE CE 
 of banks  Mean Standard Deviation  Mean Standard Deviation 
2001 17  0.660 0.264  0.452 0.263 
2002 18  0.603 0.235  0.416 0.253 
2003 18  0.602 0.178  0.451 0.201 
2004 18  0.606 0.157  0.484 0.188 
2005 20  0.641 0.177  0.486 0.174 
2006 22  0.617 0.199  0.469 0.201 
2007 23  0.614 0.222  0.453 0.196 
2008 25  0.700 0.204  0.526 0.206 
2009 25  0.706 0.212  0.577 0.250 
2010 25  0.819 0.199  0.661 0.276 
Mean   0.663 0.213  0.505 0.231 
Notes: PTE and CE represent pure technical efficiency and cost efﬁciency, respectively. 
 
In terms of yearly results, the mean pure technical efficiency of the Ghanaian banking 
industry improves from 0.660 in 2001 to 0.819 in 2010, an increase of 24.1 percent. Pure 
technical efficiency declines from 0.660 in 2001 to 0.602 in 2003 indicating an increase in 
input wastage, but has a steady improvement in input utilization from 2007 to 2010. 
 
Similarly, the cost efficiency of the Ghanaian banking industry improved considerably 
from 0.452 in 2001 to 0.661 in 2010, an increase of 46.2 percent. In early years, from 2002 
to 2005, cost efficiency increases from 0.416 in 2002 to 0.486 in 2005, showing 
improvement in input utilization, but then declines to 0.469 in 2006 and eventually begins 
to show a steady improvement in input utilization from 2007 to 2010.  
The trend in efficiency from 2007 to 2010 suggests that bank managers in Ghana have 
begun to use their inputs more eﬃciently that is, the managers are able to control the 
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underutilization or wastage of valuable input resources. Nevertheless, the results indicate 
that more effort is still required especially in terms of cost efficiency where a lot of input 
waste occurred.  
 
Our results show both pure technical and cost efficiency are relatively unstable over the 
study period. The instability is more pronounced in cost efficiency than in technical 
efficiency. The results also show the low level of the efficiency scores in Ghana’s banks. 
However, since 2007 there has been remarkable improvement in the efficiency scores in 
Ghana’ banking sector. For instance, the average pure technical efficiency increased 
substantially from 0.706 in 2009 to 0.819 in 2010, representing a yearly increase of 16 
percent, the biggest over the study period. Similarly, the average cost efficiency increased 
from 0.577 in 2009 to 0.661 in 2010 representing a yearly increase of 14.6 percent, also the 
biggest during the study period.  
 
4.9.2 Composition of Efficient Frontier Banks 
Table 4.6 describes the the composition of the Ghanaian bank efficiency frontier, which is 
the input and output combination of the ‘best-practice’ banks in Ghana. Panel A in Table 
4.6 presents the pure technical efficiency frontier and panel B shows the cost efficiency 
frontier. Panel A in Table 4.6 shows a total of 108 out of the 211 observations are regarded 
pure technically efficient over the study period whereas Panel B indicates a total of 62 out 
of the 211 observations are considered as cost efficient. The result reveals that only a small 
 
Table 4.6 Number of Efficient Frontier Banks (2001-2010) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Panel A:PTE 
All Banks 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
11 
 
12 
 
16 
 
12 
 
11 
 
10 
 
12 
 
108 
 
Panel B: CE 
All Banks 
 
 
3 
 
 
5 
 
 
5 
 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
 
7 
 
 
9 
 
 
7 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
62 
 
No. of Banks 
 
17 
 
17 
 
18 
 
19 
 
20 
 
23 
 
23 
 
25 
 
25 
 
25 
 
Notes: All banks are the banks under study. PTE and CE represent pure technical efficiency and cost 
efﬁciency, respectively. 
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number of banks in Ghana is efficient each year. For instance, 12 out of 25 banks are on 
the pure technical efficiency frontiers and 7 out of 25 banks are on the cost efficiency 
frontiers in 2010. The low level of bank cost efficiency apparently reflects the high 
operating and financial costs of managing a bank in Ghana. Only Ghana commercial bank 
(GCB) and Barclays bank (BBG) remain on the cost efficiency frontier from 2001 to 2010 
and 2002 to 2010, respectively (see Appendix D). This suggests that the other efﬁcient 
banks remain on the frontier for a few years but fail to maintain their performances. 
 
Similarly, in terms of pure technical efficiency, only these two banks remain on the pure 
technical efficiency frontier throughout the study period. This indicates the other pure 
technical efficient banks fail to remain on the frontier for longer years. These results 
suggest that the financial reforms have not produced the expected results.  
 
Relative to pre-reforms period the financial sector reforms have improved the bank 
efficiency in Ghana, but there is more room for improvement, especially in terms of bank 
cost efficiency. The cost inefficiency of the Ghanaian banking industry reflects the higher 
cost of operation mainly due to high non-performing loans (inadequate credit monitoring) 
and inefﬁcient control of operating expenses particularly high staff cost and cost of funds. 
This suggests that banks operating in a less competitive banking market such as Ghana are 
able to charge higher prices and interestingly, may not be under any pressure to control 
their costs (see Maudos et al., 2002) and therefore become less cost efficient. High non-
performing loans in Ghana may be attributed to problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard caused by asymmetric information between the banks and their customers. Banks 
can reduce adverse selection by screening potential borrowers and reduce moral hazard 
behaviour by monitoring borrowers (Vennet, 2002) in order to reduce bad debts (non-
performing loans) and therefore total costs leading to increase in cost efficiency. 
 
4.9.3 Determinants of Bank Efficiency 
4.9.3.1 Bank Pure Technical Efficiency 
Tables 4.7 presents the results for both the fixed effect and system GMM pure technical 
efficiency models used in the study. A positive coefficient implies an improvement in 
efficiency while a negative coefficient indicates decline in efficiency.  
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4.9.3.1.1 Model Specification and Validity of Instruments Tests 
 
The diagnostic test of the fixed effect model for the technical efficiency shows p-value of 
the F-test to be 0.001 and therefore F-test is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
confirming the joint significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables (see Table 
4.7). This indicates that the determinants employed are relevant in explaining the pure 
technical efficiency. The analysis of the residuals suggests the existence of 
heteroskedasticity and hence the application of White test (1980) for robust standard error. 
 
In contrast, the results of the dynamic panel model show the p-value of the Hansen test of 
0.921 is deemed closer to one and is viewed with concern (see Table 4.7). Consequently, 
this result suggests that the instruments are not valid (that is, the instruments correlate with 
the error terms). This raises the questions on the specification of the model. On the 
contrary, the difference-in-Hansen test (with p-value of 0.863) confirms the validity of the 
extra moment restrictions imposed by the levels equation in the system GMM 
specification. This suggests that the instruments used for the equations in levels are 
exogenous which strengthens the validity of instruments employed in the system GMM 
estimation.  Further, the p-value of Arellano-Bond test statistics AR(1) is 0.011 which 
shows that AR(1) test rejects the null hypothesis of no existence of ﬁrst-order serial 
autocorrelation in the pure technical efficiency equation. In contrast, the model does not 
exhibit second order serial correlation since the p-value of Arellano-Bond test statistics 
AR(2) is equal to 0.393 (because 0.393 is more than 10 percent level of significance and 
thus cannot reject the null hypothesis). Furthermore, the number of instruments is 
reasonably less than the number of banks. Nevertheless, the results show that the 
coefficient of the lagged pure technical efficiency is insignificant, and endogeneity of loan 
loss provision and capitalization is questionable as indicated by the Hansen test (because 
the p-value of 0.921 is closer to one). This suggests the superiority of the static model over 
the dynamic model. Therefore, the results of the pure technical efficiency are based on the 
fixed effect model estimates.  
 
4.9.3.1.2 Impact of Bank Specific Factors on Pure Technical Efficiency 
 
Table 4.7 shows bank size has a positive relationship with pure technical efficiency and is 
significant, suggesting that larger banks in Ghana have higher level of pure technical  
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Table 4.7 Determinants of Bank Pure Technical Efficiency   
Variable 
PTE  
Fixed Effect Model 
Estimates 
System GMM 
Estimates 
PTEt-1  - 0.117 
  (0.99) 
SIZE 0.522** 0.422 
 (2.71) (1.25) 
INF 4.074* -0.243 
 (1.81) (-0.17) 
LLP 1.784 2.434 
 (0.48) (0.53) 
GDPG -0.874 -12.869 
 (-0.09) (-0.89) 
CAP 7.319*** -7.485 
 (4.57) (-0.66) 
TREND  0.180 
  (1.33) 
CONSTANT -6.693*** -3.737 
 (-2.82) (-0.77) 
R-squared 0.144    
F-Statistic (p-value) 0.001*** 0.000*** 
Wald test Heteroskedasticity (p-value) 0.000***  
Number of observations 211 186 
Number of banks 25 25 
Number of instruments  14 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.921 
Arellano-Bond test:   
   AR(1)  p-value  0.011 
   AR(2)  p-value  0.393 
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-values):   
   GMM instruments for levels    0.863 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below estimates. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. PTE represents pure technical efficiency. F-Statistic is for the joint significance of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second order autocorrelation 
in the first-differenced residuals, respectively.  
 
 
efficiency. This result is similar to studies of Miller & Noulas (1997) on US banks, 
Yildirim (2002) on Turkish banking industry, Ataullah & Le (2006) on India banks, Rezitis 
(2006) on Greece banks and Sufian (2009) on Malaysia banks. The economies of scale 
could be the possible reason for this positive relationship in Ghana. Large banks in Ghana 
operate nationwide and may face more competitive pressures than small banks which often 
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operate within the cities.  Therefore, there is pressure on larger banks to control costs and 
be efficient. 
 
The results in Table 4.7 indicate that bank capitalization has a significant positive effect on 
pure technical efficiency. This suggests that higher capitalized banks in Ghana are pure  
technical efficient. This could be that banks with higher capital are perceived to be 
relatively safe by depositors (capital playing a role of implicit deposit insurance) and 
therefore reduces their cost of borrowing leading to reduction in efficiency (Das & Ghosh, 
2006). This finding is consistent with the results of Isik & Hassan (2003) on Turkey, Casu 
& Girardone (2004) on Italy and Pasiouras (2008) on Greece banks.  
 
On the other hand, the result indicates that loan loss provision ratio is not important factors 
in determining bank pure technical efficiency in Ghana over the study period 2001- 2010.  
It is hypothesized that loan loss provision ratio will always impact negatively on bank 
efficiency since higher efficiency is expected to be associated with better credit risk 
evaluation (Berger & DeYoung, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2000). But interestingly, the results 
in Table 4.7 show that loan loss provision variable exhibits a positive relationship with 
pure technical efficiency. However, it is statistically insignificant and has no impact on 
pure technical efficiency. This result is similar to Altunbas et al. (2000) and Tecles & 
Tabak (2010) studies where efficiency is not very sensitive to credit risk. Similarly, this 
result is consistent with Casu & Girardone (2004) finding on Italian banks. 
 
4.9.3.1.3 Impact of Macroeconomic Factors on Pure Technical Efficiency 
 
The results in Table 4.7 show that the rate of inflation on pure technical efficiency is 
significant and positive. This suggests that the higher the inflation rate, the higher the 
efficiency. The rate of inflation in Ghana has been high and unstable even after economic 
structural adjustment reforms since 1987. The high inflation increases uncertainty the 
banks encounter in Ghana. This reflects the high interest rate charged by Ghanaian banks 
to compensate for their returns after more than two decades of financial service reforms. 
Thus, the positive sign on inflation depicts that Ghanaian banking industry is able to 
benefit from inflationary economic environment as the banks able to pass on the cost of 
inflation to their customers by charge higher lending rates relative to deposit rates. The 
result is similar to the findings of Grigorian & Manole (2006) on the banking sectors in 17 
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Eastern European transition countries. Thus, the high inflation in Ghana may be 
influencing bank behaviour such as stimulating banks to compete through excessive branch 
networks (see Kasman & Yildirim, 2006) and charging high interest margins. 
 
GDP growth rate, on the other hand, has a negative impact on pure technical efficiency, but 
is statistically insignificant in explaining differences in pure technical efficiency. This 
supports the results of Fries & Taci (2005) and di Patti & Hardy (2005) whose studies 
show no significant association between efficiency and GDP growth rate 15 East European 
countries and Pakistan, respectively. However, these two studies find positive relationship 
between GDP growth rate and bank efficiency. 
 
Finally, the findings also suggest that GDP growth rate and loan loss provision have no 
influence on managerial efficiency in Ghana banks between 2001 and 2010. The results 
show that bank capitalization, inflation and bank size are the only factors that influence 
pure technical efﬁciency, which suggests that these factors are important and should be 
accounted for in measuring the pure technical efﬁciency in the Ghana’s banks. 
 
4.9.3.2 Bank Cost Efficiency 
Table 4.8 presents the results of the determinants of bank cost efficiency in Ghana.  
 
4.9.3.2.1 Model Specification and Validity of Instruments Tests 
 
In the case of fixed effect model, the F-test for the overall significance of the explanatory 
variables rejects the null hypothesis that all the explanatory are not different from zero. 
The results indicate that bank size and capitalization are the most important factors in 
determining bank cost efficiency in Ghana (see Table 4.8). The analysis of the residuals 
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and, as a result, White (1980) robust standard 
error test is applied. 
 
In terms of the system GMM, the Arellano-Bond test statistics AR(2) of the residuals do 
not reject the specification of the error term, since the p-value of AR(2), 0.948, is more 
than 10 percent level of significance (see Table 4.8). Thus, there is no serial correlation in 
the error term. The p-value of the Hansen test is 0.881 and therefore fails to reject the null 
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hypothesis of over-identification of the validity of the instruments. Accordingly, the 
Hansen test of over-identiﬁcation reports that the instruments used in the system GMM 
estimation are valid. The difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity (with p-value of 0.784) 
indicates the validity of the extra moment restrictions imposed by the level equations in the 
system GMM specification and that the instruments used for the equations in levels are 
exogenous which strengthens the validity of instruments employed in the system GMM 
estimation. There is no evidence of correlation between the instruments and error terms. In 
addition, since the loan loss provision and capitalization are endogenous variables, the 
analysis of the results is based on the two-step system GMM. Finally, the number of 
instruments is less than the number of banks. 
 
4.9.3.2.2 Impact of Bank Specific Factors on Bank Cost Efficiency 
 
The system GMM results in Table 4.8 show that lagged cost efficiency, GDP growth rate 
and capitalization are the important factors in determining bank cost efficiency in Ghana.  
 
The lagged cost efficiency is significant and has a positive effect on the bank efficiency of 
the current year. This implies that bank cost efficiency tends to persist from year to year. 
This suggests that an increase in lagged cost efficiency could help increase the current 
year’s cost efficiency. The positive lagged cost efficiency may constitute some 
accumulated knowledge and technologies that may help banks to reduce costs (see 
Ataullah & Le, 2006). This implies that the financial services reforms in Ghana’s banking 
industry have encouraged banks to improve their cost efficiency. The result is consistent 
with the studies of Staub et al. (2010) and Manlagnit (2011) which show lagged cost 
efficiency to have positive and significant effect on the current year efficiency. This result 
also suggests that a proper speciﬁcation of cost efficiency should incorporate a dynamic 
term. 
 
Table 4.8 shows that bank size is positive but has no significant impact on cost efficiency 
suggesting that larger banks in Ghana have no cost advantages over their smaller 
counterparts. Similarly, some previous studies did not observe any significant efficiency  
advantage for large banks. For instance, Girardone et al.’s (2004) study on Italian banking 
sector indicates no evidence of association between size and bank eﬃciency suggesting 
that larger banks are not more cost eﬃcient than their smaller ones. Moreover, Staub et 
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al.’s (2010) study on the Brazilian banking system in the recent period 2000 to 2007 find 
that bank size is not an important factor in determining bank cost efﬁciency. The result is 
also consistent with the finding of Ariff & Can (2008) for large Chinese banks. 
 
The bank capitalization coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 10 percent 
level of significance. This result suggests that well-capitalized banks are cost inefficient in 
Ghana contradicting the result documented in Table 4.7. This could be that higher 
shareholders' leverage is forcing banks to sacrifice costs in order to attain better results 
(Tabak et al., 2011). This suggests that moral hazard incentives (as banks are inefficient) 
may increase and banks are more likely to increase costs (see Ariff & Can, 2008). This 
may reduce cost efficiency. Thus, bank capitalization, on the one hand, may reduce bank 
capital risk, but on the other hand, may increase moral hazard incentives leading to 
increase in costs and therefore decline in cost efficiency (Ariff & Can, 2008). Ghana has 
worse credit information environment as the culture of credit risk management practices is 
not well-developed in Ghana’s banking industry (Amissah-Arthur, 2010). In addition, the 
result may be an indication that well-capitalized banks in Ghana incur higher costs due to 
higher cost of capital resulting from the increase in minimum regulatory capital 
requirement (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). This may increase costs and lead to decrease 
in cost efficiency. Thus, financial capital affects costs through its use as a source of 
financing loans (Berger & Mester, 1997; Ariff & Can, 2008; Manlagnit, 2011). This 
suggests raising capital in Ghana involves higher costs than taking deposits generating a 
negative relationship between bank capitalization and efficiency. This finding is similar to 
the results presented by Sufian (2009) on Malaysia over the period 1995-1999, Altunbas et 
al. (2007) on 15 European countries from 1992 to 2000 and Tabak et al (2011) on Latin 
American countries over the period 2001-2008. 
 
Table 4.8 shows loan loss provision (proxy for credit risk) has a negative effect but has no 
significant influence on bank cost efficiency in Ghana during the study period 2001 to 
2010. This is because the loan loss provision to NPLs is only 53.2 percent indicating 
under-provisioning for loans (International Monetary Fund, 2011). This result supports the 
findings of Staub et al. (2010) and Tecles & Tabak (2010) studies on the Brazilian banking 
system from 2000 to 2007 which show that loan loss provision ratio has insignificant 
impact on cost efﬁciency. Furthermore, Yildirim & Philippatos (2007) and Brissimis et al. 
(2008) also find loan loss provision to be negatively related to efficiency.  
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Table 4.8 Determinants of Bank Cost Efficiency      
Variable 
CE   
Fixed Effect Model 
Estimates 
System GMM 
Estimates 
CE t-1 - 0.269* 
  (1.85) 
SIZE 0.511** 0.033 
 (2.42) (0.07) 
INF 1.722 0.794 
 (1.33) (0.38) 
LLP 0.916 -5.445 
 (0.34) (-1.03) 
GDPG -8.665 -42.910* 
 (-1.30) (-1.97) 
CAP 3.501** -28.743* 
 (2.18) (-1.81) 
TREND  0.356 
  (1.36) 
CONSTANT -6.138** 3.815 
 (-2.49) (0.59) 
R-squared 0.109  
F-Statistic (p-value) 0.000*** 0.004*** 
Wald Test Heteroskedasticity (p-value) 0.000***  
Number of observations 211 186 
Number of banks 25 25 
Number of instruments  14 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.881 
Arellano-Bond test:   
   AR(1)  p-value  0.042 
   AR(2)  p-value  0.948 
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-values):   
   GMM instruments for levels    0.784 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below estimates. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. CE represents cost efﬁciency. F-Statistic is for the joint significance of the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second order autocorrelation first-differenced 
residuals, respectively.  
 
 
In addition, Staikouras et al. (2008) assess the cost efficiency of banks operating in six 
emerging South Eastern European countries and find a negative relationship. 
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4.9.3.2.3 Impact of Macroeconomic Factors on Bank Cost Efficiency 
 
The GDP growth rate has a negative and significant effect on bank cost efficiency. This 
shows that economic growth reduces the banks’ cost efficiency. This finding is consistent 
with the studies of Fries & Taci (2005) and Chan & Karim (2010) on the Middle 
Eastern/North African, but opposite to the findings of Maudos et al. (2002) on 10 European 
countries, Grigorian & Manole (2006) on 17 Eastern European countries and Lozano-
Vivas & Pasiouras (2010) on 87 countries, who find that real GDP growth rate is positively 
related to cost efficiency. One possible explanation for the negative relationship is that 
during higher economic growth the banks lower their operating standards, such as less 
evaluation and monitoring of the borrowers leading to higher costs and thereby become 
cost inefficient. Thus, higher economic growth leads to greater risk taking (in less 
competitive banking markets) resulting in reduction in bank cost efficiency (Soedarmono 
et al., 2011).  
 
In the case of inflation rate, contrary to our expectation, the results show that the inflation 
coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant, implying that inflation has a weak 
influence on cost efficiency. The result suggests that high inflation in Ghana does not 
contribute to bank cost efficiency.  This finding supports the study of Yildirim (2002) who 
find no relationship between inflation and cost efficiency. The positive relationship 
revealed in this study indicates that Ghana banks are able to charge higher rates in high 
inflationary environment to compensate for their returns (see Chan & Karim, 2010).  
 
Table 4.8 shows inflation, loan loss provision and bank size have no significant effect on 
bank cost efficiency in Ghana during the study period 2001 to 2010. The results also show 
that only bank capitalization and GDP growth rate influence the cost efﬁciency of banks 
suggesting that these factors should be accounted for in measuring the cost efﬁciency of 
the banks in Ghana. Bank capitalization is the only factor that influences both bank 
managerial (that is, pure technical efficiency) and cost efficiency in Ghana. 
 
4.10 Summary  
The findings reveal that Ghana banks operate with low levels of efﬁciency in a weak 
competitive environment, but the levels of efﬁciency has increased significantly from 2001 
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to 2010, particularly cost efficiency. However, the trend in efficiency from 2007 to 2010 
suggests that bank managers in Ghana have begun to use their inputs more eﬃciently, that 
is, the managers are able to control the underutilization or wastage of valuable input 
resources. The results indicate that more effort is needed especially in the cost efficiency 
which is low relative to pure technical efficiency.  
 
The results show that bank cost efficiency model recognises the dynamic nature of cost 
efficiency indicating the superiority of the system GMM over the fixed effect estimator. 
However, in terms of pure technical efficiency the fixed-effect estimator appears more 
effective.  
 
In terms of the pure technical efficiency, bank size, capitalization and inflation are 
important determinants of pure technical efficiency. The results suggest that higher 
capitalized and larger banks in Ghana are pure technically efficient banks. Interestingly, 
Ghana banks are able to benefit from inflationary economic environment and high rate of 
interest by charging higher lending rates relative to deposit rates.   
 
In the context of cost efficiency, lagged cost efficiency, GDP growth rate and 
capitalization are important factors in determining cost efficiency in Ghana banks. Cost 
efficiency tends to persist from year to year. The positive lagged cost efficiency indicates 
some accumulated knowledge and technologies that may help banks to reduce costs and 
become more efficiency. Further, well-capitalized banks in Ghana incur higher costs 
providing banking products and services due to high level of non-performing loans and 
higher cost of capital resulting from the increase in minimum regulatory capital 
requirement (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). Moreover, higher economic growth in 
Ghana contributes to greater risk taking leading to decline in bank efficiency. 
 
Even though the study reveals that there Ghana’s banks are inefficient, the results 
presented in this study show major improvements in efficiency in comparison to banks’ 
behaviour before the financial sector reforms. Before the financial sector reforms, bank 
efficiency virtually did not exist in Ghana’s banking system. 
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    Chapter 5 
Bank Competition 
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.2 discusses the measurement of 
competition using Lerner index. Section 5.3 reviews some previous studies on bank 
competition. Section 5.4 provides the methodology whereas variables measurements are 
presented in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 presents the empirical results and analysis. The 
chapter concludes with the summary. 
 
5.2 Measurement of Bank Competition  
On the degree of bank competition, Lerner index is employed to measure bank 
competition. Consequently, transcendental logarithmic (translog) total cost function is 
specified and marginal cost computed by using one output and three inputs. 
 
5.2.1 Structural and Non-Structural Indicators 
Structural and non-structural indicators are the two types of competition measurement that 
have gained prominence or widely used in the banking literature to evaluate the 
competitive behaviour of the banking industry. The structural indicators which employ the 
traditional industrial organization theory that focuses on the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm. The SCP paradigm dominated the structure for empirical 
research in industrial organization between 1950s and early 1980s. The SCP hypothesis 
(1951) posits that greater concentration in banking market creates less competitive bank 
behaviour and leads to higher bank profitability. With this approach, the competitive 
characteristics of the industry are derived from structural characteristics that affect the 
firms’ conduct or behaviour and performance. Thus, the SCP paradigm argues that market 
structure drives firms’ conduct, which in turn drives their performance. This approach 
depends on the market structure tests to assess bank competition using the SCP model. The 
market structure tests employ various concentration indices such as the market share of the 
largest banks, or the HHI to measure the degree of competition. However, the limitation of 
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these approaches is that they infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such as 
market structure (e.g. concentration levels, number of firms). Thus, structural approaches 
to measuring competition rely on concentration. Specifically, bank competition is 
considered inverse of HHI or bank concentration ratios. In addition, empirical studies have 
revealed that the relationship between concentration and performance is not always 
positive (see Jackson, 1992, Anzoategui et al., 2010) and that concentration is not a reliable 
measure of competition (see Cetorelli, 1999; Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; 
Fernandez de Guevara et al.,2005; Claessens & Laeven, 2004). 
 
To address these criticisms, an alternative approach, non-structural indicators of 
competition based on the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach has 
become widely popular in the banking literature since the early 1980s. NEIO 
measurements challenge the usual way of using market structure to measure banking 
competition. The NEIO aims to infer the conduct (e.g. pricing policies) of firms directly, 
without considering the analysis of the structure of the market (Degryse et al., 2009). In 
other words, the NEIO methods aim to measure the degree of competition directly by 
addressing firms’ behaviour. The methods require the estimation of equations based on 
theoretical models of price and output determination. In particular, these include tests for 
competitive conditions in contestable markets: conjectural variation (Bresnahan, 1982; 
Lau, 1982), H-statistic (Panzar & Rosse, 1987), Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) and Boone 
Indicator (Boone, 2001, 2008).  Thus, non-structural approaches to estimating competition 
do not rely on concentration. 
 
Many empirical studies in banking have used the Panzar & Rosse (1987) H-Statistic (e.g. 
De Bandt & Davis, 2000; Bikker & Haaf, 2002; Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Claessens, 
2009), Lerner indexes (e.g. Prescott & McCall (1975) for US banks; Angelini & Cetorelli 
(2003) for Italian banks; Fernandez de Guevara & Maudos (2007) for the Spanish banking 
sector; Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005), Carbó et al. (2009), Casu and Girardone (2009) 
for the European banking industry; Solis & Maudos (2008) and Maudos & Solis (2011) for 
the Mexican banking system; Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) for Czech Republic, Delis & 
Tsionas (2009) for European and US banks; Turk-Ariss (2010) for selected region in the 
developing countries, conjectural variation measure by Bresnahan (1982), Lau (1982) and 
recently Boone indicators (e.g. Leuvensteijn et al., 2007; Schaeck & Cihák, 2008). 
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However, the two main and widely used methods for measuring bank competition (or bank 
market power) are H-Statistic (Panzar & Rosse, 1987) and Lerner index (Lerner, 1934). 
 
In our study, Lerner index is chosen to assess bank competition (or market power) for four 
reasons
18
:  
i. it can be estimated for each bank in the sample; consequently, the determinants of 
competition can be analysed by using information at bank level (bank-specific 
variables).  
ii. the evolution of market power can be analysed estimating a Lerner index for each 
year. 
iii. it better reflects competition in broader banking activity, it does not focus only on 
traditional banking loan and deposit services (Carbó et al., 2009).  
iv. it offers a continuous measure of the degree of competition and as a result can have 
higher descriptive power when used as dependent variable in the subsequent 
analysis of determinants of competition (Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara, 2009). 
 
5.2.2 Estimation of Lerner Index 
Lerner index of monopoly (market) power has been widely used in the banking literature 
as a non-structural indicator of the degree of competition (market power is inversely 
related to competition). Lerner index is used to evaluate the difference between the prices 
that banks charge for their product and services and the marginal costs (MC) they pay to 
offer their product and services. In other words, it measures the ability of a bank to fix 
prices of their product and services above their MC. This difference between price and MC 
indicates the existence of market power. The Lerner index measures the capacity to set 
prices (interest rates and fees) above MC as a proportion of prices. This is expressed 
mathematically as: 
 
     Lernerit = 
        
   
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
                                                 
18
 Limitations of Lerner index as an indicator of market power include: a) it relies on the definition of 
revenue and costs; (b) the cost of risk is not included, despites its relevance on bank costs and revenues and 
(c) banking output is usually proxied by the total assets of each firm mainly because of data problems 
(Pindyck, 1985 and Perloff et al., 2007). 
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where P is the price of output and is calculated as total revenue divided by total assets 
following Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005) and Carbó et al. (2009) methods. When the 
Lerner index is equal to zero indicates perfect competition and implies the bank has no 
pricing power. When the Lerner index equals to one indicates pure monopoly implying that 
the banks are able to charge a price far above the MC. The closer the Lerner index to one 
the higher the bank’s market power and the closer to zero signifies increase in competitive 
behaviour of the banks. Finally, when the Lerner index is less than zero it implies pricing is 
below MC. Negative value of Lerner index is possible and it reflects non-optimizing 
behaviour of the banks (Delis & Pagoulatos, 2009; Soedarmono et al., 2011). This means 
that the banks do not function within the principles of a market economy and may be 
supported, for example, by the government (Delis & Pagoulatos, 2009).  
 
5.2.2.1 Specification of Cost Function Model 
As observed in the computation of the Lerner index, it is essential to know the banks 
output prices and their cost functions. The estimation of the cost function is performed 
separately in each bank. This permits the parameters of the cost function to vary from one 
bank to another to reflect different technologies (Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). 
Fixed effects are also introduced in order to capture the effect of possible unobserved 
variables specific to each bank. A time trend variable is added to capture the changes in 
technology over time leading to movements in the cost function over time (Maudos & 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2007).  
 
Following Fernandez de Guevara & Maudos, (2007, 2011), Fungacova & Weill, 2009 and  
Maudos & Solis, (2011), this study estimates a transcendental logarithmic (translog) cost 
function
19
 developed by Christensen et al. (1973)  with one output (total assets) and three 
input prices (price of labour, price of physical capital and price of deposits). The 
unrestricted translog cost function  is specified as follows: 
 
                                                 
19
 The translog cost function offers a second-order Taylor expansion (logarithmic) approximation to an 
arbitrary continuous transformation surface. The translog is preferred to Cobb-Douglas form because it offers 
a better fit than the Cobb-Douglas form (Kumbhakar & lovell, 2000). The Fourier ﬂexible form is even more 
general than the translog production function. However, the results of both cost functions are more or less in 
line with each other (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
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where       
i denotes banks and t denotes years,  
j and k are production inputs, 
TC = total cost which is the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and 
interest expenses,  
y = total assets which is a proxy for the bank output, 
wjit = input prices 
Trend = time trend representing technology, 
α0i = unobserved specific effect, 
v = the disturbance term, 
 , ρ,  ,  , µ, and π are coefﬁcients to be estimated. 
 
The estimation is performed by imposing symmetry of cross-partial derivatives and linear 
homogeneity restrictions in input prices (Fernandez de Guevara & Maudos, 2007, 2011; 
Fungacova & Weill, 2009; Maudos & Solis, 2011). The linear homogeneity
20
 conditions 
are imposed by normalising price of capital and price of deposits by the price of labour. In 
addition, symmetry of cross price effects requires that    =     for all j≠k. After imposing 
linear homogeneity with respect to input prices and symmetry of cross-partial coefﬁcients 
the translog cost function is specified as: 
 
                                                 
20
 In order to correspond to a well-behaved production function, a cost function must be homogeneous of 
degree one in prices; that is, for a fixed level of output, total cost must increase proportionally when all prices 
increase proportionally. 
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where 
i denotes banks and t denotes years, 
TC = total cost which is the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest and interest 
expenses,  
y = total assets which is a proxy for the bank output,  
w1 = price of deposit and is defined as the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits
21
,  
w2 = price of fixed capital and is defined as the ratio of capital-related expenses (i.e. 
operating expenses minus personnel expenses) to fixed assets,  
w3 = price of labour and is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets,  
w1
*
= w1/w3 
w2
*
= w2/w3 
Ø0i = unobserved specific effect, 
µ = the disturbance term, 
    ,  , γ, τ, λ and φ are coefﬁcients to be estimated. 
 
Following Shaffer (1993) Berg and Kim (1994) Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005) and 
Turk-Ariss (2010), it is assumed that the flow of goods and services produced by a bank is 
proportional to its total assets since total assets account for the entire product of the bank, 
thus, total assets is used as a proxy for the bank output in this study. 
 
Finally, a fixed effect regression is used to estimate the coefficients of the cost function 
which are then used to compute the MC. Fixed effect regression model is the preferred 
model because the banks used in our study are not randomly chosen. Due to the lack of 
statistical data information, proxies are used for the banks’ outputs and the three prices of 
inputs following Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara (2005, 2007); Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. 
                                                 
21 There were many missing data on total borrowing. 
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(2008); Fungacova & Weill (2009); Fernandez de Guevara & Maudos (2011) and Turk-
Ariss (2010) studies. 
 
MC is then obtained by taking the first derivative of the translog cost function with respect 
to yit:   
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The coefﬁcients  ,  ,  , and ω3 estimated in the cost function equation (5.3) are plugged 
into equation (5.4) to compute the marginal cost. 
 
5.3 Literature Review 
This section is divided into three parts; evidence of bank competition in developed 
countries and in developing and emerging countries both based on individual-country and 
cross-country studies. 
 
5.3.1 Evidence on Developed Countries 
Individual country studies by Nathan & Neave (1989) for Canada, Vesala (1995) for 
Finland, Hempell (2002) for Germany, and Maudos & Pérez (2003) and Carbó et al. 
(2003) for Spain, all conclude that monopolistic competition is prevalent in these countries 
banking sectors. In addition, Molyneux et al. (1996) examine the degree of competition in 
Japanese banking system in 1986 and 1988 and find existence of monopoly power in 1986, 
but monopolistic competition in 1988. Using data from the period 1988-1996, Coccorese 
(1998) find evidence of monopolistic competition in the Italian banking system.  
 
Smith & Tripe (2001) use pooled regressions for the period from 1996 to 1999 to assess 
New Zealand banking market competitiveness using Panzar & Rosse (1987) H-Statistic 
and find that New Zealand banking market operate under conditions of monopolistic 
competition. The authors’ cross-sectional regression analysis indicates conditions of 
monopolistic competition for 1996, while the analysis suggests the existence of monopoly 
or conjectural variation oligopoly conditions in 1997. There is evidence that the New 
Zealand banking market behaved like a natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable 
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market, perfect competition or sales-maximising firms subject to a break-even constraint in 
1998 and 1999. 
 
Maudos & Pérez (2003) study is one of the studies on Spanish banking sector to assess the 
degree of bank competition. The study spans the period from 1992 to 2001. The authors 
apply both the Lerner index and the Panzar & Rosse H-statistic test to compute bank 
competition and report evidences of monopolistic competition. In the same year, Carbó et 
al. (2003) obtain similar result as Maudos & Pérez (2003) indicating prevalence of 
monopolistic competition in the period 1986-1999, as well as an increase in market power 
since 1996. Similarly, in a recent study on bank competition in Spain, Fernandez de 
Guevara & Maudos (2011) find the existence of monopolistic competition.  Their results 
confirm Maudos & Pérez (2003) and Carbó et al.’s (2003) findings of monopolistic 
competition in Spanish banks since 1996.  
 
In another study, Coccorese (2004) addresses the competitive conditions in the Italian 
banking industry using the Rosse–Panzar H-statistic test for a panel of banks for the period 
1997–1999 both nationwide and in the standard four macro-regions within the country. 
The study shows that Italian banks earn revenues as if they are under conditions of 
monopolistic competition. Their results also indicate that there is a positive association 
between the local economic performance and the degree of competition in the banking 
sector: banks behave competitively where local macroeconomic data reveal lower 
unemployment rates, greater per capita GDP, faster loan growth rates, lower bad loans to 
total loans ratio, and lower market loan rates. 
 
A study by Fernandez de Guevara & Maudos (2007) investigate the degree and 
determinants of market power in the Spanish banking sector in the period 1986-2002. Their 
findings reveal that the market power of the Spanish banking system decreased 
considerably until the mid-1990s, but find existence of an increase of market power from 
the mid-1990s. This is the period the European banking sectors embarked on considerable 
financial reforms and consolidation. Their results also show that the savings banks have 
more market power than the commercial banks. Their study uses fixed effects regression 
model to assess the explanatory factors of market power employing the Lerner index. The 
authors find that bank size has a negative and significant impact on market power. Their 
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findings also indicate that loan loss provision ratio is not an important factor for explaining 
market power in the Spanish banking sector. 
 
Matthews et al. (2007) examine competitive conditions among the major British banks, 
during the period of major structural changes. They estimate the Rosse–Panzar H-statistic 
for a panel of 12 banks for the period 1980–2004. The authors also estimate the Lerner 
index of market power and both measures confirm that UK banking system is 
monopolistically competitive. The study also reports that the intensity of competition in the 
core market for bank lending is almost the same throughout the 1980s and 1990s. On the 
other hand, competition in the non-core business of banking (off-balance sheet business) 
appears to be less intense. The authors are, however, puzzled at the results that competitive 
conditions on the core business of banking (balance sheet business) are unchanged in the 
1990s and 2000s as in the 1980s. This is because their empirical investigation includes a 
number of mergers and acquisitions by banks and newly converted banks. Their results 
reveal a small reduction in concentration in the 1990s, indicating that the mergers and 
acquisitions by the banks have been neutralised by the new bank entrants. 
 
5.3.2 Evidence on Developing and Emerging Countries 
 
Buchs & Mathisen’s (2005) study on 20 banks operating in Ghana during 1998-2003 using 
Panzar-Rosse (1987) approach and find evidence of a non-competitive market structure in 
the Ghanaian banking system. In a later study on bank competition in Ghana, Aboagye et 
al. (2008) use data from 2001 to 2006 and employ the Lerner index (1934) and their 
finding also support the view that Ghanaian banks exhibited market power. Using a fixed 
effects panel regression model to estimate the determinants of competition, they find a 
negative relationship between bank efficiency (proxy by staff costs) and market power. In 
addition, the bank size and time trend have significant positive relationship with market 
power. Thus, increase in bank size leads to more market power. The passage of time leads 
to increase in market power. Furthermore, their result indicates that changes in the rate of 
inflation have strong and negative effect on market power. Their result showed that both 
concentration variables Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) and bank market share in Ghana 
do not lead to market power including credit risk. Thus, bank size, efficiency (proxy by 
staff costs), inflation and time are found to be the most important factors influencing the 
bank competition in Ghana. 
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Yuan (2006) investigates the degree of competition in the banking industry in China over 
the period 1996-2000 before its affiliation with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
using Panzar-Rosse (1987) H-statistic. The findings of the study show that the banking 
system in China is close to perfect competition in the years; 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000, 
whereas monopolistic competition is evidenced in 1998. The four largest banks in China 
show evidence of monopolistic competition from 1996 to 2000. In contrast, the small 
banks operate under conditions of perfect competition under the same period of time. The 
author also suggests that the Chinese banking system was already showing competitive 
behaviour before it became a member of WTO in 2001.  
 
Gunalp & Celik (2006) use the Panzar-Rosse (1987) H-statistic to assess the competitive 
conditions of the Turkish banking industry over the period 1990 to 2000. Their results 
show the existence of monopolistic competition in the Turkish banking industry. The 
authors conclude that their findings are in accordance with the result of Aydinli (1996) on 
the competitiveness of the Turkish banking industry. 
 
Simpasa (2010) examines the intensity of competition experienced by Zambian 
commercial banks in the post-reform era 1998-2006 using unbalanced panel of 388 
observations. Simpasa’s findings indicate the existence of market power in the Zambian 
banking industry. Moreover, in his quest to investigate the factors influencing Zambian 
banking competition, the author finds strong impact of market structure index, capital and 
cost efficiency on market power. The author’s results also indicate that credit risk and 
inflation have negative and significant impact on bank market power in Zambia. 
 
In a more recent study, Maudos & Solis (2011) investigate the evolution of competition in 
the Mexican banking sector from 1993-2005, a period that covers the eras of deregulation, 
liberalization and consolidation of the banking sector in Mexico. The authors find evidence 
of monopolistic competition. Thus the transformation experienced by Mexican banking 
sector have not led to greater competitiveness within the sector. 
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5.3.3 Evidence on Cross-Countries 
Looking at the cross-country studies on the European Union banking markets, Molyneux et 
al. (1994) examine the bank competition on a sample of banks in France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain and the UK for the period 1986-89. They find that monopolistic competition exists 
in all countries except Italy where the monopoly power is observed.  
 
To examine the competitive structure of the banking industry in the entire European Union 
and in individual European Union countries, Bikker & Groeneveld (2000) provide 
evidence of the existence of monopolistic competition in the European banking sectors, 
however, to various degrees. Similarly, De Bandt & Davis (2000) assess the effect of 
European Monetary Union on market conditions for banks operating in the Euro zone over 
the period 1992-1996. The authors provide evidence of monopolistic competition in 
Germany and France for large banks and monopoly for small banks. In Italy, however, the 
study finds that both small and large banks operate under the condition of monopolistic 
competition. The authors also compare European Union banking market with the 
behaviour of US banking markets and find that US banking market shows a higher level of 
competition than European Union banking market. Specifically, De Bandt & Davis (2000) 
find that the behaviour of large banks in the European Union was not fully competitive as 
compared to the US. 
 
In another study on Europe, Weill (2004) measures bank competition for a sample of 12 
European Union countries over the period 1994-1999 and finds monopolistic competition 
in the banking sector for all 12 European Union countries. The author also evaluates the 
relationship between bank competition and X-efficiency and finds evidence of a negative 
relationship between bank competition and efficiency in European Union banking. 
 
Maudos & Nagore (2005) use a panel data of 10,479 annual observations over the period 
1995-1999 to investigate 58 banking sectors from both developed and developing 
countries. Their study examines the effect of bank-specific, regulatory, institutional, 
macroeconomic and financial development variables on bank competition, using 
information at both national and bank level using generalised linear squares with random 
effects. Their findings show that size and bank efficiency explain a substantial proportion 
of market power and are the most important for explaining the differences in market power 
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among banks. The authors also find market structure variables and the level of financial 
development help to explain the differences observed in the levels of bank competition. 
However, their study indicates that macroeconomic and regulatory conditions are not 
important in explaining the differences in market power. 
 
In the same year, Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005) assess the evolution of competition in 
the banking industries of five European countries by estimating the Lerner Index of market 
power and examine their determinants. They employ 18,810 observations of the banking 
sectors of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom over period 1992-1999. 
Their study finds large differences in the Lerner index among the sample countries 
suggesting market power (lack of competition) still exist in spite of the reforms in the 
European banking systems. This trend may be attributed to low level of cross-border bank 
penetration. The low level of integration in the European banking markets is due to natural 
and policy-induced barriers that protects national markets from outside competition. The 
introduction of the single currency and the measures of the Financial Services Action Plan 
over the period 1999-2005 may increase the levels of competition and financial integration. 
Further, the findings of their study suggest that the size of banks, operating efficiency, 
default risk and economic growth are the main explanatory variables for market power. 
The authors apply fixed effects estimator and observe that economic growth and bank size 
have positive and significant effect on market power. Their results also show that default 
risk has positive but insignificant impact on market power and more efficient banks enjoy 
higher margins.  
 
Casu & Girardone (2006) evaluate the effect of increased consolidation as a result of 
deregulation of the financial services in the European Union (EU) and the development of 
the Economic and Monetary Union on the competitive conditions of the EU 15 countries 
banking markets. The authors employ the Panzar-Rosse (1987) H-statistic to assess the 
degree of competition in the EU-15 countries. Their findings show empirical evidence of 
monopolistic competition in the single market. In most countries, banks achieve higher 
cost efficiency through rationalization processes and reduction in cost.  
 
Bikker & Spierdijk (2008) examine the evolution in bank competition spanning 15 years in 
101 countries with 112,343 bank-year observations from 17,476 different banks. Using the 
Panzar-Rosse (1987) H-statistic, the authors document large changes in the 
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competitiveness of the banking industry over time. On average, they observe small changes 
in competition over time in all the 101 countries under evaluation, but substantial 
differences for several countries and regions. For instance, the major Western economies 
under evaluation show a large fall in bank competition during the past years. The EU 
record a substantial fall in the degree of competition, especially the EU 15 record 
approximately 60% drop in the level of competition, with a 10% fall experience by the 
Eastern Europe members of the EU. On the other hand, the emerging countries’ banking 
sectors document more competitive behaviour during the past few years. Consolidation is 
seen as the cause in the fall in competition as consolidation process is seen to create larger 
banks with higher market powers.  
 
Using the 15 older European Union (EU15) countries and 14 Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries, during financial reform periods, Delis & Pagoulatos (2009) find evidence 
of bank competition in 15 older European countries but not in 14 Central and Eastern 
European countries. Using the generalised method of moments (GMM), they examine the 
impact of the quality of institutions, bank size, ownership, inflation, gross domestic 
product per capita and bank capital on bank market power during the financial reforms 
period in EU15 and 14 CEE countries. Their empirical findings reveal a positive 
relationship between institutional quality and bank competition in EU15 which indicates 
institutional quality promotes bank competition in EU15. In contrast, similar banking 
reforms failed to enhance competition in the 14 CEE countries due to insufficient legal, 
institutional and bureaucratic quality. The authors also find negative and significant 
relationship between foreign ownership and market power, re-enforcing the perspective 
that foreign bank entry helps increase efficiency through increased competition and better 
quality of reforms (Javorcik, 2004). This negative relationship, according to their results, is 
more pronounced in the 14 CEE countries. Their results also indicate that publicly owned 
banks have considerable market power in the 14 CEE countries. Bank capitalization and 
size are positively related with market power. There is a negative impact of gross domestic 
product per capita on market power in the EU15 banking sectors and positive in the 14 
CEE countries. Finally, inflation has a negative and significant effect in both EU15 and the 
14 CEE countries.  
 
Turk-Ariss (2009) investigates 12 banking sectors in the Middle East and Northern Africa 
(MENA) countries over the period 2000–2006. Using Panzar & Rosse (1987) H-statistic, 
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the author finds evidence of monopolistic competition in the banking sectors.  On the 
determinants of bank competition, Turk-Ariss observes that bank capitalization has a 
negative effect suggesting that well-capitalized banks operate in less competitive 
environment. This finding is consistent with Bikker & Haaf (2002) results but inconsistent 
with the results of Claessens & Laeven (2004) who find a positive relationship. In broader 
set up, Anzoategui et al. (2010) examine bank competition in the MENA region during 
1994–2008, using the H-statistic and the Lerner index. These two measures suggest that 
the banking sectors in MENA region are less competitive compare to other developing 
countries around the world and have not improved in recent years. They also assess the 
determinants of bank competition across countries and find evidence that lower levels of 
bank competition in the MENA are due to the region’s worse credit information 
environment and high barriers to entry into the banking sector (lower market 
contestability). The authors also find that competition is more pronounced in countries 
with large size of non-bank financial intermediaries. The banking sector is not contestable, 
because of high barriers to entry and exit. 
 
Sun (2011) analyses the effect of both the introduction of euro and before and after the 
recent financial crisis on bank competition in the euro area, the U.S and U.K. The results 
indicate that overall bank competition decline from 0.699 to 0.518 (changes in the values 
of H-Statistic) after the introduction of euro which is consistent with the findings of Bikker 
& Spierdijk (2008), who also report some decline in European banks competitive 
behaviour. Similarly, the bank competition in euro area falls after the financial crisis. The 
decline is more pronounced in US and Spain where large credit and housing booms 
occurred.  
 
Delis (2012) estimates the degree of market power at the bank-level for 84 banking sectors 
drawn from both developed and developing countries across the world with data sample 
ranging from 1987–2005 using the Boone Indicator (2008). The author finds that 
worldwide bank competition steadily improves in the period 1993–2002, but decreases 
after 2003. However, the market power of banks in the lower-middle and low-income 
countries are higher than that observed in high-income countries. Using GMM estimator 
for dynamic panels developed by Blundell & Bond (1998) which permits regressors to be 
treated as exogenous, predetermined, or endogenous, the author analyses the determinants 
of bank-level market power. Delis findings show evidence of positive association between 
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bank capitalization and competition suggesting the importance of bank capitalization for 
the improvement of competition. Similarly, the author notices that bank size is positively 
related to market power. Thus, larger and well-capitalized banks have higher market power 
and the author identifies the causes to be:  
i. banks have access to cheaper sources of funds  
ii. banks cope better with moral hazard issues on the part of borrowers  
In addition, banks market power increase in countries with high inflation. The author 
observed that low income countries have higher values of lagged one market power 
suggesting evidence of informational opacity of the banking systems in less developed 
countries. 
 
On determinants of bank competition, only Delis & Pagoulatos (2009) and Delis (2012) 
employed a dynamic model specification. In other words, other studies used static models 
to investigate the internal and external factors that affect bank competition. They failed to 
recognise the importance of the lagged competition (or lagged market power) on the 
current competition. They also ignore the endogeneity of some of the regressors including 
credit risk and bank capital. Regarding the dynamic nature of bank competition, Berger et 
al. (2000) indicate that developed banking systems may still have informational opacity, 
networking and relationship lending. These characteristics will cause bank rents and 
market power to persist for some time. 
 
Some studies use HHI or bank concentration ratios which are appropriate measure for bank 
concentration in terms of bank competition (market power). However, recent studies have 
identified the inappropriateness of using market concentration measures as indicators of 
banking competition (see Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Claessens & Laeven, 
2004; Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005, 2007; Carbó et al., 2009). Consequently, the non-
structural (that infer market power from the observation of banks’ conduct) indicators of 
competition such as Panzar-Rosse (1987) H-statistics or the Lerner index (1934) among 
others have emerged as the appropriate measures of competition or market power. 
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5.4 Methods 
5.4.1 Estimation of Bank Competition in Ghana’s Banking Industry 
The section computes bank competition using the approach discussed in Section 5.1. Fixed 
effect regression estimator is used to estimate the parameters of the total cost function. The 
results will be used as the dependent variable in the estimation of the determinants of bank 
competition using fixed effect regression estimator for the static model and two-step 
system GMM for the dynamic model (as discussed in the Chapter 3) 
 
The main variables involve in estimating the Lerner index are bank costs, price of total 
assets computed as the ratio of total income (interest and non-interest) to total assets, with 
a single output represented by total assets and three input prices (for deposits, labour 
expenses and capital-related expenses). The input prices are also defined as in Table 4.2.  
 
In the Ghanaian banking industry, interest and operating expenses dominate the bank costs. 
The operating expenses reported in the banks’ annual income statements include the 
following elements: salaries and wages, employee benefits, depreciation and amortisation, 
administrative expenses and software licensing and other information technology expenses. 
The interest expenses are expenses relating to deposits due to customers and deposits from 
banks. These variables and their prices are used to compute the Lerner index (see Table 
4.2). 
 
5.4.2 Determinants of Bank Competition 
The following key factors are considered for identifying the determinants of bank 
competition in the Ghanaian banking industry: credit risk, capital, fee income and bank 
size as bank-specific characteristics, inflation as macroeconomic factor.  
 
5.4.2.1 Static Panel Model of Bank Competition  
The static panel data model that is used to investigate the determinants of the bank 
competition in Ghana as follows:                                        
                                  
                                                                     
                               
  112 
where 
i represents the individual bank and t denotes time, 
  j = parameters to be estimated,  
i = individual bank specific effect,   
eit = error term, 
LERNERit = Lerner index of market power,  
CAPit = capitalization, and is measured as total equity divided by total assets, 
SIZEit = bank size, and is measured as natural logarithm of total assets, 
LLPit = loan loss provision ratio proxy as credit risk, and is measured as loan loss 
            provisions divided by total loans,  
GDPGit = real gross domestic product growth rate,  
FEEit = fee income, and is measured as non-interest income divided by total income 
INFit = inflation rate, and is measured as change in consumer price index.  
 
 This model assumes that all explanatory variables are exogenous. 
 
5.4.2.2 Dynamic Panel Model of Bank Competition  
In terms of the dynamic nature of bank competition, Berger et al. (2000) indicate that 
developed banking systems may still have informational opacity, networking and lending 
relationship
22
. These characteristics will cause bank rents and market power to persist for 
some time. For instance, if a banking industry is characterised by informational opacity 
due to networking, it is likely that the bonds that created the networking are strong and 
thus persistent (Agoraki et al., 2011). To capture the dynamic behaviour of bank 
competition, one-year lagged market power is added to the explanatory variables of the 
dynamic model (5.4). Following Delis & Pagoulatos (2009) and Delis (2012) the dynamic 
panel data model is given as follows: 
 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
                                                 
22 Relationship bank lending can be defined simply as the provision of financial services repeatedly to the 
same customer (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). Firms benefit from relationship lending because it is associated 
with lower loan interest rate, reduction in collateral requirements (Berger & Udell, 1995) and enhanced credit 
availability (Cole, 1998; Elsas & Krahnen, 1998). 
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where  
i represents the individual bank and t denotes time, 
  j = parameters to be estimated,  
i = an individual bank specific effect,   
vit = an error term, 
LERNERit = Lerner index of market power,  
LERNERi,t-1 = one-year lagged market power,  
CAPit = capitalization, and is measured as total equity divided by total assets, 
SIZEit = bank size, and is measured as natural logarithm of total assets, 
LLPit = loan loss provision ratio proxy as credit risk, and is measured as loan loss 
            provisions divided by total loans,  
GDPGit = real gross domestic product growth rate,  
FEEit = fee income, and is measured as non-interest income divided by total income 
INFit = inflation rate, and is measured as change in consumer price index 
 
5.5 Variable Measurements 
This section explains the measurements of the variables used in the determinants of bank 
competition (bank-specific and macroeconomic factors) as well as the signs of their 
relationships with bank competition.   
 
5.5.1   Bank-Specific Factors 
The bank-specific variables considered are size, credit risk, bank capitalization and fee 
income.  
 
5.5.1.1 Size 
In regards to the relationship between bank size and bank competition, it is expected that 
bank size affects the Lerner index positively, indicating that large banks tend to have more 
market power (Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005; Maudos & Nagore, 2005).  
 
5.5.1.2 Credit Risk  
It is hypothesized that the relationship between credit risk and market power is positive. 
Lower loans loss provision ratio will prompt banks to lower their prices relative to 
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marginal cost leading to lower price-cost margins, indicating weaker market power 
(Simpasa, 2010). Hence, the impact of the credit risk on the Lerner Index is expected to be 
positive. 
 
5.5.1.3 Bank Capitalization 
A positive relationship is expected between well-capitalized banks and market power. 
Higher regulatory capital requirements (as mandated by Bank of Ghana in 2006 and 2009) 
will make banks well-capitalized and this will lead to improvement of buffer for risk 
absorption, however, this could increase market power. Tighter regulatory burden will 
prompt banks to raise margins in order to build up adequate capital necessary for absorbing 
risk in the industry (Simpasa, 2010). Similarly, well-capitalized banks have higher market 
power in a less competitive environments, suggesting that banks pay less for deposits 
because depositors view these banks as safe (Maudos & Nagore, 2005). Thus, a positive 
relationship is hypothesized. 
 
5.5.1.4 Fee Income 
 
Fee income is measured as non-interest income divided by total income. This variable is 
included due to the growing importance of non-interest income in recent years in Ghana as 
a result of the increasing competition in the traditional loan and deposit services. Therefore 
a positive impact of fee income on market power is expected. Fee income from non-
traditional services has a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the market power (Maudos 
& Nagore, 2005; Carbo et al., 2009). 
 
5.5.2 Macroeconomic Factor 
The rate of inflation is included to account for the impact of macroeconomic conditions on 
bank competition. This is because macroeconomic developments are likely to affect the 
quality of banks’ assets (Soedarmono et al., 2011). 
 
5.5.2.1 Inflation Rate 
Inflation rate is expected to have a positive relationship with bank market power (negative 
with bank competition). This is because high rate of inflation compels banks to increase 
their product prices leading to high market power (Simpasa, 2010).  
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Finally, in this study, bank capitalization and loan loss provision (non-performing loans) 
are considered as endogenous. The recent banking studies have identified an endogenous 
relationship between market power and bank risk taking (Berger et al., 2009; Uhde & 
Heimeshoff, 2009; Gonzales, 2005; Schaeck & Cihak, 2008, Agoraki et al., 2011). Lower 
credit risk will prompt banks to lower their prices relative to marginal cost weakening 
banks’ market power (Simpasa, 2010). On the other hand, more market power may lead to 
higher credit risk as banks charge higher interest rates on loans making it difficult for the 
bank borrowers to repay their loans (Berger et al., 2009). Similarly, bank capitalization is 
considered to be endogenous determinant factor of market power (Delis & Pagoulatos, 
2009; Delis, 2012). Higher bank capitalization may give banks higher market power. 
Banks with higher market power may generate higher profits leading to higher levels of 
capital. Ultimately, banks with higher market power may have better access to equity 
capital markets (Delis, 2012).  
 
5.6 Empirical Results and Analysis 
This section presents the results of the degree of bank competition and the determinants of 
bank competition of Ghana’s banks during the study period 2001-2010.  
 
5.6.1 Average Output Price and Marginal Cost  
Figure 5.1 shows the prices and marginal costs in Ghana’s banking industry. During the 
study period, the gap between the average price of bank output and MC has not reduced 
much. This in part is due to high interest rates in Ghana as well as the inability of the 
Ghana banks to consistently reduce their operating costs. Even though MC and output 
price have fallen during the study period they are still high. Interestingly, both output price 
and MC run almost parallel to each other. 
 
Figure 5.1 reveals that MC declines from 2001 to 2006 but rises until 2009 and decline 
during the period 2009-2010. In parallel, the average output price declines sharply from 
2001 to 2002 followed by a rise in 2003, but falls again until 2006. The output price again 
increases for three years between 2006 and 2009 and then falls moderately between 2009 
and 2010. During the study period, the average output price decline from 0.230 in 2001 to 
0.168 in 2010 due to the fall of the money market rate. At the same period, MC also 
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Figure 5.1 Average Output Price and Marginal Cost of Ghana’s Banking Industry  
 
 
reduces from 0.138 in 2001 to 0.100 in 2010 as a result of the fall in both financial and 
operating costs. Concurrently, the value of the Lerner index (the relative measure) 
increases from 0.343 in 2001 to 0.400 in 2010 signalling an increase in bank market power. 
This suggests a reduction in bank competition in Ghana over the study period. Thus, Ghana 
banks are able to set prices well above MC over the same period. This pricing behaviour 
has helped the banks to preserve their market power. This finding is consistent with the 
results of Simpasa (2010) on Zambian banking system, where the Lerner index is 
characterised mostly by the high price of bank products and services.  
 
Broadly, the reduction in MC
23
 in the periods 2001 to 2006 and 2009 to 2010 is attributed 
to decrease in operating and financial costs. The decline in operating and financial costs 
reflects the significant reduction in government Treasury bill. At the same time, the output 
price also falls due to fall in lending rates in response to the decline in interest rates on 
government Treasury bill. However, the MC decline faster than the output price. Both MC 
and output price may have seen some decline over the study period, but are still high in 
Ghana.  
 
                                                 
23 Increase in marginal costs is attributed to increase in operating and financial costs whereas increase in price 
response to increase in lending rates.  
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5.6.2 Lerner Index in Ghana’s Banking Industry 
The Lerner Index of market power is also an indicator of the degree of competition. Market 
power is inversely related to competition. Table 5.1 reports the Lerner index for Ghanaian 
banks for each year over the period 2001 to 2010. The market power has increased from 
0.343 in 2001 to 0.400 in 2010 suggesting a decline in bank competition. The average 
Lerner index for the period is 0.349 as oppose to 0.385 recorded by Maudos & Nagore 
(2005) on Ghana for the period from 1995 to 1999 in cross-country studies. Delis& 
Pagoulatos (2009) characterise the value of Lerner index between 0.10 and 0.40 (in most 
EU 15 countries) as moderately competitive behaviour
24
. Consequently, the banking 
environment in Ghana over the study period could be described as moderately competitive. 
This implies that the Ghanaian banking industry experience a weak competition. This 
finding supports the previous empirical studies on banking sectors in both developed and 
developing countries (De Bandt & Davis, 2000 for EU countries; Delis & Pagoulatos, 2009 
for Central and Eastern Europe and the EU; Fungacova et al., 2010 for Russia; Buchs & 
Mathisen, 2005 and Aboagye et al., 2008 for Ghana; Simpasa, 2010 for Zambia). 
 
The development in bank competition in Ghana has not been regular and there is no 
noticeable steady trend towards a strong banking competition over the study period despite 
the experience of economic growth and banking reforms. The reduction in competition in 
 
Table 5.1 Lerner Index in Ghana’s Banking Industry (2001-2010)  
Year Number of 
Banks 
Output 
Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
Marginal 
Cost 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
2001 17 0.230 0.046 0.138 0.046 0.343 0.440 
2002 18 0.181 0.022 0.130 0.074 0.287 0.358 
2003 18 0.185 0.031 0.105 0.037 0.441 0.133 
2004 18 0.175 0.025 0.095 0.028 0.461 0.117 
2005 20 0.160 0.047 0.094 0.027 0.289 0.505 
2006 22 0.135 0.033 0.087 0.018 0.275 0.438 
2007 23 0.144 0.025 0.092 0.024 0.359 0.149 
2008 25 0.154 0.039 0.098 0.032 0.340 0.280 
2009 25 0.175 0.030 0.117 0.043 0.316 0.345 
2010 25 0.168 0.043 0.100 0.032 0.400 0.150 
Mean      0.349 0.318 
Notes: The mean Lerner indices per year are the means of all the Lerner indices of the year for each bank. 
Lerner index of market power is an inverse measure of competition.  
                                                 
24 Maudos and Nagore consider any Lerner index over 0.30 as high market power. 
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the early years of the study period is followed by increase in competition during the 
periods 2001 to 2002, 2004 to 2006 and 2007 to 2009. The Lerner index increases sharply 
from 2009 to 2010 indicating a rise in market power and therefore decline in competition. 
This occurs because interest rates on treasury bills fall from 23.7 percent in 2009 to 12.3 
percent in 2010 as a result of the steady reduction in the government borrowing 
precipitating a decline in the price of output (Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 2011). The 
average lending rate of 33 percent in the beginning of the 2010 falls to to 25.8 percent in 
December 2010 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011), whereas the average interest paid on 
deposits fall from 13.2 percent in 2009 to 8.3 percent in 2010 reducing marginal cost 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). Further, banks in Ghana did not reduce their interest rate 
on loans even with sharp fall in inflation and money market rates from 2009 to 2010. The 
banks assign their insensitivity to the interest rate to high level of non-performing loans 
and higher cost of capital as a result of the increase in minimum regulatory capital 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). This result of less competition is in line with study by 
Anzoategui et al. (2010) who investigate bank competition in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa region during 1994-2008 and attributes it to the region’s worse credit 
information environment and high barriers to entry into the banking market. 
 
In addition, the improvement in competition may be, in part, due to the foreign banks entry 
into the Ghana’s banking market as a result of the financial reforms. For instance, four 
foreign banks (Zenith Bank Limited, United Bank of Africa, Guaranty Bank Limited and 
Intercontinental Bank Limited) and one domestic bank (Fidelity Bank Limited) entered 
Ghana’s banking market between 2004 and 2006 and three foreign banks (Bank of Baroda, 
Access Bank and BSIC) during the period from 2007 to 2008.  
 
Due to high operational costs (as a result of high cost of capital and high non-performing 
loans), high inﬂation rates and less competitive pressures in Ghana interest spread is still 
high in spite of more than two decades of financial reforms (see Barajas et al., 1998). 
 
5.6.3 Determinants of Bank Competition in Ghana 
This section analyses the impact of bank-specific and macroeconomic factors on bank 
competition that impact bank competition in Ghana. The study compares the static and 
dynamic panel models. The determinants of bank competition include size, capitalization, 
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loan loss provision ratio, fee income as the bank specific factors and inflation as the 
macroeconomic factor. For meaningful system GMM results, this study uses a small 
number of determinant factors. This is due to the small number of banks and observations 
used in this study. Increasing the determinant factors will increase the number of 
instruments in the system GMM estimation which may invalidate the system GMM results. 
 
The static model assumes that the determinant factors are all exogenous. Previous studies 
report the possibility of endogeneity in modelling market power and risk relationship 
(Shaeck & Cihak, 2007; Berger et al., 2009) and the association between market power and 
capitalization (Delis, 2009). Therefore, in this study, bank capitalization and loan loss 
provision ratio are considered to be endogenous variables. Consequently, the results of the 
fixed effect model may be considered biased.  
 
The dynamic model treats the lagged dependent variable, capitalization and loan loss 
provision as endogenous. Moreover, the study restricts the GMM instruments to second 
and third lags as well as collapsing the instrument matrix to limit the instruments count. 
Combining the two techniques gives credible results. The regressions are estimated by 
employing the Hansen and second order autocorrelation tests to select the appropriate lags 
used as instruments for the system GMM estimation. Table 6.8 presents the results of the 
determinants of bank market power in Ghana.  
 
5.6.3.1 Model Specification and Validity of Instruments Tests 
The results in Table 5.2 indicate that the fixed effect model (static model) passes the F-test 
(with p-value of 0.081) of the overall significance of the explanatory variables. This shows 
that the determinants employed are relevant in explaining bank competition. White (1980) 
robust standard error test is employed due to the presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals.  
 
The results in Table 5.2 show the Hansen test cannot be rejected and hence is insignificant 
as revealed by the Hansen test p-value of 0.709 (since 0.709 is more than 10 percent level 
of significance). This suggests that the model does not suffer from over-identiﬁcation. 
Therefore, the instruments used in this model are valid, that is, the instruments are not 
correlated with the error term. The results also indicate that second-order (AR2) 
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autocorrelations are not present. This is because the null hypothesis of second-order (AR2) 
autocorrelations cannot be rejected since the p-value of AR2 is 0.318. The results signal 
that the model appears correctly specified. The results in Table 5.2 also reveal a p-value of 
0.491 for the difference-in-Hansen test suggesting that the additional subset of instruments 
used in the system GMM estimates is exogenous. This implies the assumption that any 
correlation between the endogenous variables and unobserved fixed effect is constant over 
time holds. This assumption makes possible the inclusion of the levels equation in the 
system GMM equation. Finally, the number of instruments is reasonably less than the 
number of banks. 
 
Given these results, the analysis of bank competition model will be based on the two-step 
system GMM estimation instead of the fixed effect model. Using the fixed effect model 
estimation will render biased results in the presence of the endogenous variables: lagged 
Lerner index, capitalization and loan loss provision. This indicates the superiority of the 
dynamic model over the static model making the reliance on the system GMM more 
realistic. 
 
5.6.3.2 Impact of Bank Specific Factors on Bank Competition 
The coefficient (0.519) of lagged Lerner index in the model is positive and statistically 
significant at 1 percent level suggesting persistence of bank market power in Ghana (see 
Table 5.2). This finding implies the existence of rigidity in Ghana’s banking industry (see 
Delis & Pagoulatos, 2009). This confirms Acquah (2006) assertion that Bank of Ghana 
distinctively advocates that the entry of new banks be selective, well-managed, and paced 
over time as well as clear exit rules to ensure systemic stability and avoid decline in banks’ 
franchise value. This could contribute, in part, to the high bank operating and financial cost 
in Ghana. The bank operating costs is high generating higher spreads in Ghana. Thus, the 
banks pass on costs to borrowers by charging higher interest to compensate for the higher 
operating costs. Such attitude is reminiscence of the bank market power and reflection of 
less competitive environment in Ghana. In addition, informational opacity due to 
information asymmetry had characterised the lending function in Ghana’s banking 
industry. The problem of information asymmetry puts the banking system at greater risks 
leading to higher lending rates. The evidence of this problem is the Ghanaian banking  
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Table 5.2 Determinants of Bank Market Power  
Variable 
LERNER     
Fixed Effect Model 
Estimates 
System GMM 
Estimates 
LERNERt-1 - 0.519*** 
  (4.92) 
SIZE  0.087** -0.033 
 (2.64) (-0.75) 
INF 0.466 -0.006 
 (1.36) (-0.01) 
LLP 0.050 0.088 
 (0.17) (0.14) 
FEE 0.468 0.258 
 (1.12) (0.63) 
CAP -0.702** -3.082* 
 (-2.18) (-2.03) 
TREND  0.022 
  (0.98) 
CONSTANT -0.801 0.758 
 (-1.67) (1.63) 
R-squared 0.226  
F-Statistic (p-value) 0.081* 0.000*** 
Wald Test Heteroskedasticity (p-value) 0.000***  
Number of observations  186 
Number of banks  25 
Number of instruments  14 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.709 
Arellano-Bond test:   
   AR(1)  p-value  0.042 
   AR(2)  p-value  0.318 
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-values):   
   GMM instruments for levels    0.491 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below the estimates. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. LERNER represents Lerner index of market power. F-Statistic is for the joint significance of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second order autocorrelation 
in the first-differenced residuals, respectively.  
 
industry’s high non-performing loans. However, XDS Data limited, credit reference 
bureau, is operating in Ghana (since 2009) and Hudson Price Data Solutions and Dun and 
Bradstreet (since 2011) to provide credible information on prospective bank borrowers 
(Bank of Ghana, 2009a) to help reduce the problem of information asymmetry. This result 
also suggests that a proper speciﬁcation of market power (or competition) should 
incorporate a dynamic term.  
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It is hypothesized that bank capitalization and market power are positively related 
suggesting that well-capitalized banks have higher market power, which implies that the 
banks pay less for deposits as depositors consider these banks to be more safer (Maudos & 
Nagore, 2005). This lowers the banks’ funding costs. However, the results in Table 6.8 
indicate negative and strong significant relationship between bank capitalization and 
market power. The result indicates that better bank capital adequacy in Ghana reduces 
market power in the banking industry and therefore increases bank competition. The 
possible explanation is that the banks pay more for deposits as depositors perceive them to 
be less safer increasing the banks’ funding costs leading to decrease in market power and 
increase in competition.  
 
Another possible explanation for the negative relationship between bank capitalization and 
market power is the evidence that banks in Ghana pay higher interest on deposits to attract 
depositors because of the high yield on government securities (see 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). This increases funding costs and reduces market power 
and therefore increases competition. This finding supports the view that well-capitalized 
banks are more competitive. It is consistent with the finding by Turk-Ariss (2009) who 
also finds negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect of bank capitalization on market 
power on the Middle East and North Africa banking sectors. Moreover, it is also consistent 
with the results of Bikker & Haaf’s (2002) study on 23 European and non-European 
countries. However, the result differs from the finding of Simpasa (2010) where higher 
regulatory capital requirement appears to increase bank market power and therefore 
reduces bank competition in Zambia. Similarly, Delis & Pagoulatos (2009) find a positive 
impact of bank capitalization on bank market power using bank data from 15 EU and 17 
Central and Eastern countries. In addition, Delis’s study (2012) also shows that bank 
capitalization is positively related to bank market power using 84 banking sectors 
worldwide.  
 
In contrast, fee income is not statistically significant and as a result is not considered 
relevant in the explanation of the differences in market power in Ghana. Fee income is not 
statistically significant because the banking industry in Ghana relies generally on interest 
income. Despite the adoption of universal banking policy, Ghana banks still concentrate on 
the core activities (see Appendix H) rather than fee income activities such as cash 
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management services and financial commitments (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). This 
suggests a lower level of diversification in banks’ sources of income in Ghana.  
 
Similarly, loan loss provision ratio has positive effect on market power. It is statistically 
insignificant and cannot account for the differences in market power in Ghana’s banking 
sector. Nevertheless, the positive relationship suggests that more risky banks have 
compensated their higher probability of default with higher margins.  
 
On the other hand, bank size is negative and has insignificant impact on market power. 
Thus, bank size has weak relationship with bank competition suggesting that bank size 
does not matter as far as Ghana’s banking industry is concern.  This finding also implies 
that there is no evidence that larger banks have more market power than smaller banks in 
Ghana. This is an indication that larger banks do not have cost advantage and therefore 
have no ability to set higher fees. This finding differs from the findings of Aboagye et al. 
(2008) who find that an increase in bank size leads to more market power in Ghana. 
However, the authors applied static fixed effect regression model. This result of weak 
impact of bank size on market power reflects the remarkable decline in bank market 
concentration. The bank concentration in Ghana using HHI has declined considerably from 
1,065.9 points in 2000 to 744.0 points in 2008 (Bank of Ghana, February 2009) 
representing a decrease in bank market concentration of 30.2%, as a result of the increase 
in the number of banks. 
 
5.6.3.3 Impact of Macroeconomic Factors on Bank Competition 
The result reveals that the rate of inflation is statistically insignificant and negatively 
related to market power and therefore has no influence on bank competition. The negative 
relationship between inflation rate and market power is consistent with the finding of  
Aboagye et al. (2008) and Simpasa (2010) who also report that the rate of inflation is 
negatively related to bank market power in Ghana and Zambia. However, the authors find 
that the rate of inflation has significant impact on bank market power employing the static 
fixed effect regression estimator. 
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5.7 Summary  
The findings reveal that Ghana’s banks are weak competitively from 2001 to 2010. The 
findings show that the dynamic term (lagged market power) is significant suggesting that 
bank competition model recognises the dynamic nature of competition indicating the 
superiority of the system GMM over the fixed effect estimator.  
 
Bank capitalization plays an important role in determining the Ghanaian banking industry 
competitive environment. The results indicate that well-capitalized banks are more 
competitive in Ghana. There is also persistence of bank market power in Ghana an 
evidence of the existence of opaqueness and rigidity in Ghana’s banking industry.  
 
The significant lagged market power indicates the importance of dynamic adjustment over 
instantaneous adjustment. The finding reveal that the dynamic models are more appropriate 
in estimating the determinants of bank competition in Ghana’s banking industry relative to 
the static model.  
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    Chapter 6 
Causality Between Bank Efficiency and Bank Competition in 
Ghana 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The third objective of this study is to investigate the causality between bank competition 
and efficiency. The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 6.2 presents relationship 
between bank efficiency and bank competition. Section 6.3 describes the literature review. 
Section 6.4 discusses the empirical models and method used to estimate the causality 
between bank efficiency and bank competition. Section 6.5 presents the results and Section 
6.6 provides the summary of the chapter. 
 
6.2 Relationship between Bank Efficiency and Bank Competition 
 
Competition, in this financial reform era, is perceived to foster efficiency. This perspective 
is supported by the quiet-life hypothesis proposed by Hicks (1935) which supports a 
positive (negative) causality only running from competition (market  power) to efficiency. 
Quiet-life hypothesis indicates that firms with greater market power may take advantage of 
the gains from less competitive environment in which managers are under no pressure to 
reduce cost. Berger & Hannan (1998) support this view and suggest that the lack of 
competition may also reduce the effort of managers to operate efficiently supporting the 
quiet-life hypothesis. On the other hand, the efficiency-structure hypothesis, proposed by 
Demsetz (1973) posits a reverse causality between competition and cost efficiency. Berger 
(1995), Goldberg & Rai (1996) and Weill (2004) also supported this hypothesis. The 
efficiency-structure hypothesis explains that efficient firms can reduce costs and as a result 
have higher market share which leads to a higher level of concentration indicating lower 
level of competition. Thus, causality runs from efficiency to competition. Similarly, more 
efficient banks (banks with better management of their inputs) can benefit from their 
greater efficiency and use it as a barrier to entry and hence achieve greater market power 
(Fernandez de Guevara & Maudos, 2007). The relationship will be estimated using the 
Stata software.  
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The association between bank efficiency and competition is of great interest because of its 
policy implications regarding bank failures, economic development, and financial stability. 
 
6.3 Literature Review 
 
There are only a few studies that have investigated the relationship between bank 
competition and efficiency, most of them regressed cost efficiency on a set of variables for 
market structure (HHI or bank concentration ratio), for example, Berger & Hannan (1998) 
on US banks; Weill (2004), Casu & Girardone (2006), Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara 
(2007) on European banks; Ataullah & Le (2006) on India. More precisely, Berger and 
Hannan (1998) investigate the relationship between bank market structure and bank cost 
efficiency for the U.S. banking sector. The authors find that market power negatively 
relates to cost efficiency. Similarly, Casu & Girardone (2006) study on 15 European Union 
countries for the period 1997-2003 reports a negative association between bank 
competition and bank efficiency suggesting that a more efficient banking systems can be 
less competitive. Casu & Girardone finding is supported by Weill’s (2004) study on the 
EU banking systems. Using the Indian banking industry over the period 1992-1998, 
Ataullah & Le (2006) report a positive relationship between bank competition and bank 
efficiency. In these studies, the HHI or bank concentration ratio is considered as inverse of 
bank competition. 
 
In Maudos & Fernandez de Guevara (2007) study, the authors focus on the impact of 
market power (using Lerner index) on the cost efficiency of banks with data from the 15 
European Union countries. Their result documents that market power positively links with 
cost efficiency.  
 
Williams (2012) investigates the relationship between bank efficiency and market power to 
primarily test the quiet life hypothesis for a sample of 419 Latin American commercial 
banks over the period 1985-2010. The author employs two-stage least squares model with 
instrumental variables to control for the simultaneous relationship between bank efﬁciency 
and market power (using Lerner index). The author’s result rejects the quiet life hypothesis 
in favour of the efﬁcient structure hypothesis. 
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With the exception of the study by Ataullah & Le (2006) which used the dynamic method 
system GMM, the rest of the studies use static regression models such as Tobit regression 
model, logistic regression model, two-stage least squares, generalised least squares and 
fixed or random effect regression models in their estimations.  
 
However, only a handful of recent studies have directly addressed the issue of the causality 
between competition and efficiency (see Casu & Girardone, 2009; Pruteanu-Podpiera et 
al., 2008; Schaeck & Cihák, 2008; Ab-Rahim et al., 2011). For example, Schaeck & Cihák 
(2008) study on the relationship between efficiency, competition and soundness in EU and 
US banking sectors and find evidence that Granger-causality runs from bank competition 
to cost efficiency, but not vice versa. Their samples span over the period 1995-2005 and 
include 3,665 banks from Europe and 8,990 banks from the US.  
 
Using data on Czech banking system over the period 1994-2005, Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. 
(2008) investigate the effect and evolution of bank competition and the relationship with 
cost efficiency. The authors did not include any other explanatory variables besides 
competition and efficiency. Their results, based on Granger-causality techniques, indicate 
that causality between bank competition and bank efficiency run in both directions. 
Moreover, the authors also notice evidence of a negative relationship between market 
power and efficiency in the Czech banking sector. Their results, therefore, reject the quiet 
life hypothesis which posits a negative relationship between market power and efficiency. 
It indicates that the higher the market power, the lower the effort of managers to maximize 
operating efficiency and hence managers enjoy “quite life”. This means managers are 
under no pressure to reduce cost. Therefore, firms with market power choose to operate 
inefficiently. 
 
Using similar method employed by Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008), Casu & Girardone 
(2009) used an unbalanced sample of 2701 commercial bank observations operating in 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom over the period 2000-2005 to 
investigate the causality between bank efficiency and bank competition using Granger-
causality test. Similar to Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008), the authors did not include any 
other explanatory variables in their model. They notice that market power may have 
positive impact on bank efficiency. On the other hand, their study reports a weak causality 
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running from bank efficiency to bank competition. Their results, however, do not suggest 
that increases in bank efficiency enhance market power.  
 
Ab-Rahim et al. (2011) examine the causality between bank competition and bank 
efficiency (technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency) using 10 
domestic Malaysian banks over period 1995–2005. The authors apply generalized least 
square estimator to estimate the causal relationship between bank competition and bank 
efficiency. Their results reveal that positive causality runs from bank competition to bank 
efficiency. The reverse causality indicates a negative causality running from bank 
efficiency to bank competition.  
 
A few recent studies have directly addressed the issue of the causality between competition 
and efficiency (see Pruteanu-Podpiera et al., 2008; Schaeck & Cihák, 2008; Casu & 
Girardone, 2009; Ab-Rahim et al., 2011). The linkage between bank efficiency and 
competition is of great interest because of its policy implications for bank efficiency, bank 
failures, financial stability and economic development.  
 
6.4 Estimation Method 
 
The recent bank studies have adopted dynamic GMM approach (a departure from static 
approach used by previous studies) using Granger-causality test to assess the causality 
between competition and efficiency. The pioneers of this approach are Pruteanu-Podpiera 
et al. (2008) and Casu & Girardone (2009). These authors applied either the first-
differenced GMM estimator (Pruteanu-Podpiera et al., 2008) or system GMM estimator 
(Casu & Girardone, 2009).  
 
Following Casu & Girardone (2009) method, the Granger-causality analysis is performed 
using a two-step system GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error 
(for small sample bias) as described in Chapter 3.  
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6.4.1 Granger Causality Test  
According to Granger causality, a variable X Granger-causes variable Y if past values of 
variable X contain information that helps predict or better explain the present value of 
variable Y.  
 
It is essential to note that the Granger causality tests only indicate that changes in one 
variable precede changes in another variable of interest. Inferences on causality is achieved 
by running Wald tests on the coefficients of the lagged X and lagged Y in order to check 
whether they are jointly statistically different from zero (Casu & Girardone, 2009).  
 
6.4.2 Empirical Models 
This study follows Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) and Casu & Girardone 
(2009)
25
framework, the dynamic panel data model used to assess the Granger causal 
relationship between bank efficiency and competition as follows
26
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where  
i represents the individual bank and t denotes time, 
 j,  j,    and    = parameters to be estimated, 
i = individual bank fixed effect,   
 it and     = error terms, 
LERNERit = Lerner index of bank market power,  
LERNERi(t-j) = j
th
 lagged market power, j =1,2, …n 
EFFit = pure technical efficiency (PTE) or cost efficiency (CE) of the bank i   
                                                 
25 Pruteanu-Podpiera, et al. (2008) and Casu and Girardone (2009) did not include any other explanatory 
variable as such it is viewed as a baseline specification model. 
26 The causality uses the bank efficiency and bank competition computed in chapters 4 and 5 respectivlely. 
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EFFi(t-j) = j
th
 lagged pure technical efficiency or cost efficiency, j =1,2,…n 
 
In addition, the optimal lag length n of the variables involved in the causality test is based 
on Schwarz information criterion (SIC). It is imperative to note that Granger causality test 
results are sensitive to the choice of lag length in vector autoregression (VAR) model and 
therefore it is essential to specify the lag structure correctly (Hartwig, 2010, 2011). 
 
We test the following hypotheses: 
i. the coefficients ψi are set jointly equal to zero (to test whether competition 
Granger-causes efficiency) 
ii. the coefficients ϔi are set jointly equal to zero (to test whether efficiency Granger-
causes competition) 
 
The test statistics is distributed as χ2 with two degrees of freedom. The sign of the causal 
relationship is assessed by the sum of the jointly signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. A positive 
(negative) sum implies that the causal relationship is also positive (negative), that is, an 
increase (decrease) in EFF in the past increased (decreased) the LERNER in the present 
(see Casu & Girardone, 2009). 
 
6.5 Empirical Results and Analysis 
A Granger causality test between efficiency and competition tests whether causality runs at 
least in one direction and possibly in both directions. 
 
Before examining Granger causality between bank efficiency and competition, we decide 
to explicitly test efficiency and competition for stationarity. Since the data structure of this 
study is unbalanced panel, the stationarity of the variables (PTE, CE and LERNER) is 
assessed using unit root test developed by Maddala & Wu (1999) for unbalanced panels 
based on Fisher
27
 (1932) test that uses Phillips-Perron (1988) test. Phillips-Perron test 
accounts for serial correlation using the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation-consistent covariance matrix estimator. The null hypothesis assumes the 
existence of non-stationarity in all the series and the alternative 
                                                 
27 Fisher test does not require a balanced panel. In practice, the Fisher test may reduce the bias caused by the 
lag selection (Maddala and Wu, 1999). Another variant of Fisher test is augmented Dickey-Fuller. 
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Table 6.1 Fisher Philips-Perron Panel Unit Root Test Results 
 PTE  CE  LERNER 
  Statistic P-value  Statistic P-value  Statistic P-value 
PP-Fisher χ2 267.578 0.000  238.417 0.000  183.875 0.000 
Note: LERNER, PTE and CE represent the Lerner index of market power, pure technical efficiency and cost 
efﬁciency, respectively. 
 
hypothesis is that at least one series is stationary. Table 6.1 reports the results of the Fisher 
unit root test. The results in Table 6.1 reject the null hypothesis that all panel series are 
non-stationary in levels for efficiency and competition. 
 
6.5.1 Causality Tests 
 
Granger causality tests are sensitive to the selection of lag lengths, and could influence the 
results. The maximum lag length for the vector autoregression (VAR) is set at 4, and the 
Schwarz Information Criterion is used to select the appropriate lag length following  
 
Table 6.2 Causality Test: Optimal Lag Length using Schwarz Information Criterion 
Lag 1 2 3 4 
Variable: 
CE 
 
1.217 
 
1.339 
 
1.402 
 
1.547 
PTE 1.700 1.723 1.846 1.993 
Note: PTE and CE represent pure technical efficiency and cost efﬁciency, respectively. 
 
Atukeren (2008), Hartwig (2010) and Miyakoshi & Tsukuda (2004). Table 6.2 shows that 
based on Schwarz information criterion the optimal lag length is one. 
 
The next step is to estimate the causal relationship between efficiency and competition 
using the two-step system GMM estimator (using lag-one efficiency and lag-one market 
power as explanatory variables). The small sample standard error correction proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005) has been applied.  
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6.5.1.1 Causality Tests between Bank Pure Technical Efﬁciency and Bank 
Competition 
 
To investigate the causality running from pure technical efﬁciency to competition, the 
dependent variable is competition and the endogenous explanatory variables are lagged 
pure technical efficiency and lagged market power. The results are presented in the Table 
6.3. 
 
Table 6.3 Granger Causality Tests (dependent variable → competition) 
Dependent Variable                                                      
LERNER  
System GMM 
Estimates 
P-value 
CONSTANT 0.207*** 0.002 
 (3.46)  
LERNERt-1 0.550*** 0.001 
 (3.84)  
PTE t-1 0.006 0.734 
 (0.34)  
F-Statistics (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Number of observations 186  
Number of banks 25  
Number of instruments 8  
Hansen test (p-value) 0.362  
   AR(1)  p-value 
   AR(2)  p-value 
0.110 
0.259 
 
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-value):   
   GMM instruments for levels 0.149  
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Time 
trend is included in the model. LERNER and PTE represent Lerner index of market power and pure technical 
efﬁciency, respectively. F-Statistic is for the joint significance of the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first and second order autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
residuals, respectively. Market power is inversely related to competition. 
 
Table 6.3 shows the results of the Granger causality test with competition as the dependent 
variable. The results in Table 6.3 do not reject the null hypothesis of no causality running 
from pure technical efﬁciency to competition since the p-value of the lagged pure technical 
efficiency, 0.734, is greater than 10 percent level of significance. Therefore pure technical 
efﬁciency does not Granger-cause market power (competition). In other words, there is no 
evidence that increases in market power precede increases in pure technical efﬁciency 
indicating that lagged pure technical efficiency cannot be used to predict current market 
power (competition). It should be noted that the p-value of difference-in-Hansen test is 
above the conventional level of significance but it is still considered small and should be 
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viewed with concern (Roodman, 2007). The result also shows that the lagged competition 
is statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that current competition is inﬂuenced by previous 
years' competition. 
 
Table 6.4 shows the results of the Granger causality test with pure technical efficiency as 
the dependent variable and it is regressed on lagged pure technical efficiency and lagged 
competition. Table 6.4 results do not reject the null hypothesis of no causality running  
 
Table 6.4 Granger Causality Tests (dependent variable → pure technical efficiency) 
Dependent Variable 
PTE  
System GMM 
Estimates 
P-value 
CONSTANT -0.843** 0.044 
 (-2.13)  
PTE t-1 0.348 0.042 
 (0.042)  
LERNERt-1 0.623 0.581 
 (0.56)  
F-Statistics (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Number of observations 186  
Number of banks 25  
Number of instruments 8  
Hansen test (p-value) 0.134  
Arellano-Bond test:   
   AR(1)  p-value 0.024  
   AR(2)  p-value 0.416  
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-value):   
   GMM instruments for levels   0.432  
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Time 
trend is included in the model. LERNER and PTE represent Lerner index of market power and pure technical 
efﬁciency, respectively. F-Statistic is for the joint significance of the coefficients. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests 
for first and second order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. Market power is 
inversely related to competition. 
 
 
from competition to pure technical efﬁciency since the p-value of the lagged market power, 
0.581, is greater than 10 percent level of significance. The result shows that competition 
does not Granger-cause pure technical efﬁciency. This means increases bank competition 
do not foster pure technical efficiency. In addition, the result reveals that the lagged pure 
technical efficiency is not different from zero implying that current pure technical 
efficiency does not rely on previous years' pure technical efficiency.  
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The results in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 indicate that there is no causal relationship between pure 
technical efficiency and market power. The diagnostic tests are all appropriate except that 
the p-value of the Hansen test appears small even though it is above the conventional level 
of significance. 
 
6.5.1.2 Causality Tests between Bank Cost Efﬁciency and Bank Competition 
This section presents the results of the causal relationship between bank cost efficiency and 
competition. Lerner index of market power is estimated as a function of lagged 
competition and lagged cost efﬁciency.  
 
Table 6.5 results show that the lagged cost efficiency coefficient is positive and significant 
at the 10 percent level. The p-value of 0.057 rejects the null hypothesis of no causality 
 
Table 6.5 Granger Causality Tests (dependent variable → competition) 
Dependent Variable                                                      
LERNER 
System GMM 
Estimates 
P-value 
CONSTANT 0.237*** 0.000   
 (6.30)  
LERNERt-1 0.475*** 0.000 
 (7.12)  
CEt-1 0.020* 0.057 
 (2.00)  
F-Statistics 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Number of observations 186  
Number of banks 25  
Number of instruments 8  
Hansen test (p-value) 0.732  
Arellano-Bond test:   
   AR(1)  p-value 0.048  
   AR(2)  p-value 0.349  
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-value):   
   GMM instruments for levels   0.376  
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Time 
trend is included in the model. LERNER and CE represent Lerner index of market power and cost efﬁciency, 
respectively. F-Statistic is for the joint significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are tests for first and second order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. 
Market power is inversely related to competition. 
 
running from cost efﬁciency to competition at the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance. The 
results show that efficiency positively Granger-causes market power and hence efficiency 
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negatively Granger-causes competition. This result is consistent with Demsetz’s (1973) 
efficient structure hypothesis, where higher cost efficiency leads to higher market power. 
This result suggests that cost efficient banks operating in Ghana could reduce costs and 
gain higher market shares and as such increase their market power relative to their 
competitors. Thus, bank managers have incentives to reduce cost as that could increase 
their market power. The finding urges the Ghana bank regulators and policy makers to 
promote or pursue policies that enhance bank cost efficiency. However, these policies 
could also increase market power leading to less competition in Ghana’s banking market. 
The policymakers face trade-off. Similar results have been reported by Weill (2004) on 
European banks, Weill et al. (2006) on Czech banking industry, Maudos & Fernandez De 
Guevara (2007) on Spanish banking sector, Koetter et al. (2008) on US banks and 
Williams (2012) on 419 Latin American commercial banks but opposite to the findings of 
Casu & Girardone (2009) whose study reveals that higher market power enable banks in 
five European Union countries to attain higher level of cost efﬁciency. Competition can 
enhance or deteriorate financial stability of banks. The implication of this finding is that 
any policies relating to bank competition should first look at the potential impact on bank 
cost efficiency. In other words, policymakers can design or use policies that would 
promote bank cost efficiency in order to achieve increase in bank competition. Therefore, 
the improvement in bank cost efficiency should be the focus of regulatory policies so as to 
ensure competitive conditions in Ghana’s banking industry. The economic rationale of this 
finding is that it saves the government the cost of designing and implementing competition 
policies that would not have any impact on bank cost efficiency. This is because the result 
suggests that policies on cost efficiency will rather have effect on bank competition.  
 
The finding that lagged cost efficiency leads to increase in current market power is 
essential from the view of bank prudential regulation. The trend in cost efficiency could 
serve as early indicator of the direction of bank competition in Ghana. 
 
To examine the reverse causality running from competition to cost efficiency, the 
dependent variable is cost efficiency and lagged cost efficiency and lagged market power 
as endogenous explanatory variables. The results in Table 6.6 reveal that the reverse 
causality running from market power to cost efficiency offers no evidence that market 
power (competition) Granger-cause cost efﬁciency (no rejection on p-value = 0.917).  The 
result shows that market power has no significant impact on cost efficiency. This finding 
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raises questions about policies that are directed to promote bank competition with the 
objective of reducing the price of financial services and products (see Fang et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the results indicate that pursuing greater bank competition in Ghana may not 
help banks to gain economies of scale in monitoring and consequently, may have no 
impact on loan rates (see Fang et al., 2011). The result does not support the existence of the 
 
Table 6.6 Granger Causality Tests (dependent variable → cost efficiency) 
Dependent Variable                                           
CE 
System GMM 
Estimates 
P-value 
CONSTANT -0.829*** 0.000 
 (-4.54)  
CEt-1 0.354** 
(2.23) 
0.035 
LERNERt-1 0.067  0.917 
 (0.11)  
F-Statistics (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Number of observations 186  
Number of banks 25  
Number of instruments 8  
Hansen test (p-value) 0.25  
Arellano-Bond test:   
   AR(1)  p-value 0.047  
   AR(2)  p-value 0.272  
Difference-in-Hansen test (p-value):   
   GMM instruments for levels  0.322  
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Time 
trend is included in the model. LERNER and CE represent Lerner index of market power and cost efﬁciency, 
respectively. F-Statistic is for the joint significance of the coefficients of the explanatory variables. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are tests for first and second order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, respectively. 
Market power is inversely related to competition. 
 
Hick’s (1935) quiet life hypothesis in Ghana’s banking industry since an increase in bank 
market power does not lead to a reduction in bank cost efficiency. 
 
The causality findings in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 reveal that the causality between bank market 
power (competition) and bank cost efficiency is not bidirectional but rather unidirectional, 
this is because causality runs only from bank cost efficiency to market power (competition) 
but not vice versa.  
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6.6 Summary  
The findings indicate that there is no evidence of causal association between bank pure 
technical efficiency and bank competition. On the contrary, causality runs only from cost 
efficiency to competition but not vice versa, suggesting that cost efficiency can be used to 
predict the direction of bank competition. Thus, increase in bank cost efficiency could 
encourage more bank market power and hence less competition.  Thus, to increase bank 
cost efficiency, the Bank of Ghana (banks regulator) may have to allow some increase in 
bank market power. However, the reverse causality indicates that increase in bank market 
power (competition) cannot stimulate cost efficiency in Ghana’s banking industry. 
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    Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
7.1 Introduction  
Ghana’s banking industry has undergone major financial reforms since 1988 which have 
transformed the banking industry by enhancing bank competition, efficiency and 
productivity. The financial reform process has been gradual but consistent. The financial 
sector reforms are aimed at increasing banks competitiveness, efficiency and performance 
in Ghana’s banking system that could then contribute in greater measure to stimulate 
economic growth and ensure financial stability. During the pre-reforms era, Ghana’s 
banking industry was besieged with inadequate capital, insufficient loans loss provisions, 
high operating costs due to inefficient operations, high nonperforming loans and endured 
immense political influence (International Monetary Fund, 1999; World Bank, 1989). The 
reforms have undoubtedly increased the capacity of financial institutions to mobilise 
domestic savings and strengthened economic growth in Ghana.  
 
It is expected that increased competition in the ﬁnancial sector will to lead to lower costs 
and improve efﬁciency, offer greater product innovation and enhance the quality of 
ﬁnancial products (Claessens, 2009). However, it is not clear that deregulation process that 
increases bank competitiveness always improves bank efficiency (Fecher & Pestieau, 
1993). Thus, the association between competition and bank performance is more complex 
(Claessen & Leaven, 2004) and that it is naïve to assume that bank competition is always 
good.  
 
Thus, the studies in bank competition in both developed and developing countries have 
reported mixed results. Most studies on banking sectors have shown evidence of imperfect 
competitions in developing and emerging countries (Gunalp & Celik, 2006 on Turkey; 
Maudos & Solis, 2011 on Mexico; Simpasa, 2010 on Zambia; and Aboagye et al., 2008 on 
Ghana) in developed countries (Fernandez de Guevara & Maudos, 2011 on Spain; 
Matthews et al., 2007 on Britain; and Rezitis, 2010 on Greece) and in cross-country studies 
(Claessens & Laeven, 2004 on 50 developed and developing countries; Soedarmono et al., 
2011 on 12 Asian countries; Anzoategui et al., 2010 on Middle East and Northern Africa 
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region; and Weill, 2004 on 12 EU countries). In contrast, very few studies have reported 
perfect competition. For example, Nathan and Neave (1989) in their study find perfect 
competition for Canadian banks in 1982, but reject the hypothesis of monopoly and perfect 
competition for Canadian banks over the period 1983-1984. Staikouras et al.’s (2001) 
study on Argentina reports that competitive conditions in Argentina banks are closer to 
perfect competition for the period 1997 to 1999. Similarly, Yuan (2006) investigates the 
degree of competition in the banking industry in China over the period 1996-2000 before it 
became a member of WTO and finds that the banking system in China is closer to perfect 
competition. 
 
Similarly, various studies on financial reforms and efficiency have indicated mixed results 
as well. For instance, individual country bank studies by Gilbert & Wilson (1998) on 
Korea, Kumbhakar & Lozano-Vivas (2001) on Spain and Mukherjee et al. (2001) on the 
US, and cross-country bank studies by Ataullah et al. (2004) on India and Pakistan, Casu et 
al. (2003) on Italy and Spain, Hermes & Nhung (2010) on four Latin America and six Asia 
countries have found some favourable effect of financial sector reforms on bank efficiency. 
On the other hand, individual country studies by Wheelock & Wilson (1999) on U.S banks, 
Sturm & Williams (2004) on Australian banks, Ariff & Can (2008) on Chinese banks and 
Sathye (2003) on Indian banks and cross-country studies by Casu et al. (2003) on French 
and German banks and Fries & Taci (2005) on 15 East European countries banks have 
reported inefficiencies in these banking sectors.  
 
The Ghana’s banking reforms are designed to modernise the banking system. The main 
reforms include the elimination of restrictions of foreign banks entry, liberalisation of 
banks interest rates and bank charges, new regulatory and supervisory framework, and 
modernization of payment and settlement system. Currently, there are 27 banks operating 
in Ghana, all under the licence of universal banking. Only three banks are state-owned, 
namely Ghana Commercial Bank, Agricultural Development Bank and National 
Investment Bank. The Ghanaian banking reform is still on-going so the understanding of 
bank efficiency and competition and their determinants as well as the causal relationship 
between bank efficiency and competition is vital to ensure improvements in bank 
efficiency and competition which could ultimately ensure financial stability and stimulate 
economic growth in Ghana. Thus, the present research in bank efficiency and competition 
in Ghana’s banking industry after two decades of banking reforms is informative and 
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necessary to policymakers, regulators and bank management in Ghana that are interested in 
the level of bank efficiency and the degree of bank competition and their determinants. In 
addition, the causal direction between bank efficiency and competition will determine what 
policies should be geared towards bank competition in order to help enhance bank 
efficiency or vice versa. The policymakers and regulators have come to realize the vital 
role the banking industry plays in the Ghana’s economy. That is, the role in having a safe 
and sound banking system to facilitate financial stability and economic development. 
 
This study investigates the level of bank efficiency and the degree of bank competition and 
their determinants as well as the causal relationship between bank efficiency and 
competition taking into consideration the heterogeneity of the Ghana’s banks. The study 
has also taken into account the time it takes for the impacts of competition and eﬃciency 
to materialize as well as its instantaneous impact (static impact). The study estimates both 
the static and dynamic models for both bank efficiency and competition. The static models 
are estimated using the fixed effect estimator (applying ordinary least squares after mean 
deviation) while the dynamic models estimation are conducted employing the GMM 
estimator (two-step system GMM). The GMM estimator includes the dynamic nature of 
bank efficiency and competition which offer valid instruments that deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity.  
 
The diagnostic tests indicate the superiority of the static model over the dynamic model in 
the case of bank pure technical efficiency. This implies the fixed-effect method is preferred 
in the case of the static pure technical efficiency model. However, the dynamic model is 
superior to the static model in the context of both bank cost efficiency and competition 
suggesting that the two-step system GMM approach is the appropriate method for the 
dynamic cost efficiency and competition models. In other words, cost efficiency and 
competition models recognize the dynamic nature of bank cost efficiency and competition 
in Ghana. Hence the analyses for the determinants of bank efficiency and competition are 
based on the superior estimation techniques. In addition, the two-step system GMM is used 
to assess the causality between bank competition and efficiency. 
 
The annual sample data for this study is an unbalanced panel which covers 25 Ghana banks 
generating 211 observations.             
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The rest of the chapter summarises the findings of the study in Section 7.2 and provides the 
policy implications in Section 7.3. Limitations of the study and future research 
recommendations are discussed in Section 7.4.     
                                                                                     
7.2 Summary of the Findings   
7.2.1 Bank Efficiency  
This study investigates the level and determining factors of bank efficiency in Ghana to 
answer research question one: 
 
How efficient are Ghanaian banks and what role have bank-specific and macroeconomic 
factors played in the variation of efficiency across Ghanaians banks? 
 
To answer the first part of research question one, the study estimates bank efficiency using 
the DEA approach. Overall, the results show relatively low average eﬃciency scores for 
Ghana’s banks during the study period, suggesting that Ghana banks are operating far from 
the efficiency frontier. This finding is attributed to underutilisation or waste of input 
resources. This implies there is much waste of valuable input resources in the Ghanaian 
banking system. However, from 2007 onwards, the results show remarkable improvement 
in the efficiency scores in Ghana banks. Thus, Ghana banks are able to control the 
underutilization and wastage of valuable input resources. Nevertheless, the results indicate 
that more effort is still required to improve Ghana banks’ performance especially in terms 
of cost efficiency.  
 
Our results also show that both pure and cost efficiencies are relatively unstable over the 
study period. The instability is easily noticeable in cost efficiency than in pure technical 
efficiency. In addition, out of 25 banks, only two banks namely GCB and BBG are able to 
remain on the bank efficiency frontiers from 2001 to 2010 and 2002 to 2010, respectively. 
This suggests that the other banks remain on the efficient frontier for a few years but fail to 
maintain their performances.  
 
The study results exhibiting low bank efficiency reflects the high operating and financial 
costs of managing a bank in Ghana. Ghana banks face challenges such as high cost of 
borrowing and high non-performing loans. Non-interest operating expenses of banks in 
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Ghana include staff costs, occupancy, publicity and advertisement, fees and commissions, 
depreciation and other administrative costs. Staff cost (comprising of salaries and wages, 
and employee benefits) accounted for 51% in 2006 compared to 49% in 2002 of the total 
non-interest operating expenses (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). Employee benefits 
continue to be the largest expense item, contributing 46 percent in 2009 and 47 percent in 
2010 of the staff cost (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). This may be due to the competitive 
remuneration to attract and retain qualified bank staff. The banks have failed to train 
sufficient qualified staff to meet their demands to help stem out the shortfalls in qualified 
bank staff in Ghana’s banking sector. In addition, Ghana banks have high level of non-
performing loans. Increased cost of funds (including higher cost of capital emanating from 
the increase in minimum regulatory capital) and high inflation rate have been identified by 
banks as factors for worsening loan default rate (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010). 
Furthermore, the banks are still saddled with the associated costs of the previous years’ 
deterioration in nonperforming loans, a reason used by many banks in order not to further 
reduce their lending rates (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011).  
 
The second part of research question one is accomplished by estimating and analysing the 
impact of bank size, capitalization, loan loss provision ratio, inflation rate and GDP growth 
rate on bank efficiency. The diagnostic tests indicate that the fixed effect estimator is 
preferred in the pure technical efficiency model while the two-step system GMM is 
considered superior in the cost efficiency model. 
 
With reference to the macroeconomic factors, the results suggest that the rate of inflation 
has a positive and significant effect on bank pure technical efficiency. Thus, Ghana banks 
are able to benefit from inflationary economic environment. GDP growth rate is significant 
and negatively related to bank cost efficiency. This shows that economic growth reduces 
the banks’ cost efficiency in Ghana’s banking sector. This is because the banks lower their 
operating standards during the boom period as a result of aggressive lending. Thus, bank 
management conduct less screening of borrowers and less monitoring of loan performance 
(lack of internal risk control) ultimately increase their non-performing loans portfolio 
(eventually it becomes more costly to monitor) and thereby become less cost efficient. On 
the contrary, GDP growth rate has no impact on pure technical efficiency while inflation 
rate has negligible effect on cost efficiency.  
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Turning to bank-specific factors, the results reveal that bank capitalization and bank size 
are significant and positively related to pure technical efficiency. This suggests that well-
capitalized and larger banks in Ghana are pure technically efficient. This could be that 
banks with higher capital are perceived to be relatively safe therefore encourages more 
deposits at lower interest expenses leading to lower total costs.  The finding also shows 
that the loan loss provision ratio has no impact on pure technical efficiency.  
 
In contrast to the results on pure technical efficiency, the findings reveal that bank 
capitalization has negative and significant effect on bank cost efficiency suggesting that 
well-capitalized banks are less cost efficient. As Ariff & Can (2008) suggest bank 
capitalization may reduce bank capital risk, but, it may also increase moral hazard 
incentives leading to increase in costs and therefore decline in bank cost efficiency. Loan 
loss provision ratio, bank size and rate of inflation, however, are not important factors in 
influencing bank cost efficiency in Ghana. 
 
The findings also show that lagged cost efficiency is an important factor in determining 
bank cost efficiency in Ghana. The lagged cost efficiency is significant and has a positive 
effect on the current year cost efficiency. This implies that bank cost efficiency tends to 
persist from year to year. Therefore, an increase in lagged cost efficiency could help 
increase the current year’s cost efficiency. The positive lagged cost efficiency may 
constitute some accumulated knowledge and technologies that may help the banks to lower 
costs. The level of bank cost efficiency is low in Ghana’s banking sector but persists from 
year to year. Policymakers should direct banks to focus on cost efficiency. 
 
7.2.2 Bank Competition  
In this study, the degree and the determining factors of bank competition in Ghana is 
investigated in order to answer research question two: 
 
Has competition in Ghana’s banking sector improved and what are the determinants of 
competition (or market power) within the industry? 
 
In order to answer the first part of research question two, we used the Lerner index to 
measure the degree of competition following recent empirical studies on bank competition 
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(Carbó et al., 2009; Casu and Girardone, 2009; Delis & Tsionas, 2009; Maudos & 
Fernandez  de  Guevara, 2007; Turk-Ariss, 2010). The study results exhibit that the value 
of the Lerner index increases from 0.343 in 2001 to 0.400 in 2010 signalling an increase in 
bank market power. The average Lerner index for the study period is 0.349. This suggests 
that the Ghanaian banking industry is weak competitively and as a result Ghana banks are 
able to set prices well above marginal cost. However, using the cross-country studies 
Maudos & Nagore (2005) find the value of the Lerner index for Ghana’s banking industry 
is 0.385 for the period from 1995 to 1999. This apparently shows that there has been some 
improvement in competition in Ghana’s banking industry underscoring the increases in 
competition during the periods from 2001 to 2002, 2004 to 2006 and 2007 to 2009. The 
results also reveal that the development in bank competition in Ghana is not regular and 
there is no noticeable steady trend towards a strong banking competition over the study 
period despite the experience of economic growth and banking reforms. 
 
Overall, the findings exhibit that both marginal costs and output price decline over the 
study period but marginal cost declines faster than the output price. This enabled banks in 
Ghana to set prices well above marginal cost over the same period. This pricing behaviour 
has helped the banks to preserve their market power. The reduction in marginal cost is 
attributed to decrease in operating and financial costs while the decline in output price is 
due to fall in lending rates in response to the decline in interest rates on government 
Treasury bill. The interest rate on Treasury bill dropped from approximately 28.9 percent 
in 2001 to 10.2 percent in 2006 (Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 2005, 2009) and from 23.7 
percent in 2009 to 12.3 percent in 2010 (Bank of Ghana Annual Report, 2011).  
 
To answer the second part of research question two, the determinants of bank competition 
is estimated and analysed. The study investigates the impact of size, capitalization, loan 
loss provision ratio, fee income (bank specific factors) and inflation rate (macroeconomic 
factor) on bank competition in Ghana. The analysis is based on the two-step system GMM 
estimation as the dynamic model appears to be more appropriate than the static model. 
 
The results show that the lagged Lerner index is positive and statistically significant 
suggesting persistence of bank market power in Ghana. This provides evidence of 
opaqueness and rigidity in Ghana’s banking industry which results in high bank operating 
and financial costs. 
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In contrast, fee income is not statistically significant and is not considered relevant in 
explaining the differences in market power in the Ghanaian banking industry. Fee income 
is not statistically significant because the banking industry in Ghana relies heavily on 
interest income (see Appendix H). This indicates that Ghana banks may still focus on their 
core activities suggesting lower level of diversification in banks’ sources of income in 
Ghana. Similarly, the coefficient of loan loss provision ratio is positive but is statistically 
insignificant and therefore has negligible influence on market power in Ghana’s banking 
industry. This suggests that loan quality has no significant role in determining bank 
competition in Ghana.  
 
In terms of the macroeconomic factors, the result reveals that the rate of inflation is 
statistically insignificant and negatively related to market power and therefore has no effect 
on bank competition.  
 
7.2.3 Causality between Bank Competition and Bank Efficiency  
To answer research question three: Does bank competition (or market power) influence 
bank efficiency and vice versa. 
 
Causality test between bank efficiency and competition is conducted using two-step system 
GMM. The causality tests results show no causality running from pure technical efﬁciency 
to bank competition and the reverse causality does not runs from bank competition to bank 
pure technical efficiency. This finding suggests lagged pure technical efficiency cannot be 
used to predict current market power and the reverse causality result indicates lagged 
market power cannot help to predict current pure technical efficiency. 
 
In addition, the results of the causal relationship between bank cost efficiency and 
competition suggest no evidence of causality running from bank competition to bank cost 
efﬁciency. However, the results show that bank cost efficiency positively Granger-causes 
market power. This indicates that an increase in the bank cost efﬁciency leads to an 
increase in the bank’s market power and hence less bank competition. The policymakers 
face trade-off. The finding suggests that policymakers in designing or promoting policies 
that enhance bank cost efficiency should be cautious since it could lead to less bank 
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competition in Ghana. This finding indicates that, in terms of causation, bank cost 
efficiency is more significant than pure technical efficiency.  
  
7.3 Policy Implications of the Study 
The financial reform in Ghana is an ongoing process. The findings of this study offer 
important implications for the bank regulators, policymakers and bank management in 
Ghana, relating to design and formulation of regulatory changes and competitive policies 
to help promote bank efficiency, financial stability and sustain economic growth.  
 
The results show that banks are inefficient in Ghana. The inefficiencies have generated 
high bank operating costs in Ghana’s banking industry. Bank management should be 
encouraged to set-up internal policies and procedures to control the wastage of valuable 
input resources. In addition, as bank risk management practices are not well-developed by 
Ghana banks, banks should strengthen their risk management practices (screening 
borrowers to reduce adverse selection and monitoring loan performance to reduce moral 
hazard problems) in order to minimize financial losses. This is because poor risk analysis 
can have a very negative effect on bank operations by exposing depositors and creditors to 
unnecessary risk which could quickly deplete bank capital and fund. Banks should also 
desist from unnecessary risk taking through aggressive lending as a means of competing 
which may increase default risk and impose heavy financial losses. These measures will 
help reduce high non-performing loans. Moreover, banks should encourage their customers 
to make use of technology in their banking transaction (e.g. ATMs, mobile banking and 
internet banking) which will reduce the workload of bank staff and hence number of staff 
and staff cost.  
 
Furthermore, banks in Ghana have failed to train sufficient qualified staff, and therefore 
the policymakers should urge the banks to train more staff to meet their demands in order 
to stem out the unrealistic increases in employees benefits in order to retain the well-
qualified staff. This will help solve the qualified bank staff retention problems responsible 
for the high bank staff turnover costs in Ghana. Banks should not resort to spending 
unnecessary as a means to retain staff. For instance, they may align or adjust their staff 
cost, particularly employees benefits to their revenue (that is, employees benefits should 
not increase disproportionately to the bank revenue).  
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Ghana banks have market power to set prices (for example, interest rates on loans and 
deposits) as indicated by the Lerner index value of 0.349 for the period 2001-2010. In 
other words, prices are not competitive. Thus, the higher their market power, the higher 
will be the cost of financial intermediation. This may negatively affect investment and 
lower economic growth. There are other ways that bank competition in Ghana can be 
improved. For example, it is difficult for customers to switch between banks because 
switching costs are high. Switching costs are fixed costs that bank customers face when 
switching banks. The higher the switching costs, the harder it will be for newer entrants to 
gain customers or cheaper existing participants to grow market share (Barry, 2010). 
Therefore, switching cost is a barrier to bank competition. Examples of `switching costs' 
include the transactions costs of closing an account with one bank and opening another 
with a competitor. The ability to switch between banks enables bank customers to react 
quickly to new, innovative or better products, which compels banks to develop better and 
more competitive products. Thus, bank switching and customer mobility are critical to 
effective competition in the banking market. Therefore policymakers could ensure 
customers’ mobility by demanding that the banks to justify the high switching costs. Thus, 
the policymakers should ask the banks to provide the underlining reasons to support high 
switching costs. 
 
In addition, many households still do not have access to ﬁnancial services such as ATMs 
and internet banking. Policymakers should persuade the banks to provide households 
greater access to ﬁnancial services at reasonable cost and convenience. Another problem is 
the unavailability of informed data on prices of services for customers. Therefore, 
policymakers should provide price information on ﬁnancial services to assist bank 
consumers to compare prices, for example, interest rates on deposit (Caessens, 2009), 
interest rates on loans, ATM withdrawal fees and cheque clearance fee. This will help bank 
customers to have access to competitive prices of financial products and services and could 
promote bank competition. However, policymakers and banks should be cautious of a 
competitive pricing, because taking from the lesson learnt from other developed countries, 
too much competition could weaken banks’ standard of evaluating borrowers. For 
example, increased competition led banks to lower lending standards in the recent 
subprime mortgage lending market in US that caused systemic financial crisis across the 
world. This led to the bankrupt of Lehman Brothers, acquisition of Bear Stearns and 
Merrill Lynch and bailed-out of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley by the U.S 
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government. These failures increased the instability in the global financial system 
resulting, for instance, the nationalization of UK bank, Northern Rock (González, 2009; 
Hall, 2008; Llewellyn, 2009). 
 
Ghana economy has enjoyed economic growth throughout the period under study. 
However, the finding of this study indicates that the GDP growth rate negatively influences 
bank cost efficiency. This suggests that banks lower their evaluation standards of 
borrowers or reduce their monitoring of loan performance during boom period. Therefore, 
regulators and policymakers should emphasize credit risk management practices. For 
instance, credit risk management involving control of adverse selection problems by 
screening loan applicants and moral hazard problems via loan performance monitoring. 
This may help them avoid unnecessary risk-taking especially during boom times in order 
to reduce their non-performing loan problems which have plagued the Ghanaian banking 
industry for a long time and therefore reduce banks’ operating costs. The non-performing 
loans pose considerable constraint to banks’ credit delivery and lending rates reduction 
(Bank of Ghana Financial Stability Report, December 2010). For instance, the non-
performing loans ratio increases from 16.2 percent in 2009 to 17.6 percent 2010  (Bank of 
Ghana Financial Stability Report, February 2011). The non-performing loans problem has 
reduced but it is still high. These policies could help promote bank cost efficiency in 
Ghana. 
 
The results reveal that bank size has a positive and significant effect on pure technical 
efficiency suggesting that increase in bank size increases pure technical efficiency. This 
means large banks appear to be more pure technically efficient than small banks in Ghana. 
This may be due to the fact that the large banks have been able to use current technology 
such as ATM networks, internet banking and the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication) system (for transacting international payments). Thus, 
improvements in technology and ﬁnancial services may lessen the costs more for large 
banks, to some extent, than for small banks. Therefore, for pure technical (managerial) 
efficiency purposes, policymakers could encourage consolidation among the small banks 
through mergers and acquisitions in order to improve pure technical efficiency. In this 
case, the policy of consolidation may allow banks through economies of scale and scope to 
better integrate technological changes. For instance, providing many ATM networks would 
have considerable effect on bank technical efficiency. Consolidation may reduce the 
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amount of personnel and, thus, reduce staff cost which is 51 percent of the Ghanaian 
banking industry’s total operating costs. However, banks cannot easily lay off staff due to 
the rigid labour market regulation in Ghana. Therefore, policymakers may have to allow 
banks the flexibility of hiring and firing. However, mergers and acquisitions may increase 
bank concentration which may lead to decrease in bank competition and increase in 
profitability. 
  
The results show that previous year’s cost efficiency (lagged cost efficiency for the cost 
efficiency model) is statistically significant and has positive effect on the current cost 
efficiency suggesting that bank cost efficiency is persistent. This implies that bank cost 
efficiency in Ghana persist from year to year. This persistence suggests that relatively cost 
efﬁcient banks tend to remain cost efﬁcient over a period of time consistent with the result 
of Staub et al. (2010) and Manlagnit (2011). This is an evidence of accumulation of 
knowledge and technologies that help the banks to lower their operating costs (see 
Ataullah & Le, 2006). The persistent cost efficiency should encourage banks to focus on 
cost efficiency in order to reduce financial and operating costs which would help them 
increase their profits. On the contrary, the results show that bank market power in Ghana 
persists from year to year. However, the persistent market power may weaken competitive 
forces and discourage innovation of financial products and services to the detriment of the 
bank customers and economy in the form of higher prices of products and services. 
Policymakers and regulators should redefine or scrap the policy of selecting and managing 
banks’ entry and exit to reduce or eliminate the persistence of the bank market power. 
 
The results also indicate that causality runs from bank cost efficiency to bank market 
power. Thus, promoting bank cost efficiency may ultimately lead to higher bank market 
power and hence less competitive environment in the banking market in Ghana since 
causality runs from bank cost efficiency to bank competition. The finding implies that any 
policy relating to bank competition should also look at the potential impact on bank cost 
efficiency. However, bank regulators and policymakers faced the choice of either reducing 
cost efficiency to reduce bank market power or increase cost efficiency to increase bank 
market power. In addition, causality running from bank cost efficiency to bank competition 
suggests that cost efficiency could serve as early indicator of the direction of bank 
competition in Ghana. Furthermore, this finding could save the government the cost of 
designing and implementing competition policies that would not have any impact on bank 
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cost efficiency. The reason is that causality runs from bank cost efficiency to bank 
competition but not vice versa. 
 
7.4 Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
This section provides some limitations of the study and recommends some corresponding 
directions for future research.  
 
The first limitation relates to the small number of banks included in the data sample. The 
small number of Ghana banks prevents this study from employing more determinant 
factors such as bank profitability, liquidity, interest rate, market share and bank 
concentration (measured by the HHI) for both bank efficiency and competition for the 
dynamic system GMM estimations. This is because increasing the determinant factors will 
increase the number of instruments in the system GMM estimation which may invalidate 
the system GMM results. The increase in the number of instruments could become large 
relative to the number of banks in the regression. This could generate too many 
instruments (over-fitting endogenous variables) in the system GMM estimations which will 
weaken the specification tests and bias the results (Roodman, 2007, 2009). Thus, when the 
instrument count is high, the Hansen test of validity of the instruments weakens (Roodman, 
2009). This could mean accepting a model as valid when the problem of endogeneity is 
partially solved.  
 
Second, this study only applies DEA to measure bank efficiency. The main drawback of 
the DEA approach is that it does not take into account the random error in the data, and 
due to the small number of observations parametric methods could not be considered 
because parametric methods require a large sample size in order to produce reliable 
estimations. Future research should consider parametric measures such as stochastic 
frontier analysis, distribution free approach and thick frontier approach to examine the 
level of bank efficiency in Ghana in order to optimise the efficiency results. Unlike the 
DEA where any deviation from the efficiency frontier is attributed to inefficiency, these 
methods incorporate the error term into the efficiency estimation and separate inefficiency 
from random errors. In terms of bank competition, the use of other approaches such as H-
statistic and Boone indicator should be considered for comparison purposes since the 
determination of competition may differ depending on the approach chosen. This is 
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because the various competition indicators measure different things (Carbo et al., 2005). 
Using these other measures would establish the robustness of the estimated levels of bank 
efficiency as well as the degree of bank competition in Ghana. 
 
Third, technical and cost efficiency may be inadequate to draw conclusions on banks’ 
overall performance. Technical efficiency is the ability of a firm (bank) to obtain a 
maximum set of output from a given set of inputs and cost efficiency measures how close a 
bank’s cost is to the minimal cost (or best practice bank’s cost) for producing a certain 
level of output with given input prices and technology. Profit efficiency, on the other hand, 
takes into consideration both cost and revenue efficiency. Profit efficiency is based on the 
economic goal of profit maximisation. The objective of proﬁt maximization not only 
requires goods and services to be produced at a minimum cost, it also demands the 
maximization of revenues. Profit efficiency essentially captures the efficiencies (or 
inefficiencies) on the input side as well as the output side. Computing proﬁt efﬁciency, 
therefore, constitutes a more important source of information for bank management. 
Therefore, investigating the profit efficiency of Ghana banks would enrich the banking 
literature. To avoid ignoring the possibility of inefﬁciencies on the revenue side, future 
research should also include profit efficiency.  
 
Fourth, this study examines the causality between bank efficiency and competition without 
incorporating any other factors such as bank capitalization, size, non-performing loans and 
the GDP growth rate in the models. The relationship between market power and efficiency 
might be more complex (Casu & Girardone, 2009) and that other explanatory variables 
such as bank size, non-performing loans, GDP growth rate and capitalization may impact 
both the magnitude and the direction of the causality and therefore should be considered in 
the future research.  
 
Finally, this study only examines Ghana’s banking industry and we suggest that future 
research study could use cross-country studies including other African states such as 
Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda which have also undertaken similar 
financial reforms. Such a study may provide useful information about cross-country 
comparison of bank efficiency and competition in other countries with banks in Ghana. 
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     Appendix A: Variance Inflation Factor Results 
Table A. 1 Variance Inflation Factor - Efficiency 
Variable VIF 1/VIF (Tolerance) 
Size 1.22 0.8206 
Inflation 1.16 0.8652 
GDP growth 1.10 0.9100 
Capitalization 1.09  0.9148 
Loan loss provision 1.03 0.9666 
Mean VIF 1.12  
Note: PTE or CE is the dependent variable. VIF stands for Variance inflation factor. 
 
 
 
Table A. 2 Variance Inflation Factor – Lerner 
Variable VIF 1/VIF (Tolerance) 
Size 1.19 0.8431 
Inflation 1.13 0.8864 
Fee income 1.11 0.9024 
Capitalization 1.03 0.9754 
Loan loss provision 1.03 0.9755 
Mean VIF 1.09  
Note: LERNER is the dependent variable. VIF stands for Variance inflation factor. 
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     Appendix B: Summary Statistic of Bank Specific Factors 
Table B.1 Summary Statistic of Bank Specific Factors: 2001-2010 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Size 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
10.486 
 
 
1.474 
 
10.859 
 
 
1.290 
 
11.268 
 
 
1.179 
 
11.563 
 
 
1.085 
 
11.502 
 
 
1.248 
 
11.835 
 
 
1.124 
 
12.287 
 
 
0.995 
 
12.479 
 
 
1.218 
 
12.797 
 
 
1.117 
 
13.152 
 
 
0.858 
LLP 
Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
 
0.100 
 
 
0.094 
 
0.122 
 
 
0.111 
 
0.116 
 
 
0.088 
 
0.097 
 
 
0.063 
 
0.086 
 
 
0.063 
 
0.067 
 
 
0.046 
 
0.066 
 
 
0.067 
 
0.059 
 
 
0.058 
 
0.082 
 
 
0.071 
 
0.106 
 
 
0.130 
CAP 
Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
 
0.134 
 
 
0.073 
 
0.104 
 
 
0.075 
 
0.097 
 
 
0.074 
 
0.119 
 
 
0.043 
 
0.192 
 
 
0.232 
 
0.140 
 
 
0.076 
 
0.103 
 
 
0.045 
 
0.143 
 
 
0.153 
 
0.152 
 
 
0.110 
 
0.158 
 
 
0.091 
FEE 
Mean  
Standard 
Deviation 
 
0.240 
 
 
0.067 
 
0.327 
 
 
0.106 
 
0.288 
 
 
0.091 
 
0.298 
 
 
0.091 
 
0.256 
 
 
0.108 
 
0.259 
 
 
0.090 
 
0.280 
 
 
0.086 
 
0.238 
 
 
0.109 
 
0.238 
 
 
0.091 
 
0.235 
 
 
0.090 
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     Appendix C: Pagan and Hall Heteroscadasticity Test 
Table C.1 Pagan and Hall Heteroscadasticity Test 
 χ2-statistic P-value 
Ho: error is homoskedastic   
PTE 22.098 0.0047 
CE 18.019 0.0211 
LERNER 17.041 0.0297 
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     Appendix D: Efficient Frontier for GCB and BBG 
Table D.1 Efficient Frontier for GCB and BBG (2001-2010) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
PTE:           
GCB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BBG 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CE:           
GCB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BBG 0.69 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Notes: GCB and BBG stand for Ghana Commercial Bank and Barclays Bank of Ghana 
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     Appendix E: Structure of the Banking Industry in Ghana 
Figure E. Structure of the Banking Industry in Ghana (2010) 
 
 
1. Access Bank  (not included in this study)                                           Rural Banks (135) 
2. Agricultural Development Bank 
3. Amalgamated Bank   (now Bank of Africa)                                                                                    
4. Bank of Baroda 
5. Barclays Bank 
6. Banque Sahélo-Saharienne pour I’Investissement et le Commerce Limited (BSIC) 
7. CAL Bank 
8. Ecobank 
9. Energy Bank (not included in this study) 
10. Fidelity Bank 
11. First Atlantic Merchant Bank 
12. Ghana Commercial Bank 
13. Guaranty Trust Bank 
14. HFC Bank 
15. Intercontinental Bank 
16. International Commercial Bank 
17. Merchant Bank 
18. National Investment Bank 
19. Prudential Bank 
20. SG-SBB Bank 
21 Stanbic Bank 
22. Standard Chartered bank 
23. The Trust Bank 
24. UniBank 
25. UT Bank  
26. United Bank for Africa  
27. Zenith Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank of Ghana 
Universal Banks ARB Apex Bank 
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     Appendix F: The List of the Banks used in this Study 
Table F. List of the Banks used in this Study 
Agricultural Development Bank International Commercial Bank 
Amalgamated Bank (now Bank of Africa) Merchant Bank 
Bank of Baroda National Investment Bank 
Banque Sahélo-Saharienne pour I’Investissement et le 
Commerce Limited (BSIC) 
Prudential Bank 
SG-SBB 
Barclays Bank Stanbic Bank 
CAL Merchant Bank 
Ecobank 
Fidelity Bank 
First Atlantic Merchant Bank 
Standard Chartered Bank 
The Trust Bank 
Unibank 
United Bank of Africa 
Ghana Commercial Bank 
Guaranty Trust Bank 
UT Bank 
Zenith Bank 
HFC Bank  
Intercontinental Bank   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  158 
     Appendix G: Non-Performing Loans: Compare Ghana to Other 
Countries 
 
Figure 7.1 Non-Performing Loans: Compare Ghana to Other Countries 
 
Source: TheGlobaleconomy.com 
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     Appendix H: Fee Income versus Interest Income 
Table G. Fee Income versus Interest Income (as a Percentage of Total Income) 
 
Year Fee Income Interest income 
2001  14.7 77.6 
2002 21.1 67.0 
2003 19.3 71.3 
2004 21.0 70.0 
2005 20.5 71.0 
2006 20.7 71.6 
2007 21.5 70.9 
2008 17.8 69.6 
2009 14.8 74.1 
2010 14.9 78.0  
Source: Bank of Ghana  
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     Appendix I: Interest Rate Spread 
Table H. Interest Rate Spread 
Year Interest Rate Spread 
2001 14.2 
2002 15.4 
2003 11.7 
2004 13.2 
2005 10.8 
2006 10.2 
2007 8.4 
2008 8.6 
2009 9.1 
2010 11.1 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
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     Appendix J: Cost-Income Ratio 
Table I. Cost–Income Ratio 
Year Cost-Income Ratio 
2001 40.2 
2002 59.0 
2003 63.9 
2004 63.5 
2005 67.4 
2006 67.0 
2007 62.5 
2008 64.8 
2009 62.8 
2010 58.5 
Source: Bank of Ghana  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  162 
     Appendix K: Concept of Efficiency 
1. The Concept of Efficiency 
 
The concept of efficiency is employed to characterise the use of resources within a unit or 
units within an industry or sector. Efficiency is the performance of units transforming 
inputs into outputs (Forsund & Hjalmarsson, 1974). The efficiency measurement was first 
pioneered by Farrell (1957) based on the work of Koopmans (1951) and Debreu (1951). 
According to Farrell (1957), the concept of efficiency measurement has two components: 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Farrell (1957) defined technical efficiency as 
the ability of a firm to obtain a maximum set of output from a given set of inputs and 
allocative efficiency as the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions for the 
given prices. The combination of these two measures produces a measure of overall 
economic or cost efficiency. Farrell (1957) adopted input reducing focus or input-oriented 
measure as opposed to output-oriented measure.  
 
1.1  Input-Oriented Technical and Cost Efficiencies 
 
The concept of efficiency based on input-oriented measure under constant returns to scale 
is illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2.  Input-Oriented Technical and Cost Efficiencies 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
              
Consider a bank is using only two inputs x1 and x2 to produce a single output y at point P 
under constant returns to scale. SSis the production function or frontier which indicates all 
P 
S 
A 
x2/y 
x1/y 
Q 
R 
O 
S 
Q 
A 
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efficient combination of x1 and x2. Any bank operating on SS is considered technically 
efficient. For example, point Q is technically efficient because it lies on the efficient 
isoquant SS. Given that the bank produces at the point P implies it is technically 
inefficient, since by producing at point Q, it could produce the same output with fewer 
inputs. The technical inefficiency of the bank could be represented by the distance QP. 
This is expressed by ratio QP/OP, which means that all inputs could be proportioally 
reduced without a reduction in outputs. Therefore the bank’s technical efficiency (TE) is 
given by the ratio:  
 
TE = OQ/OP       which is equal to 1- QP/OP                                                       (A.1)                     
 
Technical efficiency scores vary between zero and one. A value of one shows that the bank 
is technically efficient. On the other hand, a bank is described as technically inefficient if 
its efficiency score is less than one. Thus, a value closer to one shows that the level of 
output of the bank for a given level of input is closer to technically efficient point whereas 
a value nearer to zero suggests that the level of output is nearer to the most technically 
inefficient point for a given level of input. 
 
If input prices are known and represented by the line AA (isocost) in Figure 7.2, then a 
bank is allocatively inefficient for producing at point P, because it has chosen incorrect 
combination of inputs at the given prices. The point R is allocativelly efficient but 
technically inefficient. Then the allocative efficiency (AE) of the bank operating at point P 
could be calculated as: 
 
AE = OR/OQ                                                                                                      (A.2) 
 
Thus, the point Q  in Figure 7.2 is the minimum cost combination of x1 and x2 on the 
efficient isoquant SS. If a bank operates at the point Q which is allocativelly and 
technically efficient instead of point Q, which is technically efficient but allocativelly 
inefficient, then the production cost could be reduced by the distance RQ. The distance RQ 
represents the reduction in production cost that would occur if production were to occur at 
the the allocativelly and technically efficient point Q 
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The economic or cost efficiency (CE) is defined by the ratio:  
 
CE = OR/OP                                                                                                        (A.3) 
 
which is equal to the product of technical and allocative efficiency. Thus, 
 
TE x AE = (OQ/OP) x (OR/OQ) = (OR/OP) = CE 
 
Again, economic or cost efficiency scores vary between the value zero and one. A value 
closer to one suggests that the level of output of the bank for a given level of input is closer 
to cost efficient point while value closer to zero indicates that the level of output is closer 
to the most inefficient point for a given level of input. The value of cost efficiency must be 
equal to one for a bank to be declared cost efficient, which implies the bank is both 
technically and allocativelly efficient. The input-oriented technical efficiency measure 
addresses the concern of how much reduction in input quantities is possible in order to 
produce a given level of output. On the other hand, one can also address the concern with 
how much can output quantities be proportionally increased without changing the input 
quantities used. This is an output-oriented measure. 
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     Appendix L: Summary Statistics of the Determinant Factors of Bank 
Competition in Ghana 
 
Table J. Summary Statistics of the Determinant Factors of Bank Competition in 
Ghana (2001-2010) 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
SIZE 211 11,935 1.388 7,910 14,560 
INF 211 0.164 0.067 0.102 0.329 
LLP 211 0.088 0.084 0.000 0.640 
GDPG 211 0.057 0.012 0.045 0.084 
CAP 211 0.136 0.113 -0.150 0.980 
FEE 211 0.268 0.096 0.000 0.554 
 
Notes: INF, LLP, GDPG, CAP, FEE are expressed in ratios, size is in million cedis. 
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     Appendix M: Asset and Liability Structures of Ghana’s Banking 
Sector 
 
Table K.  Assets and Liability Structures of Ghana’s Banking Sector (2001-2010) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A           
Cash and Due 
from Banks 
25.2 28.9 29.5 27.0 20.7 23.5 23.3 25.2 26.3 25.3 
Investments 28.0 31.7 27.7 27.7 26.9 23.3 17.6 14.5 21.3 26.5 
Net Advances 37.7 30.4 35.2 35.6 43.0 45.0 50.3 52.3 43.8 40.1 
Other assets 5.7 5.7 4.8 6.3 6.5 5.2 5.7 4.7 5.4 5.2 
Fixed Assets 3.4 3.3 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.9 
Panel B           
Total deposits 58.3 60.0 62.7 64.2 64.8 55.2 63.0 65.0 63.9 67.9 
Total 
borrowings 
8.4 7.5 8.0 7.4 9.0 11.3 13.5 12.7 13.3 10.8 
Other 
Liabilities 
19.5 19.0 16.7 15.5 13.4 10.7 12.2 11.8 9.8 7.4 
Shareholders’ 
Funds 
13.1 12.6 12.5 12.6 12.8 11.7 10.3 10.4 12.6 13.3 
Source: Bank of Ghana. 
Notes: Panel A represents components of assets as a percentage of total assets. Panel B represents 
components of liabilities as a percentage of total liabilities 
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     Appendix N: Selected Indicators of Ghana’s Banking Sector 
 
Table L.  Selected Indicators of Ghana’s Banking Sector 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Loan to 
Deposits 
74.2 62.0 66.5 63.8 75.1 74.5 84.4 85.9 77.1 67.7 
Loan to 
deposits+ 
Borrowings 
64.9 55.1 59.0 57.1 66.0 63.5 69.5 71.8 63.8 58.4 
Investments 
to deposits 
48.0 52.8 44.3 43.1 41.5 35.7 27.9 22.3 33.3 38.9 
NPL ratio 19.6 22.7 18.3 16.1 13.0 7.9 6.9 7.7 14.9 17.6 
Loan 
provision to 
Gross loan 
10.0 13.5 11.4 9.3 8.5 5.8 4.7 5.1 9.4 9.4 
Market share 
(Top 5) 
NA NA 70 66 61 58 56 52 50 4.5 
Herfindahl 
Index 
NA NA 1141 1066 961 871 838 744 693 600 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
Notes: All the data are expressed in percentages. NA means not available. 
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